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ICES 2015 International Conference 
 
Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University 
 
 
Asian Economy at the Crossroad: 
China, India, and ASEAN 
 
It is very clear today that rising Chinese economy as well as ASEAN and Indian economies can 
change not only the system of the world economy but also the world economic history. Japan has 
very long and intimate historical relations with China, India and ASEAN as the most important 
neighbors. So it is quite natural for us to make a comparison of China, Japan, India and ASEAN. It is 
very much delightful to get Chinese, Indian, Vietnam and Japanese together and to discuss frankly 
the future of Asian economy. 
  
Supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research and Hosei University fund for Research Institute, 
ICES (Institute of Comparative Economic Studies) has held several international workshops and 
conferences since 2008. The 2015 ICES International Conference takes place from November 14th to 
November 15th 2015 at Hosei University, Tokyo, Japan. 
 
Venue:  
Boisonnade Tower Fl. 19, Meeting Room D, Boissonade Tower, Ichigaya Campus, 
Hosei University, 2-17-1 Fujimi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 102-8160 JAPAN 
Language: English 
Coordinators: 
Hideki ESHO (Professor, Faculty of Economics, Hosei University)   
Peng XU (Professor and Director of ICES, Hosei University) 
Contact:  
(Mr.) Naoki Sekiguchi (ICES, Hosei University) 
TEL：042-783-2330 ; Email：ices@adm.hosei.ac.jp 
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Program  
 
14th November, 2015 
 
Opening Address 10:00-10:05 
 
Peng XU, Hosei University, Japan 
 
Session 1 10:05-12:35 
 
“Political Relation, Bilateral Trade and Economic Power: Evidence from East Asia” 
Hongzhong LIU, Liaoning University, China 
 
“China's Competitiveness in Promoting Free Trade”  
Akiko TAMURA and Peng XU, Hosei University, Japan 
 
Lunch 12:35 – 13:35 
 
Session 2 13:35-16:05 
 
“The Quality of Distance: Quality sorting, Alchian-Allen Effect, and Geography”  
Kazutaka TAKECHI, Hosei University, Japan 
 
“Japanese and Chinese Models of Industrial Organization: Fighting for Supremacy in the 
Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry”  
Mai FUJITA, IDE-JETRO, Japan 
 
Coffee Break 16:05-16:30  
 
Session 3 16:30-17:45 
 
“Vietnam's Trade Integration with ASEAN+3: Trade Flow Indicators Approach” 
 Nguyen Anh THU, VNU University of Economics and Business, Vietnam 
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Reception 18:30-21:00  
 
Hotel Metropolitan Edmont Tokyo  
 
 
15th November, 2015 
 
Session 4 10:00-12:30 
 
“Development of the ICT industry of India and Its Activities in ASEAN”  
K. J. JOSEPH, Centre for Development Studies, India 
 
"Business Environment for ‘Make in India’ by Japanese Firms"  
Takahiro SATO, Kobe University, Japan 
 
Lunch 12:30 – 13:30 
 
Session 5 13:30-16:00 
 
"Identifying Competition Neutrality of SOEs in China”  
Mariko WATANABE, Gakushuin University, Japan 
 
"Industrial Location and Agglomeration Economies for Enhancing Innovation"  
Akio KONDO, Hosei University, Japan 
 
Invited Discussants 
Prof. Etsuro ISHIGAMI (Fukuoka University) 
Prof. Tomoo MARUKAWA (University of Tokyo) 
Prof. Atsushi KATO (Aoyama Gakuin University) 
 
Coffee Break 16:00-16:20 
 
Wrap-up 16:20-16:30 
 
Hideki ESHO, Hosei University, Japan 
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Political Relations, Economic Power, and Trade Flows: 
Evidence from East Asia 
 
Hongzhong Liu, Gongyan Yang① 
 
Abstract 
There are conflicting views on the impact of political conflict on economic relations from the 
literature of international political economics. We use quarterly data to investigate the effects of 
political relation on export flows between China and certain countries in East Asia from 1980 to 
2013 while controlling the role of the economic power of China. The results suggest that the 
political relations between China and East Asia countries impact their trade volume significantly 
which supports the traditional view of "trade following flag". We also find that China’s economic 
power decreases the impact of political relations on the bilateral trades. However, the interaction  
among political relations, trade flows, and China economic power varies for the periods before 
and after the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
Key words: Political Relation; Trade Flow; Economic Power; Fixed Effects  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
① Hongzhong Liu, Dean, Professor of School of International Studies, Liaoning University, China; Address: No. 
58, Daoyi South Street, Shenbei New District，Shenyang，China，110136; Mobile: (+86)130-7921-6833; Email: 
hongzhongliu@126.com; Gongyan Yang, Lecturer of International Studies, Liaoning University, China; Mobile: 
(+86)150-4007-7379; Email: ygy85@163.com. 
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1. Introduction  
Early in 1940s, Hirschman (1945) found that bilateral trade flows of Nazi German, before World 
War Ⅱ were directed by its political purpose from rich countries to its weak neighbors, such as 
Bulgaria and Romania①. The paper indicated that political factors strongly influenced the bilateral 
trade volume of Nazi Germany. Galtung (1971) contributes the Center-Periphery Theory by 
indicating that trade volume between center and periphery countries is usually determined by the 
political relationship of dominating and dominated counties. Gilpin (2006) claims that political 
ambition and the competition of each country set the framework in which market and economic 
force work. Starting from the 1990s, an increasing amount of literature began to investigate the 
relationship between politics and trade by examining the conclusions of previous research from 
different perspectives. The literature can be divided into three groups. 
 
The first group is from the perspective of the special political relationship of colonies and 
suzerains and their heavy bilateral trade volumes. The perspective is introduced by Yeats (1990). 
The paper analyzes the impact of politics on traded goods price by taking 20 former French 
colonies and by analyzing the commodity import of each country from France between 1962 and 
1987. The result suggests that the former colonial countries pay a higher price (about 20-30%) 
higher than non-colonial trading partners do. The conclusions also hold true for the former 
colonial countries of UK, Portugal and Belgium. Some studies deal with the political effect from 
the perspective of trade volume. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) find the trade volume among 
colonial countries in a same imperial system is twice amount of the trade volume of the countries 
not in the imperial system because of a lower trade cost within the system. From the perspective of 
time dimension, Head, Mayer and Ries (2010) study the impact of independence of colonial 
countries from their suzerains on the trade volume. The results show the impact of independence 
of colonial countries is not significant in a short term. However, in the following three decades, 
the trade volume among the colonies and the suzerains declined by 60%. All the studies above 
suggest that political factors influence international trade. However, numerical effect of political 
factors has not been measured accurately in the existing literature. 
                                                        
① Germany is a large country, which play a dominant role in the trade with small countries. The asymmetry in the 
economic status makes its geopolitical dominance position. On the contrary, the political power of Germany does 
not have big impact on trade with Europe and the United States and other rich countries. 
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Secondly, many studies focus on the impact of military conflict on economic and trade behaviors 
for a long historical period. The results are mixed. There are some studies showing that military 
conflict impacts trade volume reversely (Omar etc, 2004; Oneal etc, 2003). There are some 
researches questioning this conclusion by arguing that expectation is not taken into account. 
Morrow (1999) claims that counties should foresee wars that might happen in the future so that 
they would adjust trade partner and trade flow gradually in advance when facing the risk of a 
potential war. As a consequence, the impact of war on trade could be very little. Even though Li 
and Sacko (2002) point out that an unexpected conflict may have a negative effect on trade. 
Oneal(2003) argues more factors should be considered in the study of impact of war on trade, such 
as characteristics of wars, because wars differ in scale and duration in the history. The study shows 
that the impact of the war on trade is severe when the war is caused by trade conflict, which is not 
agreed by Barbieri and Levy (1999) and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000). They argue that wars 
do not affect trade in general. Only for a short period, does war occasionally reduce trade volume 
between the two sides at war. In the long run after war, the bilateral trade would resume. Moreover, 
trade volume would even exceed the past. 
 
With historical data from the 18th century to the middle of the 20th century, Rahman (2007) 
examines the role of the naval supremacy in international trade. This research concludes that naval 
warfare reduces trade volume between the maritime powers and non-allied countries, however, 
increases trade volume among allies. Anderton and Carter (2010) and Glick and Taylor (2010) 
estimate the trade cost caused by wars in long history from 1870 to 1990. They find that wars 
significantly reduce bilateral trade volumes and the influence could last for many years. The 
conclusion is contradicted with Barbieri and Levy（1999）. They find that the wars reversely 
impact trade not only for the involved countries, but also for the neutral countries. As stated above, 
the related studies never agree with each other. Also, the military conflict can be only seen as an 
extreme political event. Even in peacetime, status for political relationship among countries varies. 
To our knowledge, there is no research so far using comprehensive measurement to analyze the 
impact of political relations on international economics and trade relations. 
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There is another group of studies concerning the impacts of political relations deterioration on 
economic and trade relations. Many studies show that the deterioration of the political relations 
brings adverse effect on economic and trade exchanges. Pollins (1989) finds that countries are 
more willing to establish closer trade relation with political allies. In the meantime, Morrow, 
Gowa and Mansfield (2004) point out that a country tends to trade with its allies or countries that 
have the same allies. “Trade follows flag” is supported by the studies. Reuveny and Kang (1998) 
further supplement it with an idea that the impact of political confrontation is asymmetric in 
tradable goods. Strategic commodities suffer more from political confrontation than general 
products. By contrast, Omar, Pollins and Reuveny (2004) show there is no significant correlation 
between them. Focusing on this argument, scholars have made more extensive empirical test by 
taking a specific country as the object of study (United States, Japan and China). 
 
Gupta and Yu (2009) show that political factor is significant enough to explain the U.S. foreign 
trade. The deterioration of bilateral political relations leads to a significant decline in the trade 
volume between the United States and its trade partners. The study takes the Iraq War as an 
instrumental variable to have further tests. However, this result is contradicted by Davis and 
Meunier (2001). They extend Gupta and Yu (2009). They use the trade data of the United States 
and Japan from 1990 to 2004 and find that political relations deterioration does not damage 
bilateral trade relations. For the robustness checks, they further test the impact of 2002 Iraq war 
which caused the U.S. and France political deadlock on the trade between the U.S. and France, 
and the impact of Ryutaro Hashimoto’s visit in 1996 which caused the tension of Sino-Japan 
political relations on the trade between China and Japan. The results show the results are robust. 
However, the above results seem not to agree with the popular phrase of “Hot Economics, Cold 
Politics” in the field of political and economic field, which is due to the different time spans and 
different choices of variables of political relations. Further studies begin to search for evidence 
from the micro field. Govella and Newland (2011) and Hamao and Wang (2014) test the phrase of 
“Hot Economics and Cold Politics” between China and Japan from micro perspective. They claim 
that the impacts of the politics on different types of enterprises vary. Fuchs and Klann (2013) 
examine the economic consequence of the sensitive political event, Dalai Lama's visit. They find 
that the occurrence of Dalai Lama's visit significantly reduces exports from the visited country to 
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China. The impact is more significant from 2002 to 2008. Davis, Fuchs and Johnson（2014）further 
point out that compared to private enterprises, the imports by state-owned enterprises are more 
sensitive to the change of political relations. 
 
Chinese scholars had more extensive discussions on economic and political interaction on China 
and Japan. Before the 2008 financial crisis, people all agree on describing China Japan relation as 
“Hot Economics and Cold Politics”. Liu (2006) discusses the root of “cold politics and hot 
economy” between China and Japan from three perspectives: the impact of the changes on 
international environment and Japan’s policy on China, Japanese political right deviation 
development and the balance of power changes, and misleading of wrong strategic thought and 
misjudgment of national interests. Zhu (2006) analyzes this problem from the perspective of 
Japan's domestic political requirement. Feng (2006) points out that the situation is experiencing 
new change. The long-term “cold politics” changes the “hot economy” into “cool economy”. The 
Sino-Japanese relation has been at a crossroad. This assertion is subsequently confirmed. The 
“collision” event in 2010 and the malicious “buy island” event in 2012 make the Sino-Japanese 
relation fall off a cliff. Xu and Chen (2014) empirically test the impact of political tension between 
China and Japan from 2002 to 2012 on their bilateral trade. The result shows that the impact of the 
Sino-Japanese political tension experienced three stages during the ten years, i.e., weak, no 
influence and significant influence that changes “cold politics and hot economy” to “cold politics 
and cold economy”. In addition, they further quantify the gains and losses from the Sino-Japanese 
conflict for both China and Japan. It is estimated that the loss of export from China to Japan in 
2012 is about 31.5 billion. Japan's loss is about 20 percentage higher than China. Jiang (2014) 
claims that since the normalization of diplomatic relation, the Sino-Japanese relation has been 
devided into four stages, “hot politics and cold economy”, “hot politics and hot economy”, “cold 
politics and hot economy”, and “cold politics and cold economy”. The research analyzes the origin 
and background of the tendency of vicious circle in East Asian cooperation and Sino-Japanese 
relation interaction and puts forward the direction of China's effort. 
 
To sum up, the existing literature analyzes the impact of politics on bilateral trade from three 
perspectives: colony and suzerain, war and negative political event. There is no consensus so far. 
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Some potential problems exist. 
 
First, in most studies, the political relation between two countries is measured by colony, war and 
political conflict, all of which are categorical either 1 or 0. The event study method adopted by 
most studies is limited because only extreme manifestation of deterioration of the political 
relations is considered. For most of time is peacetime throughout the history, the impact of the 
continuous change of bilateral political relations on economic and trade relations is still 
unambiguous. Especially in the era of global economic integration, the conflict between countries 
is often in the form of “fighting without breaking”. Among the major powers, a direct military 
conflict is almost hard to find. Gradual change of bilateral political relations becomes common. So 
the impact of gradual change of political relations on international trade is a gap between the 
academic works and the real world. In addition, the change of political relations includes two 
cases, deterioration and improvement. They are not simple inverse process of each other. When a 
war or negative political event is included as explanatory variable, it only reveals the economic 
consequence resulted from the deterioration of political relations. The effect of the improvement 
of political relations between two countries on trade is neglected in literature. 
 
Second, based on the linear relationship of political and economic variables, the conclusion of 
“cold politics and hot economy” or “cold politics and cold economy” does not consider the 
external environment and constraints, especially the asymmetric dependence due to the shift in 
country’s economic powers in the era of globalization. Therefore, this may cover up special 
features during the era of power transition (Huang, 2012) and may make it difficult to dig into the 
logic behind the story. Findlay and O’Rourke (2007) claim that state power and influence 
constantly shape the structure and form of international trade. In the era of globalization, the trend 
of economic and political interaction and integration is increasingly apparent, and economic 
power increasingly becomes a basic source of state power and an important part of comprehensive 
national strength (Ma and Feng, 2014). But state power (especially economic power) has not been 
considered in most previous studies. Most literature focuses on hegemonic countries (especially 
the United States) or colony suzerain. The rising emerging countries gain less attention. As for the 
hegemony country, its economic power keeps relatively stable in the short term compared to its 
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trade partners. However, with the rise of the emerging economies, we are experiencing the transfer 
of world economic gravity and economic power. With the continual economic growth in emerging 
powers and the continual changes in economic powers of countries, will the results on the impact 
of the bilateral political relations on international trade be different from what is already known? 
The existing literature cannot give an answer. 
 
Third, after the global financial crisis, there are more studies on China. Fuchs and Klann (2013) 
use time series approach to discuss the economic consequences of the political deadlock between 
China and Japan. But more research needs to be done on examining the general rules of economic 
and political interaction between them using panel data approach. East Asia has become the most 
dynamic economic region in the world. The economic integration based on market force continues 
to expand, and the trade exchange between China and the other East Asian countries is 
increasingly close. At the same time, the territorial dispute among countries and the debate around 
the historical issues bring the risk of tense political situation and conflict. Politics and economy 
are closely and intricately intertwined. With the rise of China and the transformation of 
international power structure, what will happen to the relationship between politics and economy 
among China and other East Asian countries? This question has not received much attention from 
both theoretical and empirical worlds yet. 
2 Model specification and data  
 
With what have been found by the previous studies, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of 
intra-East Asia political relations on the trade between China and East Asian countries. Instead of 
using categorical variables to denote events of political relations, we use a new numerical 
measurement for the political relations. We take China as our stand to look for a general rule of 
East Asian political relations and trade flows. We incorporate China’s emergence and economic 
power transference which are often neglected by existing literature into our model to examine the 
effect of China’s rising power on the results. We divide the sample by dimensions of country and 
time to do the robustness check. 
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2.1 Measuring model building 
 
Since long term period is required by political relations to influence trade among countries, our 
sample period covers 33 years from 1980 to 2013 in our empirical analysis. Quarterly data is used 
which gives higher frequency than annual data. Our sample includes five East Asian countries.① 
Following Anderson (1979) and Davis, Fuchs and Johson(2014), the basic empirical model is 
specified as follows: 
 
1 , 1 ,2 ,, 0  i t i t i ii ttEconomic Flows Political Relations X             （1） 
 
i stands for trade partner country of China, and t denotes time. The panel regression includes 
five countries for 33 quarters which generates a total of 165 observations in our sample set. The 
dependent variable Economic Flowsi,t is measured by total trade volume between country i and 
China during time t. The core explanatory variable Political Relationsi,t-1 represents the political 
relations between country i and China during lag time period t－1. To avoid the endogeneity 
problem, all explained variables lag one phase. To be consistent with the related literature, Xi,t 
includes several control variables, such as country i’s GDP per capita, inflation, exchange rate and 
country risk. These factors significantly affect bilateral trade volume. i stands for unobservable 
element relevant to country i. ԑi,t is the random perturbed variable. 
 
As stated above, political relation has a significant impact on trade between countries. However, 
the shift in economic power also influences trade simultaneously. The two forces interact with 
each other to affect trade volume between countries. Therefore, we expand the basic model by 
including explanatory variable China’s economic power (Economic Poweri,t-1) to examine direct 
impact of the increase of China’s economic power on bilateral trade. Besides direct effect, there is 
also potential indirect effect. With the rising economic power, it plays a role of hedging against 
risk and further changes the sensitivity of trade flows to political relations. Same change in the 
                                                        
① Availability of data is always a concern for empirical studies. Five countries, i.e., Japan, Korea, Indonesia, India, 
and Vietnam, are chosen in the database “Great Power Relationship”. The above countries are the most influential 
countries in the region. 
13 
 
level of political relations (deterioration) may result in a change of trade volume (decrease). The 
enhancement of interdependence of two countries is a hedge against negative impact on trade. 
Finally, a cross term of China’s economic power and political relations (Political 
Relationsi,t-1×Economic Poweri,t-1) is included into the basic model. This empirical structure listed 
below can be used to accurately examine the change of correlation coefficient of political relations 
and economic and trade flows when economic power changes. 
 
, 0 , 1 , 1
, 1 ,
1 2
3
,,
1
4
   
  
i t i t i t
i t i t
ii it t
Economic Flows Political Relations Power
Political Relations Pow
Econ
er
omic
Economic
X
  

  
 
 

 

 


  (2) 
2.2 Data and variable specification 
 
The explained variable Economic Flows is measured by the log transformation of the trade volume 
between China and country i in dollar terms. The quarterly trade volume data is obtained by 
summing the monthly value up from CEIC database. All data is based on China’s statistical caliber, 
which is China’s import from partners and export to partners. For the core explained variable 
Political Relations, this paper uses the data of political relations between China and other 
countries from Great Power Relationship Database generated by Tsinghua University, which 
provides quantitative index for the measurements of China’s bilateral relation with multiple 
countries since 1950 with a scale of -9 to 9. The higher the index is, the better the political 
relations between two countries are. This continuous numerical index helps to avoid discrepancy 
between event value and actual relationship① which distinguishes the current paper from previous 
studies in this issue.  
 
There is no clear definition of Economic Power so far. Morgenthau(2006) suggests that the 
constitute state power includes geographic factor, natural resources, industrial capacity, war 
                                                        
① According to the instructions of Great Power Relationship Database, the basic thought is that the bilateral 
relationship is constituted by many events. These events form a “event flow” with time going by. The measurement 
of bilateral relationship needs to consider two dimensions, event accumulation and event flow, that is, to 
accumulate event influence is the starting point of our measurement. The measurement of influence change with 
time going by is the process. The status quo of bilateral relationship is the end. About the detailed introduction of 
the database, see http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/iis/7522/index.html. 
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preparedness, population, national character, national morale, diplomatic skills, political strategy 
etc.① Among all these factors, the factors associated to a country’s economy such as industrial 
capacity constitute the basis of the country’s economic power. Therefore, economic power can be 
interpreted as a country’s ability to influence other countries by using its economic power during 
political and economic exchanges. It exists because of the asymmetric interdependence among 
countries. Whalley (2009）states that economic power is closely related to relative scale. It endows 
the country with the ability to influence other countries based on domestic market, to persuade or 
force other countries to act according to its will. Keohane（2001）claims that keeping a specific 
country from entering into its own country and allowing other countries to enter are powerful and 
historically important economic power weapons (Mckeown, 1983). In contrast, making the other 
side compromise or obey and opening your own huge domestic market may be an effective way to 
exert influence. The larger the domestic market is, the stronger a countries’ potential economic 
power is. According the studies cited above, we draw a conclusion that economic power mainly 
stems from a country’s total economic amount and market scale. Based on this, indicator China’s 
Economic Poweri,t-1 is measured by the proportion of China’s GNP to the global GNP which is 
measured by PPP in this paper. The GNP data is obtained from WEO database provided by IMF. 
 
For both the relationship between political relations and bilateral trade volume and the relationship 
between China’s economic power and bilateral trade volume, we can first make a descriptive 
analysis. As is shown in figure 1 we can find that in general both political relations and China’s 
economic power are positively correlated with bilateral trade meaning trade volume rises with the 
improvement of the political relations between China and other East Asian countries. However, 
the correlations vary in different time periods specially for China and Japan. In order to obtain 
more reliable results, next we apply our empirical model illustrated in section 2.1 to test the 
relations between the variables. 
 
                                                        
① For explicit discussion, please refer to Morgenthau(2006), Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and 
Peace, Peking University Press; the first edition(Nov. 1), pp151-203. 
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Figure 1 Trade volume and bilateral political relations between China and East Asian countries 
Data source: Great Power Relationship Database from Tsinghua University and CEIC database 
 
Besides the core explanatory variable, this paper brings in the following controlled variables in the 
empirical model: the first is log transformation of real GDP per capita with 2005 as the base year, 
which is used to measure the impact of difference between partner country’s economic developing 
level and wealth level on bilateral trade, and has been used by many studies in long-term empirical 
test. The second is Inflation measured by CPI, which is to control impact of partner country’s 
domestic macroeconomic fluctuation on bilateral trade. The third is real Exchange Rate measured 
by logarithm value of dollar against domestic currency, which is to reflect import and export 
change driven by the exchange rate factor. All the data above is collected from the WDI database 
of the World Bank. 
 
Besides the above economic indicators, partner country’s Country Risk often has a significant 
impact on trade volume, such as government’s administrative ability, public security environment, 
intensification of social contradiction, potential internal conflict etc. These factors are essential for 
multinational enterprises to achieve success businesses. They also affect domestic import and 
export volume. Therefore, Country Risk variable is included into the empirical model as a control 
variable. According to the definition of globally-renowned International Country Risk 
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Guide(ICRG), country risk mainly includes 12 aspects such as government stability, social 
economic environment, internal conflict, corruption, law and order, ethnic conflict, democratic 
accountability etc. The country risk index is calculated by adding the value of each factor above 
together with a sale of 0 to 100. The higher the value is, the less the country risk is. The data is  
from ICRG database. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistical variables 
Variables Observed 
value 
Average 
value 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
 Economic Flows  602 7.717 2.387 -2.282 11.417 
 Political Relations  660 0.895 4.162 -6.900 15.700 
 Economic Power  675 7.524 4.084 2.369 16.324 
GDP  644 26.620 1.650 22.563 29.415 
Country Risk  596 65.396 13.231 34.75 92.750 
Inflation  640 14.948 53.161 -2.164 411.040 
Exchange Rate  660 6.183 2.445 -0.548 9.948 
 
The econometric model includes many political and economic variables. Since many of them 
correlate with each other which causes multi-collinearity problem. To avoid this problem, we test 
calculate correlation coefficient matrix of the explanatory variables, which is shown in table 2.  
As is shown, the correlation coefficients between variables are fewer than the publicly recognized 
standard 0.8 which is often used to judge high correlation between variables. The correlation 
coefficient between exchange rate and income per capita is the highest. But it is only -0.61. 
Therefore, we can decide that there is no necessary relation between them. And we can draw a 
conclusion that there is no serious multi-collinearity in our model.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Variables correlation coefficient matrix 
  Political Relations   Economic Power GDP  Country Risk Inflation  Exchange Rate
 Political Relations  1      
 Economic Power  0.5956 1     
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GDP  0.2988 0.292 1    
Country Risk  0.4406 0.1581 0.5905 1   
Inflation  -0.2765 -0.1527 -0.5873 -0.4876 1  
Exchange Rate  0.2075 0.1911 -0.6199 -0.1282 0.3661 1 
 
3  Results 
 
In this section, we first run the panel regression to obtain results about the relationship between 
bilateral political relations and trade flows, and the role of China economic power. Secondly, 
Countries were grouped according to their political relations with China in order to examine some 
new features between political relations, trade flows and the national economic power. Finally, we 
further investigated the impact of historical periods on the results. 
 
3.1 Main results 
 
At first, pooled OLS regression was conducted for the preliminary results. Then, we control for 
country fixed-effects in the regression to address the endogeneity problem that arises when both 
political relations and economic flows are driven by unobservable time-invariant country-specific 
factors. Also the time fixed-effect factor was also considered. All the coefficients of the variable in 
table have been normalized for comparison. As shown in Table 3, in the most of regression, 
R-squared are greater than 0.9 which means that the model fits the data well. The Hausman test 
results suggest that the fixed effects improve the model. 
 
As shown in Columns 1 of Table 3, without control variables, the coefficient 1  on the 
 Political Relations  is positive and statistically significant from zero indicating that trade flows 
respond significantly to a shift in political relations .The bilateral trade flows between the China 
and other East Asia countries would decline if political relations between the China and other East 
Asia countries deteriorate. Trade follows the flag. 
 
From the regression results that Chinese economic power is introduced, we can see that the 
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expanding economic scale of China has generated obvious impact on its bilateral trades. The 
coefficient of Chinese economic power 2  in column 2-3 suggest Chinese economic power has 
a statistically significant impact on trade flow. The rising of China leads to the flourish of 
international trade in East Asia. For the regressions with the control variables, the significance of 
1  and 2  maintains a high degree of stability (Columns 4-6). Columns 6 includes time fixed 
effects and country fixed effects. It shows that the  Political Relations  enters significantly at the 
1% level in regressions, and the coefficient is 0.176. As for the  Economic Power , it enters 
significantly in the regression at the 1% level, and the coefficient is 0.482. The signs for other 
control variables in the estimation are consistent with common intuition. The results suggest per 
capita GDP has a large and statistically significant impact on bilateral trade. Inflation has a large 
and significant impact on macroeconomic volatility and reduces the trade flow. The effects of 
exchange rates and Country risk on bilateral trade are not statistically significant as shown in 
Columns 6. 
 
Over the past three decades, the world has been witnessing the rise of China. Now China has its 
influence in many parts of the world such as global supply, trade, and finance. At the same time, to 
the best of our knowledge, most literature neglected the shifting of economic powers which is 
happening tremendously in the world or East Asia. This current paper aims to fill this gap in the 
literature. We now turn to the interaction between political relations and economic power 
(   Political Relation Economi rcs Powe ) to examine whether the relationship between political 
relations and bilateral trade has been changed. Columns 7-9 in Table 3 show that the interaction 
terms enter negatively and significantly at the 1% level in the model. The marginal impact of 
political relations on bilateral trade can be obtained by Taking derivative of Economic Flows with 
respect to political relations in equation 2 as shown in equation 3. 
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Table 3. Political relations, economic power and bilateral trade 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Political Relations  
0.268*** 
(0.013) 
0.425*** 
(0.32) 
0.268***
(0.013) 
0.098***
(0.014)
0.189***
(0.024)
0.176*** 
(0.019) 
0.178***
(0.030) 
0.445***
(0.046)
0.322***
(0.044)
 Economic Power   
0. 461***
(0.024) 
0.509***
(0.029) 
0.330***
(0.007)
0.417***
(0.017)
0.482*** 
(0.039) 
0.370***
(0.010) 
0.486***
(0.019)
0.480***
(0.037)
GDP     
0.720***
(0.032)
0.408***
(0.123)
0.416*** 
(0.126) 
0.706***
(0.031) 
0.559***
(0.121)
0.528***
(0.144)
Country Risk     
0.164***
(0.149)
0.120***
(0.168)
0.032 
(0.243) 
0.149***
(0.159) 
0.055***
(0.161)
0.001 
(0.288)
Inflation     
-0.050**
(0.005)
-0.044**
(0.004)
-0.057*** 
(0.005) 
-0.052**
(0.005) 
-0.023 
(0.004)
-0.043**
(0.004)
Exchange Rate     
0.371***
(0.02) 
0.161*
(0.088)
0.048 
(0.081) 
0.366***
(0.019) 
-0.098 
(0.106)
-0.052 
(0.093)
  Political Relation Economi rcs Powe        -0.104
***
(0.003) 
-0.308***
(0.004)
-0.179***
(0.004)
 Country Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 Year Fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes 
 Hausmantest  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
.  No of observations  589 589 589 551 551 551 551 551 551 
. Adj R squared  0.96 0.629 0.953 0.94 0.948 0.956 0.941 0.954 0.958 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* Significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent; *** 
significant at 1 percent. 
 
The results suggest that trade flows respond significantly to a shift in political relations between 
China and other East Asia countries. However, the effect of political relations on the bilateral trade 
is determined by the economic power of China. Therefore, with the background of China’s rise, 
the marginal impact of political relations on bilateral trade is decreasing. 
 
3.2 Grouping Analysis 
This section aims at looking for differences of the role of China economic power in the different 
group of countries, which could suggest important policy implications. We separate our analysis 
for the “good” relation countries and the “bad” relation countries with China. If the value of the 
bilateral political relation is bigger than zero, it is defined as good relation. Otherwise, it is defined 
as bad relation. The estimation results are shown in Table 4. 
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For the Group B where good relations countries is in line with the primary conclusion. We see that 
political tension between China and trade partner produce negative and significant effects on 
bilateral trade volume. But China economic power is positive and significant at the 1% level in all 
equations. And the interaction enters positively and significantly at the 1% level in regressions. As 
for the bad relations countries which group A stands for, the political tension also produces 
negative and significant effects on bilateral trade. However, the effect of economic power on trade 
flow is not statically significant any more. 
 
Table 4. Political relations, economic power and bilateral trade in different group 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Group A（Bad Relations） Group B（Good Relations） 
 Political Relations  
0.480***
(0.1548)
0.269* 
(0.1635)
0.199** 
(0.1379) 
0.355*** 
(0.0308) 
0.143*** 
(0.0412) 
0.346***
(0.0382)
 Economic Power  
-0.039 
(0.1050)
0.032 
(0.0965)
-0.028 
(0.1088) 
0.847*** 
(0.0117) 
0.520*** 
(0.0191) 
0.686***
(0.016) 
  Political Relation Economi rcs Powe  -0.232
**
(0.0181 )
-0.117 
(0.0187)
-0.113 
(0.0202) 
-0.296*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.094 
(0.0042) 
-0.367***
(0.0037)
GDP   
1.006***
(0.1414)
1.524*** 
(0.5472) 
 
0.857*** 
(0.0251) 
0.639***
(0.0726)
Country Risk   
0.015 
(0.1622)
0.089* 
(0.4539) 
 
0.233*** 
(0.1571) 
0.034* 
(0.1728)
Inflation   
-0.04 
(0.0085)
-0.013 
(0.0083) 
 
0.02 
(0.0031) 
0.052***
(0.0023)
Exchange Rate   
0.618***
(0.0442)
0.817*** 
(0.3482) 
 
0.385*** 
(0.0155) 
-0.157* 
(0.067) 
 Country Fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
 Hausmantest  0.09  0.003 0.06  0.000 
.  No of observations  146 123 123 443 428 428 
. Adj R squared  0.935 0.946 0.653 0.951 0.929 0.938 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* Significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent; *** 
significant at 1 percent. 
 
3.3 Extension analysis in different period 
 
For the period from 1980 to 2013 when the data set covers，the world economy has been changing 
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a lot. One of the biggest changes is the status of East Asia in the world economy. East Asian 
economies have embarked on various initiatives for economic integration and cooperation in the 
areas of trade and investment. In the early stage of the time period, only the developed countries, 
such as Japan, played important roles. In the early 1990s, Japan’s real estate and stock market 
bubble burst and the economy went into a tailspin. Since then, Japan had suffered the so called 
“Japan’s Lost Decade”. After the Global financial crisis of 2008, China has been the leading 
source of economic growth in the region.  
 
We further split our dataset into three periods: 1981Q1–1997Q1, 1997Q2–2008Q2 and 
2008Q3-2013Q4. There are two arguments that motivate the two cutting off points 1997Q1and 
2008Q2. Firstly, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 Global financial crisis helped to 
integrate production networks and supply chains in Asia. The second argument is the increasing 
influence of China which improves China’s trade status. 
 
As shown in Columns 1-4 of Table 5, during the periods of 1981Q1–1997Q1 and 
1997Q2–2008Q2, we see that political tension between China and trade partner produce negative 
and significant effect on bilateral trade at the 1% level. The expanding economic scale of China 
has generated an obvious impact on bilateral trade. With the rising of China, the marginal impact 
of political relations on bilateral trade is decreasing. The impact is different for the both periods. 
In the second period, the trade promotion effect from the economic power growth is larger 
(coefficient changed from 0.23 to 0. 468). And the coefficient of interaction is changed from 
-0.563 to -0.396, indicating the negative impact of political power in defusing on bilateral trade 
declines. 
 
From 2008 to 2013, the global economy and East Asia are in a slow recovery phase. Columns 5-6 
suggest in this sub-period that the estimated effect of political relation on the trade is not 
statistically significant any more. This result is in line with the fact that with East Asia and the 
global economy getting out of crisis, the two factors may still be back to the negative correlation. 
We suspect that this could be a short-term phenomenon. 
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Table 5. Political relations, economic power and bilateral trade in different 
periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1981Q1-1997Q1 1997Q2-2008Q2 2008Q3-2013Q4 
 Political Relations  
0.500*** 
(0.0717)
0.625***
(0.0792)
0.091 
(0.1085)
0.423*** 
(0.0649) 
0.128 
(0.2028) 
0.125 
(0.1002)
 Economic Power  
0.179*** 
(0.0499)
0.230***
(0.1137)
0.200***
(0.0381)
0.468*** 
(0.0378) 
0.464*** 
(0.0581) 
0.113**
(0.0504)
  Political Relation Economi rcs Powe  -0.403
***
(0.017) 
-0.563***
(0.0188)
-0.026 
(0.0103)
-0.396*** 
(0.0066) 
0.117 
(0.0131) 
-0.244 
(0.0059)
GDP  
0.894*** 
(0.0479)
0.990***
(0.0598)
1.054***
(0.0339)
0.638*** 
(0.1359) 
0.839*** 
(0.0737) 
2.326***
(0.3219)
Country Risk  0.034 
(0.2367)
-0.044 
(0.3077)
0.257***
(0.1855)
-0.024 
(0.2763) 
0.696*** 
(0.2683) 
-0.208 
(0.9113)
Inflation  -0.160
***
(0.0048)
-0.148***
(0.0052)
0.026 
(0.0024)
0.051*** 
(0.0016) 
0.041 
(0.0103) 
0.011 
(0.0056)
Exchange Rate  0.530
*** 
(0.0274)
0.578***
(0.0292)
0.488***
(0.0189)
-0.085 
(0.1926) 
0.291*** 
(0.0239) 
0.161 
(0.2417)
 Country Fixed effects   Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Hausmantest   0.000  0.000  0.000 
.  No of observations  231 231 220 220 100 100 
. Adj R squared  0.931 0.941 0.943 0.973 0.917 0.99 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,* Significant at 10 percent, ** significant at 5 percent; *** 
significant at 1 percent. 
4 Conclusions 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between the political, trade contacts and economic power by 
taking China as the center country using the quarterly data of five countries in East Asia between 
1980 and 2013. The following conclusions have been made. In general, there is a significant 
positive correlation of the political tension and trade contacts between China and East Asia 
countries. Specifically, the political tension significantly reduces bilateral trade volume between 
the countries that is consistent with the view of "Trade Follows Flag". Being different from 
previous studies, this research considers the background of the rise of China and ongoing 
economic power shifts in East Asia. The results show that the correlation between them is not 
constant. China's economic power plays a crucial role. The continuous increase of China's 
economic power has brought an obvious pulling effect for bilateral trade. More importantly, the 
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sensitivity of bilateral trade volume drops with political conflict. The rise of China integrates the 
East Asia economy and strengthens the dependence of East Asia economy. 
 
The sample grouping analysis indicates that the trade pulling effect from the rise of China differs 
in different sample groups. Only for the countries with good relations with China, an increase of 
China's economic power brings a positive impact on trade. The strengthening of China's economic 
power serves a trade stabilizer when political deadlock appear only for these countries. Thus, the 
positive effect of Chinese economy growth on East Asia is limited by the political tensions caused 
by the historical problems. Finally, we find that political relations, bilateral trade and economic 
power also present different relations for different periods. Before the 2008 global financial crisis, 
the trade promotion effect of China's economic power is growing. However, the effect of hedging 
political risk and smoothing bilateral trade is declining. In the recovery phase from the crisis, the 
influence of political relations for trade in East Asia is not statistically significant any more. 
 
Recently, political tensions in East Asia are growing. The doubt about a peaceful rise of China and 
the strategy of the U.S. for returning to Asia-Pacific makes the region become the center of power 
games in the world. The gap between the demand of economic integration driven by market forces 
and the political division among countries is wider and wider. The results of this study indicate 
that effectively improving in the political relations between countries will release the spillover 
effect of China's economic growth and benefit the whole East Asia. 
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Abstract 
China has drastically increased its international trade flows in the last decade and now it 
is a major trade partner for OECD countries as well as ASEN and South Asian countries. The 
phenomenal export performance of China raises worldwide issues – ‘How competitive is 
China?’ and ‘Why is China so competitive?’ In this paper, we analyze China’s absolute 
advantage, its comparative advantage, and its geographical barriers, using a bilateral 
international trade matrix in manufactures for China and major Asian and OECD countries in 
2003-2008. We estimate the Ricardian theory based on the gravity model modified from Eaton 
and Kortum [2002]. Our finding suggests that China was the most competitive among our 
sample countries in 2007 and 2008. In addition, China improved its state of technology rapidly 
after 2003 and the rank was number three following Japan in 2007 and 2008. The analysis of the 
source of the competitiveness implies that lower wages and higher R&D expenditures are 
significant. China’s R&D expenditure was comparable with OECD countries but was much 
higher than emerging countries, whereas China’s wage rate was comparable with emerging 
countries but was much lower than OECD countries. In addition, the openness to foreign capital 
and the excellent transportation links may contribute to the unexplained China’s 
competitiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past three decades, China has drastically increased its international trade flows, to 
the extent that it is now it is one of the major trade partners for OECD countries. In Asia, the 
most important manufacturing center in the world, in 2006, China–Japan trade volume exceeded 
US–Japan trade volume and China became the largest trade partner for Japan. The phenomenal 
export performance of China raises worldwide issues – ‘How competitive is China?’, ‘Why is 
China so competitive?’ and ‘Is China’s competitiveness sustainable?’ Chinese manufacturing 
industries have been playing a key role in the economic growth of China. China provides a new 
model for developing countries. Furthermore, in recent economic development literature, the 
comparative economic analysis between China and India has become a hot topic. 
How competitive is China? The answer depends on the cost of producing a unit of a 
manufacturing good in China as well as the cost of delivering a unit of the good from China in 
comparison with its trade partners. Wages represent a key cost in manufacturing industries. 
Regardless of rapid economic growth in the past three decades, Chinese wages are still 
extremely low in comparison with OECD countries, as well as in comparison with most East 
Asian countries (Adams, Ganges and Shachmurove [2006]). The low wages may reflect the 
access to technology of China, because countries are working with different technologies. 
Meanwhile, the openness of China’s economy to foreign direct investment has dramatically 
improved the efficiency of China’s manufacturing technology. China has been the dominant 
destination for foreign direct investment in East Asia. Foreign direct investment often combines 
cheap labor costs and foreign technologies and makes a key contribution to China’s 
competitiveness. In sum, foreign direct investment is an important factor, not only for capital 
flows, but also for flows of technology and management skills (Adams et al. [2006]). Moreover, 
foreign invested firms play a great role in interindustry spillovers to China’s manufacturing 
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sector (Wei and Liu [2006]). So far, the openness to foreign direct investment has made a crucial 
difference in the economic growth between China and India in the past decade. 
Quite a few previous papers have discussed a variety of measures and linked them with 
China’s competitiveness. Most of them have documented China’s export performance, 
attributing it to foreign direct investment and low wages. In this paper, we explore China’s 
absolute advantage, its comparative advantage, and its geographical barriers, using a bilateral 
international trade matrix (N  N data) for China and major Asian and OECD countries in 
2003-2008. Here, comparative advantage and competitiveness are interchangeable terms. We 
estimate the Ricardian model developed in Eaton and Kortum [2002]. The model captures the 
competing forces of comparative advantage that promote trade, and both artificial and natural 
geographic barriers that inhibit trade. The model has simple expressions relating bilateral trade 
volumes to technologies and geographical barriers. Based on Eaton and Kortum [2002], we 
estimate the parameters needed to examine the absolute advantage and the comparative 
advantage of China and its trade partners.  
Our parameter estimates allow us to explore a number of issues. First, we provide an 
answer to the question ‘How competitive is China?’ Also, we explain ‘Why China is 
competitive?’ in comparison with India, the second most populous country in the world. Finally, 
we analyze the consequences of a wage rise in China, which may be caused by appreciation of 
the RMB. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical model 
and the dataset. Section 3 explore the issues listed above, using the parameter estimates. Section 
4 concludes. 
 
2. The Model and the Data Set 
2.1 The Ricardian Theory-based Gravity Model 
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Our empirical model is the Ricardian theory-based gravity model, which is modified from 
Eaton and Kortum [2002].1 With constant returns to scale, the cost of production in country i in 
good j is ci/zi(j), where ci consists of the cost of labor and of intermediate inputs, and zi(j) is the 
realization of technology in good j. Technology has a Fréchet distribution, Fi(z) = Pr[Zi ≤ z] = 
exp(–Tiz-θ), with two parameters. The first parameter is Ti > 0, where higher Ti means a higher 
average realization for country i, so Ti reflects country i’s absolute advantage. The second 
parameter is  > 1, where larger  implies lower technology differences across countries. Taking 
geographic barriers, dni, into account, the cost of exporting good j produced in country i to 
country n is the price of good j from country i under perfect competition: 
ni
i
i
ni djz
cjp 



)(
)(  
We assume that geographic barriers consist of both natural and artificial barriers, the distance, 
distni, sharing border, bni, and belonging to FTA, ftani. Countries buy the good j from the 
cheapest source, so the distribution of prices is Gni(p) = Pr[Pni ≤ p] = 1 – Fi(z) = 1 – Fi(cidni/p). 
Therefore, trade shares are expressed as the probability that country i provides a good at the 
lowest price in country n: 
 
where Xni is the amount of the manufacturing imports from i to n; and Xn is country n’s total 
spending. We assume that production in country i combines labor and intermediate inputs, with 
labor share , wage wi, and overall price index as index of intermediate goods price, 
 We can express trade shares as functions of wages, wi, geographic barriers, dni, 
                                                  
1 To describe our model as simply as possible, we introduce only the essence of the complete 
model by Eaton and Kortum [2002].  
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and technology parameters, Ti. Normalizing by the importer n’s home sales, Xnn, gives: 
 
Applying an equation of to home sales,  we obtain:  
 
Plugging this relative price of intermediates into previous equation and taking logarithms, we 
obtain the empirical equation, i.e.: 
 
(1)     ninininini
nn
ni ftabdistSS
X
X
21lnln '
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 
, 
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
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
. Source countries’ competitiveness is defined as 
iii wTS lnln
1   ; and the geographic barrier is defined as nininini ftabdistd  lnln  .  
In the same way as Eaton and Kortum[2002],  we assume that the error term δni consist of two 
components:  δni =δ1ni + δ2ni . The country-pair specific component δ2ni affects two-way trade, 
so that δ2ni=δ2in, while δ1ni affects one-way trade. Thus, when δ1ni has variance σ12 and δ2ni has 
variance σ22,  the variance-covariance matrix of  δ has diagonal elements σ12 + σ22 and 
nonzero off –diagonal elements σ22. We estimate the equation (1) by generalized least squares. 
Xni is manufacturing imports from i to n and Xii is gross manufacturing production less 
manufacturing exports. Xn is country n’s total spending, which comprises home purchases plus 
imports from everywhere else.  is a constant labor share, setting  = 0.21. Si is the coefficient 
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on source country dummies; distni is the distance between country n and i; bni is the dummy 
variable of the effect on n and i on sharing a border; ftani is the dummy variable of the effect of n 
and i both belonging to FTA; and δ is the error. Then we estimate the source of competitiveness, 
Si: 
 
(2)     ii
i
HiRi wH
RS   ln)1(ln0
 
 
We use our estimates of Si from equation (1), and Ri is country i’s R&D expenditure, Hi is 
the human capital, and  is the error.  
 
2.2 Sample Countries and Data 
We estimate China’s competitiveness in comparison with OECD countries, East Asian 
countries, and South Asian countries including India. Thus, 18 our sample countries are: China; 
the main OECD countries, namely, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK, US, and 
Japan; South Korea; ASEAN4, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand; and 
the South Asian countries, India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan2. The sample period is from 2003 to 
2008. We perform year-to-year regression3. The number of observations in equation (1) is 
N*(N-1). 
Our dependent variable in equation (1) is a transformation of bilateral manufacturing 
trades, from country i to country n. We use SITC bilateral trade data from the United Nations 
(UN) Comtrade. Xni is bilateral manufacturing trade from country i to country n; we aggregate 
SITC 5+6+7+8-68(NON-FERROUS METALS). Xn (Xi) is importer’s (exporter’s) total 
                                                  
2 Singapore is excluded because Xnn (Xii)<0 in each year. 
3 We also perform 2003-2008 average regression, as well as panel regression. In average regression, 
the number of observation is N*(N-1), and the number of observation is N*(N-1)*T in panel 
regression.  
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spending; we add importer’s (exporter’s) manufacturing production and importer’s (exporter’s) 
imports from the world. Manufacturing production data is gross output in US$ from UNIDO 
INDSTAT4, 2013. Xnn (Xii) is importer’s (exporter’s) home sales; we subtract importer’s 
(exporter’s) manufacturing export from importer’s (exporter’s) manufacturing production.  is a 
constant labor share, setting  = 0.21.4 
The first explanatory variables in equation (1), distance between country’s capital, is from 
World Atlas by Microsoft. FTA5 includes the European Union (EU), North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), ASEAN Free Trade Area, and South Asian Preferential Trading 
Arrangement (SAPTA) in all sample periods. In addition, China-ASEAN FTA started from 
2003. 
Explanatory variables in equation (2) are as follows: R&D expenditure (US$) is from 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Online by the World Bank, and the wage in 
manufacturing sector is from UNIDO INDSTAT4, 2013 (Wages and salaries / Employees). We 
also use per capita GDP (PPP, international $) from WDI Online as an indicator of wage rate. 
Year of schooling is Educational Attainment for Total Population Aged 15 of the Barro-Lee data 
from the Barro-Lee websites. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
in equation (2). The number of observations in equation (2) is N*T in our pooled regression. 
  
3. Estimating the Competitiveness and its Source 
We estimate equation (1) by performing year-to-year regression. As shown in the 
Appendix, distance substantially inhibits trade and FTA enhances international trade, while 
borders do not have a significant positive effect but have a negative effect in some periods.  
Table 2 indicates the ranking of competitiveness; which is referred to as comparative advantage, 
                                                  
4 Setting  = 0.21 is the same assumption as Eaton and Kortum[2002]. 
5 From the list on the WTO (World Trade Organization) homepage. 
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from the estimates of Si. The estimates of Si show that China was the third most competitive 
country from 2003 to 2005, following the United States. In 2006, China’s competitiveness 
ranked second. Japan was the most competitive country from 2003 to 2006. From 2007, China 
became the most competitive country in terms of comparative advantage of manufacturing 
industries and stayed ahead. Two years later, China became the second largest economy. 
In 1990, Japan was the most competitive country (Eaton and Kortum [2002]) and it stayed 
ahead until 2006. The United States was next to Japan after the competitive losses in the 1980s. 
South Korea and Germany were most competitive countries following the United States since 
2006. India, the second most populous developing country, was less competitive than China but 
it was more competitive than France and UK after 2006. Philippines, Sri Lanka and Pakistan 
were the least competitive countries6. 
A country’s competitiveness increases with higher R&D expenditures, higher level of 
human capital, and cheaper labor costs. Obviously, low wages in China contributed to its 
international competitiveness. In 2003, China’s wage rate was below those in India, Indonesia 
and the Philippines. Later, China’s wage rate has been rapidly increasing, such that in 2008 
India and Indonesia had a lower wage rate than China, as Table 3 indicates. However, the 2008 
labor cost in the Philippines was more expensive than that in China. On the other hand, China 
was less innovative than OECD countries except Italy but China put much more money into 
R&D than emerging countries. Japan was the most innovative country from 2003 to 2008. South 
Korea ranked as the second innovative country. India was the most innovative among emerging 
countries until 2007 but it lost to Malaysia in 2008. 
Now we estimate equation (2) using robust OLS, using estimated competitiveness, , 
from equation (1). Table 4 shows the estimation results. Panel A indicates that equation (2a) 
                                                  
6 The data for the Philippines, Sri-Lanka, Thailand and Pakistan is only available inconsecutively.  
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yearly wage has a significantly negative impact on . Yearly wage data is not available for 
some country*year. When we use per capita GDP as a proxy for wage rate, the result of 
equation (2b) remains unchanged, as shown in Panel B of Table 4. Per capita GDP is available 
for all country*years. However, including 1/Hi does not yield a significant coefficient on human 
capital. We drop 1/Hi from equation (2a) and equation (2b). 
Does a rapid wage rise weaken China’s competitiveness? Is China’s competitiveness 
sustainable? To answer the above questions, we estimate 2008 China’s competitiveness 
presuming a doubled 2008 China’s wage rate. Even if the 2008 wage rate in China had doubled, 
it would have remained more competitive than the second most competitive country, Japan. 
Indeed, from 2003 to 2008, the wage rate in China increased by 164.5% in comparison with a 
63.2% growth in India, and in comparison with a 17.5% growth in Japan. At the same time, the 
RMB appreciated by 20 percent against US dollar. Nonetheless, China sustained its 
competiveness and finally became the most competitive country in 2007.  
The wage rate in China is still much cheaper than wage rates in OECD countries. Adams 
et al. [2006] pointed out that in coastal areas – such as Shanghai, Jiansu and Guandong 
provinces – wages (in $US) are much higher than the national average. Recently, cities with 
huge labor pools in China’s interior use tax breaks and cheap land to attract foreign investors. 
Excellent transport links of highway, railway and airline ensure a reliable supply of inputs. 
Many foreign and domestic manufacturers have shifted from Shanghai to Henan and Sichuan 
provinces. They have been building facilities in the poorest regions, where wages are lower and 
the workforce more stable. It would be hard to recreate what China has done—not only cheap 
labor costs but also excellent transport links. Therefore, even a rapid wage rise would only hurt 
China’s manufacturing competitiveness slightly. 
A country’s wage may increase with level of technology. If the wage rise were attributable 
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to technology improvement, it would not hurt China’s competitiveness so much. Now, we 
calculate the state of technology parameter, , which is also referred to as the 
absolute advantage of country i, using data on wage and the estimates of the parameter on wage, 
. Table 5a reports the rankings of state of technology, using equation (2b). China’s rank in 2003 
is number 7, which was inferior to the United States, Japan, Germany, South Korea, France and 
Italy. However, China rapidly improved its state of technology over the sample period. In 2004, 
2006, China’s state of technology ranked ahead of France and Italy. Then China ranked third in 
2005, 2007 and 2008. Over the sample period, the United States ranked first in terms of 
technology capacity and second ranked Japan. Meanwhile, India was not good as China but it 
ranked as the top among emerging countries. The Philippines, Pakistan and Sri Lanka ranked as 
the lowest regarding to the state of technology. Table 5b reports the state of technology 
calculated using equation (2b).  
In viewing China’s competitiveness, it is important to understand that technology is 
mobile. Unlike financial investment, foreign direct investment comprises not only capital flows 
but also inflows of technology and management skills. China has been absorbing foreign 
investment as well as foreign technology, because of its ‘open door’ policy. The sharp increase 
of registered capital of foreign invested enterprises suggests that foreign firms seek entry to 
China with the intention of eventually penetrating China’s local markets for sales in the future. 
However, they begin by setting up subsidiaries or joint ventures in China to produce products 
for export to their home country, using the cheap Chinese labor force (Adams et al. [2006]). 
Direct foreign invested firms play a great role in expansion of exports. Foreign invested firms’ 
share in exports has been more than 40 percent since the late 1990s. Meanwhile, foreign 
invested firms import about 20 percent of total imports in China. 
Indirectly, spillovers from foreign invested firms to China’s manufacturing sector 
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strengthen China’s competitiveness in the locally owned sector. The openness to foreign direct 
investment implies that China is a recipient of foreign technology. Wei and Liu [2006] assessed 
productivity spillovers from R&D, exports, and the very presence of foreign direct investment 
in China’s manufacturing sector, based on a panel of indigenous and foreign-invested firms for 
1998–2001. There are positive interindustry productivity spillovers from R&D and exports, and 
positive intra- and interindustry productivity spillovers from foreign presence to indigenous 
Chinese firms within regions. Furthermore, OECD-invested firms seem to play a much greater 
role in interindustry spillovers than overseas Chinese firms from Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan do within their respective regions. As suggested above, foreign direct investment has 
been a major factor in improving China’s technology. It is remarkable that the effect of foreign 
direct investment on technology improvement is so much more pronounced, compared with 
India.  
Based on the above estimation results of equation (2), we predict the competitiveness of 
each country in 2008. Table 6 reports these rankings of predicted competitiveness, as well as the 
estimated competitiveness of equation (1). The predicted competitiveness for China is largely 
underestimated. What is responsible for this unexplained competitiveness of China?’ We 
conjecture that this might be attributable to foreign direct investment and excellent 
infrastructures in China. The openness to foreign direct investment implies openness to foreign 
technology. From this viewpoint, China may provide a new economic growth model for 
developing countries.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we explore China’s absolute advantage, its comparative advantage, and its 
geographical barriers, using bilateral international trade matrix (N  N-1 data) for China and 
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major Asian and OECD countries in 2003–2008. Our findings suggest that China was the most 
competitive country in 2007-2008. China’s low wage rate contributed to its competitiveness. 
Recently, China’s wages have been increasing with its technology improvement. However, a 
wage rise would not substantially change China’s comparative advantage. In addition, excellent 
infrastructures ensure manufacturers to move factories to China’s interior, where wages are 
lower and the workforce more stable. Rapid expansion in R&D is another important factor that 
contributes to technology improvement in China. Also, in relation to China’s competitiveness, it 
is important to understand that technology is as mobile as capital flows. Foreign direct 
investment includes not only capital flows but also inflows of technology and management 
skills. Direct foreign invested firms play a great role in expansion of export. Indirectly, 
spillovers from foreign invested firms to China’s manufacturing sector strengthen China’s 
competitiveness in the locally owned sector. The openness to foreign direct investment implies 
openness to foreign technology. It is very clear today that rising Chinese economy has important 
implications for emerging countries. It would be crucial to recreate what China has done— 
excellent transport links, an open system to foreign capital and foreign technology and 
innovation, in addition to cheap labor costs. 
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
year mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max N
2003 R&D 1.593751 0.976258 0.06544 0.70779 1.77731 2.48577 3.14388 14
Percapita GDP 20197.9 13148.87 1840.66 3204.21 27242.8 29793.2 39682.5 14
Schooling 9.618429 2.243783 5.39 8.056 10.3 11.256 12.772 14
Wage (US dollar) 18517.4 15031.18 1456.639 2061.886 21734.89 31279.81 40220.44 12
2004 R&D 1.720252 0.918794 0.06544 1.09127 1.85791 2.50339 3.1332 13
Percapita GDP 22637.11 13204.07 2010.01 11369.1 28089.6 31329 41928.9 13
Schooling 9.872769 2.279768 5.51 9.076 10.864 11.332 12.816 13
Wage (US dollar) 24145.75 17114.61 1372.674 3823.768 29481.28 38104.69 44885.27 12
2005 R&D 1.647255 1.012848 0.06544 0.77914 1.87027 2.5058 3.3087 14
Percapita GDP 22280.67 14354.55 2233.86 4114.57 28866.2 32525.6 44313.6 14
Schooling 9.876429 2.239638 5.63 8.18 10.61 11.46 12.86 14
Wage (US dollar) 23564.96 18060.74 1416.978 2826.086 29103.47 38843.25 45560.25 13
2006 R&D 1.453126 1.093659 0.06544 0.55536 1.3883 2.1891 3.4091 17
Percapita GDP 20260.35 15562.78 2314.32 3897.5 24246.5 33503.3 46443.8 17
Schooling 9.542 2.425362 4.948 7.334 10.232 11.412 12.924 17
Wage (US dollar) 20480.51 19321.93 1165.825 2254.172 16757.54 40639.3 47717.19 16
2007 R&D 1.734009 1.07538 0.06544 0.75751 1.866785 2.53169 3.46142 14
Percapita GDP 24931.43 15553.43 2757.57 5543.02 32523 36213.8 48070.4 14
Schooling 10.23057 2.15032 5.874 9.342 10.882 11.696 12.988 14
Wage (US dollar) 26741.9 20706.17 1529.11 2898.712 31725.5 45308.13 52596.23 13
2008 R&D 1.674247 1.15429 0.06544 0.75751 1.77949 2.68945 3.46706 15
Percapita GDP 24107.31 16177.01 2882.12 4533.59 33372.1 37119.2 48407.1 15
Schooling 10.19813 2.12192 5.996 8.33 10.456 11.814 13.052 15
Wage (US dollar) 24789.65 21809.66 1374.386 3852.94 28488.33 46245.09 56740.48 13
Total R&D 1.630234 1.020272 0.06544 0.74385 1.77017 2.5058 3.46706 87
Percapita GDP 22345.5 14460.07 1840.66 4234.28 28089.6 33396.6 48407.1 87
Schooling 9.881471 2.200498 4.948 8.18 10.344 11.48 13.052 87
Wage (US dollar) 22986.08 18487.96 1165.825 2351.994 28280.96 40220.44 56740.48 79
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Table 2 Competitiveness Ranking: exp(Si ) (exp(SUS)=1) 
 
2003 2004 2005
Japan 1.173 Japan 1.293 Japan 1.064
USA 1.000 USA 1.000 USA 1.000
China 0.397 China 0.925 China 0.832
Germany 0.217 Germany 0.280 Korea Rep. of 0.236
Korea Rep. of 0.187 Korea Rep. of 0.232 Germany 0.209
France 0.121 Italy 0.155 Italy 0.117
Italy 0.112 France 0.107 France 0.096
India 0.065 India 0.106 India 0.078
United Kingdom 0.054 United Kingdom 0.072 United Kingdom 0.049
Indonesia 0.047 Indonesia 0.048 Indonesia 0.037
Australia 0.024 Australia 0.029 Australia 0.022
Malaysia 0.013 Canada 0.019 Canada 0.014
Canada 0.013 Malaysia 0.012 Malaysia 0.010
Philippines 0.000 Pakistan Philippines 0.001
2006 2007 2008
Japan 1.284 China 2.103 China 1.959
China 1.130 Japan 1.246 Japan 1.135
USA 1.000 USA 1.000 USA 1.000
Korea Rep. of 0.432 Korea Rep. of 0.335 Korea Rep. of 0.308
Germany 0.177 Germany 0.296 Germany 0.295
India 0.121 Italy 0.206 Italy 0.174
Italy 0.117 India 0.160 India 0.144
France 0.105 France 0.101 France 0.087
Indonesia 0.053 United Kingdom 0.068 United Kingdom 0.067
United Kingdom 0.050 Indonesia 0.063 Malaysia 0.040
Thailand 0.026 Australia 0.028 Indonesia 0.027
Australia 0.023 Malaysia 0.018 Australia 0.024
Canada 0.015 Canada 0.017 Canada 0.019
Malaysia 0.012 Sri Lanka 0.002 Philippines 0.003
Pakistan 0.005 Sri Lanka 0.001
Sri Lanka 0.002
Philippines 0.001
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Table 3 R&D, education and wages 
 
  
2003 2006
Country R&D Year of Schooling Wage (US dollar) Country R&D Year of Schooling Wage (US dollar)
Australia 1.80395 11.256 Australia 2.1891 11.412
Canada 2.03524 11.598 30824 Canada 2.00489 12.088 42421.3
China 1.13356 7.146 1456.64 China 1.3883 7.334 2275.64
France 2.17703 9.972 31735.6 France 2.10801 10.232 38857.3
Germany 2.53963 11.014 40220.4 Germany 2.54026 11.794 47717.2
India 0.70779 5.39 1542.01 India 0.76703 5.752 1875.76
Indonesia 0.06544 5.906 1651.78 Indonesia 0.06544 6.65 1707.17
Italy 1.10064 9.002 24543.3 Italy 1.12732 9.246 30614
Japan 3.14388 11.156 27987.4 Japan 3.4091 11.36 29425.5
Korea Rep. of 2.48577 11.3 18926.5 Korea Rep. of 3.00918 11.578 27907.5
Malaysia 0.62622 9.462 5701.56 Malaysia 0.61106 9.856 5607.56
Pakistan 0.32833 4.506 Pakistan 0.55536 4.948 2334.82
Philippines 0.12994 8.056 2471.99 Philippines 0.11053 8.23 3244.11
Sri Lanka 0.16301 10.282 Sri Lanka 0.1742 10.26 1165.83
Thailand 0.26192 6.478 Thailand 0.24919 7.222 2232.7
United Kingdom 1.75067 10.628 35147.6 United Kingdom 1.74046 11.328 44703.2
USA 2.61275 12.772 USA 2.65371 12.924 45598.7
2004 2007
Australia 1.85791 11.318 Australia 2.2978 11.444
Canada 2.06669 11.814 35358 Canada 1.9634 12.146 45308.1
China 1.22989 7.218 1679.97 China 1.39582 7.378 2898.71
France 2.15591 10.046 35459.2 France 2.08306 10.344 43629.1
Germany 2.50339 11.332 44885.3 Germany 2.53169 11.938 52596.2
India 0.74385 5.51 1628.55 India 0.75751 5.874 2351.99
Indonesia 0.06544 6.158 1372.67 Indonesia 0.06544 6.89 1666.56
Italy 1.09127 9.076 28281 Italy 1.17304 9.342 34599.9
Japan 3.1332 11.228 30681.6 Japan 3.46142 11.42 29217
Korea Rep. of 2.68298 11.38 21274.3 Korea Rep. of 3.21035 11.696 31725.5
Malaysia 0.5999 9.586 5967.56 Malaysia 0.699765 10.002 6277.19
Pakistan 0.32833 4.718 Pakistan 0.67383 4.966
Philippines 0.120685 8.118 Philippines 0.10963 8.28
Sri Lanka 0.1821 10.296 Sri Lanka 0.14432 10.21 1529.11
Thailand 0.25535 6.754 Thailand 0.21378 7.414
United Kingdom 1.68751 10.864 40750.2 United Kingdom 1.77017 11.556 50162.4
USA 2.54533 12.816 42410.7 USA 2.72234 12.988 45682.9
2005 2008
Australia 2.0235 11.38 Australia 2.40649 11.476
Canada 2.03975 12.03 38843.3 Canada 1.91784 12.204 46245.1
China 1.32476 7.29 1915.35 China 1.46986 7.422 3852.94
France 2.10865 10.12 37303.7 France 2.12427 10.456 51189.1
Germany 2.5058 11.65 45560.3 Germany 2.68945 12.082 56740.5
India 0.77914 5.63 1794.47 India 0.75751 5.996 2516.8
Indonesia 0.06544 6.41 1416.98 Indonesia 0.06544 7.13 1919.73
Italy 1.08598 9.15 29103.5 Italy 1.20577 9.438 38411
Japan 3.3087 11.3 30486.4 Japan 3.46706 11.48 32904.8
Korea Rep. of 2.79176 11.46 25109 Korea Rep. of 3.3609 11.814 28488.3
Malaysia 0.60548 9.71 6021.23 Malaysia 0.78847 10.148 6889.37
Pakistan 0.43689 4.93 Pakistan 0.56932 4.984
Philippines 0.11143 8.18 2826.09 Philippines 0.10963 8.33 4230.37
Sri Lanka 0.17815 10.31 Sri Lanka 0.11444 10.16 1374.39
Thailand 0.23498 7.03 Thailand 0.23217 7.606
United Kingdom 1.71704 11.1 41929.1 United Kingdom 1.77949 11.784
USA 2.59414 12.86 44035.2 USA 2.85709 13.052 47502.9
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Table 4  Regressions of competitiveness on R&D and wage 
 
Panel A equation (2a)
Coefficient s.e.
R&D 1.595 0.224
ln(wage) -0.545 0.193
_cons 2.648 1.814
R-squared 0.484
Number of obs 79
Panel B equation (2b)
R&D 1.477 0.271
ln(per capita GDP) -0.627 0.221
_cons 3.416 2.099
R-squared 0.423
Number of obs 87
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Table 5a The ranking of state of technology based on equation (2a) 
 
2003 2004 2005
Japan 3.336054 Japan 3.440491 USA 3.397538
Germany 2.439625 USA 3.382962 Japan 3.300408
Korea Rep. of 2.170287 Germany 2.605932 Germany 2.454909
France 2.101217 Korea Rep. of 2.301186 Korea Rep. of 2.353008
Italy 2.006227 China 2.300622 China 2.283616
China 1.894943 Italy 2.183987 Italy 2.066174
United Kingdom 1.794162 France 2.071507 France 2.038152
Canada 1.307031 United Kingdom 1.937752 United Kingdom 1.796686
India 1.306321 India 1.454251 India 1.380019
Indonesia 1.230164 Canada 1.438465 Canada 1.375674
Malaysia 1.086543 Indonesia 1.209892 Indonesia 1.14952
Philippines 0.423508 Malaysia 1.063907 Malaysia 1.036947
Philippines 0.571476
2006 2007 2008
Japan 3.41943 USA 3.411844 USA 3.427124
USA 3.411124 Japan 3.395064 Japan 3.375045
Korea Rep. of 2.703238 China 2.909355 China 2.96136
China 2.483861 Germany 2.685674 Germany 2.707186
Germany 2.382636 Korea Rep. of 2.600675 Korea Rep. of 2.524925
France 2.085726 Italy 2.370887 Italy 2.315679
Italy 2.078699 France 2.099097 France 2.071382
United Kingdom 1.811752 United Kingdom 1.96312 India 1.631132
India 1.518554 India 1.654734 Canada 1.480428
Canada 1.399967 Canada 1.455236 Malaysia 1.40065
Indonesia 1.265008 Indonesia 1.30635 Indonesia 1.115835
Thailand 1.118681 Malaysia 1.172234 Philippines 0.768578
Malaysia 1.065221 Sri Lanka 0.60805 Sri Lanka 0.496689
Pakistan 0.810531
Sri Lanka 0.634819
Philippines 0.585945
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Table 5b The ranking of state of technology based on equation (2b) 
 
2003 2004 2005
USA 4.03608 Japan 4.094284 USA 4.095214
Japan 3.985231 USA 4.065473 Japan 3.948731
Germany 2.801527 Germany 2.972934 China 2.880424
Korea Rep. of 2.597536 China 2.894646 Germany 2.813324
France 2.465647 Korea Rep. of 2.742478 Korea Rep. of 2.770577
Italy 2.425332 Italy 2.600838 Italy 2.461207
China 2.386262 France 2.41029 France 2.37253
United Kingdom 2.108703 United Kingdom 2.257814 United Kingdom 2.097531
Australia 1.776885 Australia 1.854509 Australia 1.758853
Canada 1.567093 Canada 1.708687 Canada 1.630843
India 1.519215 India 1.700331 India 1.618088
Indonesia 1.496276 Indonesia 1.515397 Indonesia 1.448354
Malaysia 1.369724 Malaysia 1.347249 Malaysia 1.32302
Philippines 0.489972  Philippines 0.662532
2006 2007 2008
Japan 4.130814 USA 5.252594 USA 4.143172
USA 4.120629 Japan 5.201141 Japan 4.055169
Korea Rep. of 3.170619 China 4.40366 China 3.636792
China 3.130789 Germany 3.883771 Germany 3.096703
Germany 2.742695 Korea Rep. of 3.79993 Korea Rep. of 2.992106
Italy 2.48496 Italy 3.539882 Italy 2.731181
France 2.435789 France 3.066055 France 2.370292
United Kingdom 2.117215 United Kingdom 2.863363 United Kingdom 2.266527
India 1.796121 Australia 2.374728 India 1.902757
Australia 1.78899 India 2.30395 Australia 1.826221
Canada 1.654055 Canada 2.165885 Malaysia 1.802813
Indonesia 1.574623 Indonesia 1.973245 Canada 1.744771
Thailand 1.495852 Malaysia 1.870716 Indonesia 1.395416
Malaysia 1.382187 Sri Lanka 0.950016 Philippines 0.871284
Pakistan 0.92648 Sri Lanka 0.659105
Sri Lanka 0.84148  
Philippines 0.674293  
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Table 6 Estimated competiveness (si), predicted competitiveness based on equation (2a) (sihat) and 
the difference in 2008 
 
 
si sihat difference
Canada -3.982 -2.165 -1.818
China 0.673 -1.235 1.908
France -2.438 -2.057 -0.382
Germany -1.220 -1.737 0.517
India -1.935 -2.061 0.125
Indonesia -3.596 -5.819 2.223
Italy -1.751 -2.804 1.053
Japan 0.127 -1.035 1.162
Korea Rep. of -1.176 -1.006 -0.170
Malaysia -3.209 -2.545 -0.664
Philippines -5.801 -5.426 -0.375
Sri Lanka -7.268 -4.745 -2.523
USA 0.000 -1.543 1.543
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Appendix I:  Equation (1)  Panel FGLS Estimation Results 
 
est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
Source Country
Exporter : Si
Australia -3.748 0.105 -3.673 0.121 (omitted) -3.618 0.142 -3.738 0.156 -3.619 0.223
Canada -4.271 0.101 -4.157 0.121 -4.515 0.185 -4.314 0.142 -4.171 0.156 -4.133 0.223
China 0.052 0.110 0.203 0.123 (omitted) -0.528 0.162 0.186 0.159 0.827 0.226
France -2.346 0.102 -2.330 0.123 -2.559 0.189 -2.172 0.143 -2.295 0.158 -2.522 0.233
Germany -1.526 0.103 -1.425 0.124 -1.972 0.192 -1.451 0.145 -1.528 0.159 -1.329 0.234
India -2.380 0.103 -2.185 0.124 -2.878 0.194 -2.524 0.146 -2.177 0.160 -1.929 0.234
Indonesia -3.198 0.101 -3.107 0.122 -3.762 0.186 -2.995 0.142 -3.027 0.157 -3.398 0.232
Italy -2.053 0.102 -1.938 0.123 -2.484 0.190 -2.045 0.144 -1.988 0.158 -1.840 0.233
Japan 0.108 0.103 0.132 0.123 0.011 0.191 0.196 0.146 0.192 0.160 0.035 0.225
Korea Rp -1.439 0.107 -1.279 0.131 -1.877 0.193 -1.552 0.147 -1.111 0.162 -1.248 0.273
Malaysia -4.455 0.102 -4.166 0.122 -5.393 0.194 -4.542 0.142 -4.357 0.157 -3.500 0.225
Pakistan -5.397 0.231 -5.297 0.234 (omitted) (omitted) -5.260 0.216 (omitted)
Philippines -7.158 0.126 -6.936 0.147 -8.220 0.232 -8.296 0.205 -6.896 0.172 -5.815 0.270
Sri Lanka -6.886 0.138 -6.811 0.143 (omitted) (omitted) -6.270 0.179 -7.319 0.226
Thailand -3.731 0.150 -3.715 0.234 -4.782 0.229 -3.137 0.195 -3.682 0.215 (omitted)
UK -2.837 0.103 -2.842 0.124 -2.885 0.192 -2.764 0.145 -2.912 0.159 -2.843 0.234
Deatination Country
Importer : Sn
Australia 0.730 0.105 0.663 0.121 (omitted) 0.720 0.142 0.677 0.156 0.655 0.223
Canada 2.029 0.101 1.980 0.121 2.043 0.186 2.066 0.142 2.006 0.156 1.999 0.223
China -1.408 0.110 -1.532 0.123 (omitted) -0.830 0.162 -1.450 0.159 -2.256 0.226
France 0.235 0.102 0.382 0.123 0.129 0.189 -0.189 0.143 0.356 0.158 0.948 0.233
Germany 0.461 0.103 0.559 0.124 0.297 0.192 0.198 0.145 0.697 0.159 0.695 0.234
India -1.132 0.103 -1.092 0.124 -1.293 0.194 -1.196 0.146 -1.120 0.160 -0.830 0.234
Indonesia 0.317 0.101 0.185 0.122 1.057 0.186 0.038 0.142 0.126 0.157 0.459 0.232
Italy -0.524 0.102 -0.546 0.123 -0.414 0.190 -0.679 0.144 -0.475 0.158 -0.493 0.233
Japan -1.564 0.103 -1.565 0.123 -1.551 0.191 -1.577 0.146 -1.495 0.160 -1.687 0.225
Korea Rp -0.348 0.107 -0.398 0.131 -0.141 0.193 -0.297 0.147 -0.526 0.163 -0.007 0.274
Malaysia 3.005 0.102 2.672 0.122 4.194 0.193 3.143 0.142 2.945 0.157 1.685 0.225
Pakistan 0.775 0.231 0.746 0.234 (omitted) (omitted) 0.731 0.216 (omitted)
Philippines 5.204 0.126 4.901 0.147 6.367 0.226 6.835 0.205 4.887 0.171 2.877 0.270
Sri Lanka 1.547 0.138 1.569 0.143 (omitted) (omitted) 0.675 0.179 2.539 0.226
Thailand 1.769 0.150 2.038 0.234 2.878 0.229 0.760 0.195 2.019 0.215 (omitted)
UK 1.539 0.103 1.607 0.124 1.296 0.193 1.418 0.145 1.730 0.159 1.635 0.234
Distance(ln(distni)) -0.391 0.045 -0.349 0.050 -0.510 0.104 -0.426 0.072 -0.342 0.065 -0.282 0.074
Shaired border(bni) 0.093 0.086 0.162 0.097 -0.319 0.206 -0.003 0.130 0.151 0.125 0.229 0.152
FTA(ehni) 0.679 0.085 0.718 0.090 0.735 0.243 0.717 0.149 0.739 0.113 0.883 0.126
Const 0.550 0.442 0.106 0.499 1.842 1.004 0.896 0.700 0.035 0.646 -0.587 0.762
Number of obs. 1875 1346 373 494 636 372
Wald chi2 18252.49 13808.42 5621.75 8111.02 8694.14 6887.57
1999-2010 2003-2010 1999-2001 2002-2005 2006-2007 2007-2010
Panel FGLS Panel FGLS Panel FGLS Panel FGLS Panel FGLS Panel FGLS
48 
 
Appendix II: Equation (1) Year to Year Estimation Results 
 
 
est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
Source Country
Exporter: Si
Australia -3.727 0.201 -3.555 0.185 -3.830 0.195 -3.780 0.232 -3.573 0.238 -3.735 0.242
Canada -4.355 0.171 -3.973 0.164 -4.237 0.175 -4.202 0.200 -4.053 0.238 -3.982 0.215
China -0.924 0.197 -0.078 0.175 -0.184 0.190 0.122 0.190 0.743 0.193 0.673 0.203
France -2.110 0.158 -2.238 0.145 -2.343 0.168 -2.255 0.183 -2.288 0.194 -2.438 0.177
Germany -1.528 0.156 -1.274 0.142 -1.566 0.151 -1.733 0.179 -1.216 0.208 -1.220 0.187
India -2.726 0.182 -2.245 0.169 -2.547 0.188 -2.116 0.216 -1.830 0.230 -1.935 0.215
Indonesia -3.049 0.150 -3.028 0.154 -3.289 0.154 -2.934 0.186 -2.768 0.215 -3.596 0.195
Italy -2.190 0.171 -1.863 0.139 -2.143 0.169 -2.142 0.179 -1.582 0.180 -1.751 0.178
Japan 0.160 0.191 0.257 0.189 0.062 0.185 0.250 0.211 0.220 0.221 0.127 0.200
Korea Rp -1.674 0.447 -1.459 0.455 -1.443 0.454 -0.840 0.408 -1.094 0.476 -1.176 0.448
Malaysia -4.315 0.174 -4.440 0.177 -4.568 0.178 -4.401 0.179 -4.006 0.212 -3.209 0.193
Pakistan (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) -5.225 0.267 (omitted) (omitted)
Philippines -8.347 0.250 (omitted) -6.993 0.234 -6.949 0.265 (omitted) -5.801 0.253
Sri Lanka (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) -6.010 0.323 -6.363 0.366 -7.268 0.339
Thailand (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) -3.666 0.192 (omitted) (omitted)
UK -2.918 0.168 -2.632 0.152 -3.007 0.164 -3.002 0.172 -2.683 0.190 -2.697 0.176
Deatination Country
Importer: Sn
Australia 0.705 0.248 0.646 0.248 0.796 0.267 0.577 0.253 0.646 0.276 0.851 0.275
Canada 1.980 0.305 1.857 0.330 2.076 0.325 1.856 0.296 2.094 0.338 2.066 0.315
China -0.601 0.286 -1.122 0.276 -1.079 0.288 -1.500 0.315 -1.894 0.344 -2.036 0.342
France -0.429 0.259 0.097 0.260 0.168 0.269 0.280 0.260 0.703 0.281 0.926 0.270
Germany 0.223 0.272 0.179 0.267 0.550 0.268 0.871 0.278 0.648 0.301 0.585 0.289
India -1.181 0.257 -1.267 0.251 -1.061 0.267 -1.241 0.285 -1.099 0.276 -0.694 0.275
Indonesia -0.190 0.314 0.209 0.314 0.612 0.304 -0.203 0.314 -0.044 0.342 0.845 0.307
Italy -0.740 0.324 -0.740 0.316 -0.642 0.325 -0.359 0.304 -0.415 0.337 -0.620 0.329
Japan -1.577 0.278 -1.596 0.275 -1.446 0.288 -1.586 0.291 -1.504 0.294 -1.672 0.288
Korea Rp -0.251 0.240 -0.331 0.239 -0.431 0.251 -0.754 0.258 -0.401 0.285 0.079 0.276
Malaysia 2.795 0.310 3.122 0.298 3.287 0.298 2.882 0.300 2.587 0.323 1.330 0.306
Pakistan (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 0.657 0.270 (omitted) (omitted)
Philippines 6.820 0.311 (omitted) 5.079 0.318 4.672 0.284 (omitted) 2.877 0.317
Sri Lanka (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 0.136 0.372 1.332 0.404 2.742 0.384
Thailand (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 1.926 0.271 (omitted) (omitted)
UK 1.491 0.287 1.287 0.298 1.570 0.289 1.862 0.297 1.751 0.338 1.562 0.320
Distance(ln(distni)) -0.453 0.129 -0.361 0.131 -0.520 0.115 -0.310 0.101 -0.203 0.133 -0.190 0.118
Shaired border(bni) -0.043 0.230 0.018 0.211 -0.078 0.221 0.150 0.191 0.396 0.238 0.236 0.215
FTA(ehni) 0.642 0.287 0.800 0.287 0.492 0.241 0.842 0.187 0.821 0.223 1.090 0.216
Const 1.254 1.196 0.234 1.208 1.756 1.098 -0.182 0.971 -1.436 1.263 -1.501 1.104
Number of obs. 182 156 182 272 182 210
LOG Likelihood -168.76 -133.072 -166.978 -286.529 -192.096 -218.003
2005 2006 2007 20082003 2004
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLSFGLS FGLS
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1. Introduction
Are the markets for high-quality goods more remote than for low-quality goods?
The response of many studies appears to be in the affirmative (Bastos and Silva (2010),
Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Manova and Zhang (2012), Martin (2012)). However, while
this positive relationship between the quality of goods and the distance to market results
only from simple observation, it does lead to a more primary concern when evaluating trade
models and the specification of trade costs. This is because this empirical relationship is
inconsistent with the prediction of standard firm heterogeneity models in the absence of a
quality dimension and the specification of iceberg-type trade costs. Therefore, we need to
incorporate novel elements into our modelling, in the form of quality sorting and the presence
of specific trade costs, to reconcile the available empirical and theoretical evidence.
A quality-sorting mechanism introduces quality into standard firm heterogeneity mod-
els. Because high-quality products are also highly profitable, they can overcome the signif-
icant trade costs associated with long distances to market. In contrast, in standard firm
heterogeneity trade models, as distance increases, only highly productive, hence low-cost,
firms can provide supply. Because low-cost producers are able to set lower prices, when
measuring quality the average free on board (FOB) price, the FOB price is typically lower
in distant markets, which is not what the pattern of observed data suggests. Hence, it is
necessary to incorporate quality in a firm-heterogeneity model to account for the supposed
positive relationship between quality and distance (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011).
The presence of specific costs also account for the positive relationship between good
quality and distance to market. The relative prices of high quality, and therefore higher-
priced goods, are lower in distant markets when there are specific costs in trade. Hence,
the relative demand for high-quality goods is also high in these markets. This enables firms
producing high-quality goods to ship to these more distant markets, a process referred to as
the Alchian–Allen effect (Hummels and Skiba, 2004). Importantly, this change in relative
prices does not arise under iceberg-type trade costs.
However, because of data limitations, to our knowledge, the Alchian–Allen and quality-
sorting effects have not been jointly analyzed using individual pricing data. In the literature,
the FOB price (the unit value) of export goods is regressed on the distance to market. Unit
value is then the measure of quality. Unfortunately, in most cases, no data on trade costs
are available. Because the Alchian–Allen effects concern the specification of the trade cost
function, to identify the impacts of the quality-sorting and Alchian–Allen effects, we need to
link quality, trade costs, and distance separately. However, in the absence of trade cost data,
we could erroneously attribute variations in quality to distance, not to trade costs. Thus,
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with the exception of Hummels (2001) and Hummels and Skiba (2004), such an identification
remains undone because trade cost information is usually unavailable. The contribution of
this study to the literature is then to analyze the quality-sorting and Alchian–Allen effects
jointly and identify these effects separately.
In the recent literature, several studies incorporate specific cost components in trade
costs and assess their size and impact. For instance, Irarrazabal et al. (2013) show that
the size of specific costs is large and significant, while Khandelwal et al. (2013) use specific
costs to model quotas, which affect firm behavior in a different way from an ad-valorem cost
reduction. While our study shares a common motivation concerning the impact of specific
costs, our focus is slightly different, which is the identification of the impact of distance on
ad-valorem and specific costs.
In this paper, we first follow Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2004) suggestion for use
of the price of production (at the source or origin). The use of source and market price data
enables us to measure trade costs because there is actual delivery between these areas. As
examples of the use of origin information, Donaldson (2013) uses salt price data in India,
Atkin and Donaldson (2014) employ price data in Ethiopia and Nigeria, for which source
prices are also available, and Kano et al. (2013) use wholesale vegetable price data in
Japan, including a detailed description that allows the identification of identical products
in different locations. Because price differentials reflect both ad-valorem and specific costs,
it remains necessary to identify these costs separately. Then by utilizing the monotonic
relationship between price and quality arising from the optimal price formula, we are able
to obtain information on quality and production costs from the price data. Because variable
costs consist of ad-valorem trade costs multiplied by production and specific costs, derived
production costs enable us to separate ad-valorem costs from specific costs.
There is also an additional identification problem in that if transport is too costly,
even high-quality goods may not be supplied to distant markets. This self-selection bias is
absent in most of the literature, with the exception of Kano et al. (2013, 2014), and may
serve to create an under biased distance effect. To overcome this, we employ unique micro
data on agricultural product (vegetable) prices in Japan. As in Kano et al. (2013, 2014), this
data set contains market and origin prices, and information on the region where a product is
produced. Thus, we can establish product delivery patterns and take into account selection
bias arising because of delivery choices.
The analysis in this paper begins with reduced-form regressions as in the existing
literature. Our origin price is approximately equivalent to a FOB price in the literature,
which is used to measure product quality. Therefore, we first simply regress origin prices on
distance to markets and find that our vegetable qualities are also positively associated with
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the distance to market. We then estimate the structural model to obtain the ad-valorem
and specific cost components separately. We use the origin price and markup formula to
back out the cost of production and utilize the derived production cost to identify the ad-
valorem and specific costs. Our estimations show that the specific cost component is more
distance elastic than the ad-valorem component, which is qualitatively consistent with the
specification adopted by Hummels and Skiba (2004). The empirical analysis also shows
that the technology parameter connecting production costs and quality is positive (high-cost
producers produce high-quality goods). However, the magnitude of the increase in quality
associated with these costs alone is not sufficient to account for the positive link between
quality and distance, suggesting that the quality-sorting effect is weak. The presence of
specific costs is then important for a positive relationship between quality and distance.
In addition, the size of the technology parameter in the case of no specific costs is higher
than when we consider specific costs. This suggests that in the absence of specific costs,
the technology parameter is overestimated. Thus, our contribution is to detect not only
the relationship between quality and distance, but also the technical relationship between
quality and costs.
Existing studies, such as Irarrazabal et al. (2013), have also identified the significance
of specific costs. The identification strategy in Irarrazabal et al. (2013) is to utilize the
property that the presence of specific costs changes the demand elasticity. To identify this,
Irarrazabal et al. (2013) estimate the size of the specific costs relative to the ad-valorem
costs using the data variation in FOB (producer) prices and destinations (trade costs). Our
study is notable in that we estimate the ad-valorem and specific components separately and
then identify how these costs are sensitive to distance. Additionally, we also estimate the
elasticity of substitution parameter and thus obtain the key parameters in the heterogeneous-
quality model, including the dispersion of productivity, the elasticity of substitution, and the
distance elasticity. As these determine the behavior of the heterogeneity model, our estimates
then yield a benchmark for evaluating the implications of existing theoretical models.
Of course, our results relate in part to the characteristics of the data employed. In
particular, we use price data for agricultural products. Thus, the reason for the rather
weak effect of quality sorting in our analysis is that vegetable production is constrained by
geographic conditions. While some farmers may produce high-quality goods using superior
technology (e.g., greenhouses), farmer productivity is generally not associated with quality
rather with costs. Thus, the demand side may matter more. Specific costs make the price of
high-quality goods relatively low, creating relatively high demand in remote markets. Hence,
the presence of specific costs in our model encourages farmers producing high-quality goods
to deliver their product to distant markets.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
reduced-form regressions representing the relationship between quality and distance. In
Section 3, we set up a structural model for our estimations and conduct Monte Carlo exercises
to demonstrate the bias in the standard model. Section 4 introduces our data set, and Section
5 details the specification of our model. Section 6 reports the estimation results, and Section
7 provides some robustness checks. In Section 8, we evaluate the welfare improvements
associated with the reduction in trade costs using general equilibrium model simulations.
The final section concludes the paper.
2. Reduced-Form Relationship
A positive relationship between FOB prices and distance has been obtained in a number of
previous studies, including Bastos and Silva (2010), Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Manova
and Zhang (2012), and Martin (2012). This observation motivates the introduction of quality
because it is not consistent with a standard firm heterogeneity model. In the standard
heterogeneous model, high-productivity firms enter a market with high entry costs (e.g.,
high transport costs) and can set low prices, so there will be a negative relationship between
FOB prices and distance to markets. The introduction of a quality dimension into the
firm-heterogeneity model leads to the case where high-FOB-price firms produce high-quality
goods, and therefore these firms sell to markets that are more distant. In this section, we
conduct similar exercises using regional price data, which contain the price set in the origin
market (the production site). After controlling for market-specific effects, the origin prices
capture the quality of the product. Therefore, our empirical exercise is comparable to that
in the literature.
We use vegetable wholesale price data for Japan. Because our data set includes
detailed information about product characteristics, we can compare the prices of identical
products. In Japan, vegetables trade in a wholesale market in each prefecture, so we can
obtain the price in the production prefecture (the origin price) and the price in the market
(the market price). We depict the key observation in the relationship between quality and
the distance to market by plotting origin price and distance in Figure 1. We plot the log of
distance on the horizontal axis and the log of the origin price on the vertical axis. All figures
illustrate a positive relationship between distance and origin price. Thus, there is a positive
relationship in our data set.
=== Figure 1 here ===
Next, we report the results of the reduced-form regressions. As in the extant litera-
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ture, we regress the price at the source on the distance to the destination:
ln pjj = const+ lnDnj + ηnj, (1)
where pjj is the price in region j, Dnj is the distance between origin j and the market n,
and ηnj is the error term. Using OLS, we find that there is a positive relationship between
quality and distance as reported in Table 1 and the fitted lines in the figure. Note that
because this regression does not control for region-specific effects, this positive relationship
may result from regional shocks. Thus, we conduct the same regressions after including
origin- and market-specific effects. The estimates reflecting regional-specific effects also
display a positive relationship.
=== Table 1 here ===
As discussed in the literature, several models can explain this positive link. Unfortu-
nately, the results of the reduced-form regressions do not provide us with information about
the structural parameters, such as distance elasticity. The purpose of this analysis is then
to identify the important structural parameters in quality heterogeneity models.
3. Model
We adopt a standard monopolistic competition, producer heterogeneity, product quality
model following Baldwin and Harrigan (2011). An additional feature is the introduction of
specific costs. Assume that there are I regions and in each region there is a continuum of
producers whose mass is expressed by Nj.
A Cobb–Douglas CES utility function expresses the preferences of consumers in region
n:
Un = (
∫
z∈Jn
(cnjqnj)
(σ−1)/σdk)(σ/(σ−1))µZ1−µ, (2)
where Jn is a set of products delivered to region I, and Z is the consumption of numeraire
goods. With the budget constraint, Ynµ =
∫
pnj(k)cnj(k), the demand function is:
cnj(k) =
p−σnj
q1−σnj
Ynµ
P 1−σn
, (3)
where Pn = (
∫
(pnj/qnj)
1−σ)1/(1−σ). This signifies that as the quality of goods improves,
consumer demand increases. Quality then acts as a demand shifter in this setting.
We assume that producers produce a differentiated product, face local demand xnj(z),
and maximize their profits. On the cost side, producers must pay labor and transportation
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costs. The transportation costs consist of ad-valorem and specific costs. Thus, we express
profits from market n with:
pinj = pnjxnj − anjτnjxnj − tnjxnj − fnj, (4)
where τnj is the ad-valorem component, tnj is the specific component in transportation costs,
and a is the unit cost. Quality sorting implies that high-cost producers produce high-quality
goods. We assume a monotonic relationship between quality and production costs:
q = f(a). (5)
This is required for us to estimate the quality-sorting model. If the relationship between costs
and quality is not monotonic—for example, a U-shaped relationship—we cannot identify the
parameter that determines the quality-sorting pattern. We further assume a parametric
form of f(.). As in Baldwin and Harrigan (2012), we assume that producers decide their
cost level, and the quality of their products is then a function of that cost level:
q = a1+θ. (6)
Thus, if θ > −1, then high-cost producers produce high-quality goods. If θ > 0 and specific
costs are zero, then high-cost producers will deliver their products to more remote markets
than low-cost producers because the rate of quality improvement is greater than that of
the increase in cost. This provides the mechanism for quality sorting: high-cost producers
produce high-quality goods, so they are more profitable than low-quality producers and
hence can reach more costly markets.
Producers facing the local demand function (2) maximize their profits by setting the
optimal price in market n:
pnj =
σ
σ − 1(τnja+ tnj). (7)
We assume that there are no interregional transportation costs for within-region trade:
pjj =
σa
σ − 1 . (8)
Thus, by inverting the above price formula, we can express the cost level of the producer.
Using this implied cost enables us to recover the quality level. In our data set, as we can
observe the market price and the place of production, we can use the above relationship to
identify the specific cost component separately from the ad-valorem component.1
1There is a slight difference between the FOB price and the source price. By definition, FOB price, pFOB ,
satisfies the following equation: pmarket = τpFOB+t. Thus, pFOB = (σ/(σ−1))(a+t/στ). However, because
the source price is the price set for the source market without trade costs, psource = (σa/(σ − 1)).
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With regard to trade costs, the key idea is that by using source and market prices,
we can measure trade costs using price data. We normalize interregional trade costs by
local trade costs incurred for local delivery; thus, all trade costs are relative to the local
cost of delivery. In addition, because price is a monotonic function of production costs, we
can replicate costs using price data. Furthermore, given that the price differential function
depends on distance and the interaction term between distance and costs, we can also identify
the interaction term using the price data.
The price differentials between markets and sources are:
pnj
pjj
= τnj +
1
a
tnj. (9)
Hence, in the price differential equation, while we include the ad-valorem term in the equation
directly, the specific component is interacted with the cost term. This serves to identify the
ad-valorem and specific terms separately.
The above price differential equation is observed only when there is actual delivery
from j to n. Thus, we need to consider the producer’s delivery decision. The profit function
is:
pinj =
( σ
σ−1)
1−σ(τnja+ tnj)1−σ
q1−σnj
Y µ
σP 1−σn
− f. (10)
If profit is positive, there will be delivery from source j to market n. We construct a delivery
decision variable, Vnj:
Vnj = [
( σ
σ−1)
1−σ(τnja+ tnj)1−σ
q1−σnj
Y µ
σP 1−σn
]/f. (11)
If V > 1, then there is delivery from j to n. As Irarrazabal et al. (2013) show, because of
specific costs, even the lowest-cost producer (a ≈ 0) earns finite profits. Thus, other than
the above condition, there is a further selection condition; i.e., whether producer costs are
sufficiently low to obtain profits to cover fixed costs. We assume that this condition holds
in order to focus on the entry condition.
To close the general equilibrium model, we can assume that each consumer supplies
one unit of labor for production, a numeraire good is produced using the unit of labor, and
this is freely traded across regions. This ensures that the wage rate is equal to one and trade
balance is attained. However, to focus on the identification of trade costs, we simply analyze
individual producer behavior. Regional fixed effects in the estimations capture the general
equilibrium effects. For explicit treatment of the general equilibrium effects, we conduct
Monte Carlo exercises to reveal how large trade cost reductions increase welfare.
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3.1 Illustration of Bias
We conduct Monte Carlo experiments based on the model in the previous section to
demonstrate that the estimates using a model without specific costs account for the bias. We
create a linear economy geographically separated into 47 regions on the integer line between
1 and 47 sequentially. This linear economy implies that the distance between regions i and
j, dij, is equal to |j − i| with a minimum distance of 1 and a maximum distance of 46.
We assume that the shape of the demand function is common across the regions and
characterized by an elasticity of substitution parameter equal to 3.75. Because we focus
on estimates using a model with regional fixed effects, each region is also characterized by
an aggregate price and aggregate real expenditure, both of which we set to 20.00. For
simplicity, we ignore the cross-regional variations in productivity. We assume that in each
region, a product is produced with a productivity level equal to 0.99 and a factor cost set
to 1. Gaussian random components appear in both the fixed cost and the trade costs. In
the fixed costs, the random term has a standard deviation of 0.65. Idiosyncratic random
variations in trade costs are captured by the standard deviation, which is 0.25.
In our Monte Carlo experiment, we first draw 100 sets of Gaussian random variables
of fixed and trade cost components, uij and vij independently from their distributions. We
then calculate the price differentials and the selection equation under the hypothesized value
of the distance elasticity of trade costs, being 0.3 for the ad-valorem trade cost and 0.5 for the
specific trade cost. In each Monte Carlo draw of the true value of the distance elasticity, we
then implement our estimations of the distance elasticity. The first is the FIML estimation
without specific costs and the second is the FIML with specific costs. By construction, the
FIML estimation without specific costs suffers bias caused by misspecification. Because the
trade cost associated with the specific component is captured by the ad-valorem component,
the distance elasticity of the ad-valorem trade costs will be over biased. Similarly, because
the presence of specific costs delivers high-quality goods to distant markets, the elasticity of
quality with respect to costs also captures this effect. If this quality elasticity is high, high-
quality products are highly profitable, and thus shipped to distant market. With specific
costs, the distance elasticity of specific costs correctly estimates this Alchian–Allen effect.
However, without specific costs, the positive relationship between quality and the distance
to market will be included in the quality elasticity estimates.
Figure 2 reports the nonparametrically smoothed densities of the distance and quality
elasticity estimates with the Gaussian kernel. The top panel corresponds to the model with
specific cost and the bottom panel to that without specific costs. The figures in the top
panel show that the estimates using the true model are consistent and distributed around
the underlying true value. However, the figures in the bottom panel reveal that the estimates
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using the model without specific costs are subject to sever over bias. As we have argued,
while the true ad-valorem distance elasticity is 0.3, the median value of the estimates is
0.536. Similarly, while the true quality elasticity is -0.15, the median is 0.591. Hence, the
Monte Carlo exercise confirms the necessity of incorporating a specific cost component for
drawing correct inferences on the distance and quality elasticities.
=== Figure 2 here ===
4. Data
We conduct our empirical research using the product-level data. We employ a daily data
set of the wholesale prices of agricultural products in Japan, known as “the Daily Wholesale
Market Information of Fresh Vegetables and Fruits.”2 This daily market survey reports the
wholesale prices and quantities sold of some 120 different fruits and vegetables. We use the
2007 report representing 274 market-opening days.
The main advantage of the data set is in including information about individual
product characteristics and a detailed categorization, such that each vegetable is classified by
brand, size, grade, and source region. For example, the cabbage category typically includes
“cabbage,” “red cabbage,” and “spring cabbage.” Our data set then reports that cabbages
of size “6” and grade “syu (excellent)” produced in Aichi Prefecture traded in the Aichi and
Tokyo markets on July 1, 2007. As also shown, the price of this type of cabbage is 31.5 yen
per kilogram in Aichi and 36.8 yen in Tokyo. Thus, we can calculate the price differential
between these two locations, which may reflect the trade costs between two prefectures.
Comparing the prices in different locations to infer trade costs is meaningful if the
goods are identical as in the law of one price (LOP) literature, and in fact, the prices of these
goods are comparable. As discussed, our data have a high degree of categorization, which is
useful for our purpose of assessing our hypothesis. Furthermore, because our data represent
information on agricultural products, goods can differ depending on the date of production.
However, we do not have exact information on the production date, so we assume that
these goods are different when the trading dates are different. Thus, while this represents a
slight shortcoming, the information in our data set provides us with the identification of an
identical product in terms of many aspects of product characteristics.
The price differential, qnj, that reflects trade costs is obtained by subtracting the
wholesale price in source prefecture j, pjj, from that in consuming prefecture n, pnj.
3 The
2Our data set is identical to that employed in Kano et al. (2013, 2014).
3All of the products are sold in markets, but not necessarily in their markets of origin. In this case, when
we cannot observe both the market and source prices, we eliminate these product entries.
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price in source, pjj, is the price when we observe product l being delivered from the producer
to the wholesale market in the source prefecture. If this product is also shipped to market
n, then pnj is also observed. Thus, we set Tnj = 1 for pair (n, j) if we can calculate the price
differentials, qnj.
With regard to the distance between regions, we define interprefectural distance as
the direct distance between prefectural head offices in the prefectural capital cities. We
set the internal distance to 10 km, because the minimum interprefectural distance is 10.4
km (Kyoto–Shiga), and therefore we set the internal distance shorter than the minimum
interprefectural distance. In a later section, we use the Head and Mayer (2000) internal
distance formula as a robustness check. Natural conditions, not only market conditions,
may affect regional prices. For example, preferences and the production of vegetables may
change according to the air temperature. Thus, we use daily temperature data for the market
and origin to control for these daily variations. As these are exogenous variables, they will
also be helpful for identification of our selection models.
=== Table 2 here ===
We focus our exercise on three vegetables; namely, cabbage, Chinese cabbage (c-
cabbage, hereafter), and lettuce. As discussed in Section 2, these are the vegetables that are
priced higher in the source region and shipped to more distant markets. Table 2 summarizes
several descriptive statistics for these products, indicating that each product is highly cate-
gorized by product variety, size, and grade. The number of distinct product entries is quite
large: 1,207 for cabbage, 1,001 for c-cabbage, and 903 for lettuce. We assume that these
products differ when the trading date changes, so to a certain degree, our price differential
data are the price differentials of identical products. The average prices are 77.833 yen for
cabbage, 61.628 for c-cabbage, and 183.909 for lettuce. There are also market prices in the
data. Because we use origin prices to measure quality, Table 1 also reports the prices at the
origin. The average origin prices are 67.431, 50.671, and 168.855 for cabbage, c-cabbage,
and lettuce, respectively. Thus, market prices outside the origin region are higher than in
the origin region. This is primarily because it is costly to ship goods to distant markets.
Because we consider the truck transportation market competitive, we do not need to consider
markups in the transport sector, unlike Hummels et al (2009). Our purpose is to address how
much these price differentials reflect the shipping of high-quality goods to distant markets.
Estimating a trade model to identify the key parameters should provide us with an answer
to this question.
To understand the behavior of product shipment, we count the number of delivery
Tijl = 1 and nondelivery Tijl = 0 cases. We identify product delivery Tijl = 1 if the data
report that the source prefecture of product entry l sold in consuming region i is region j. If
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we observe no market price and only origin prices, then we set Tijl = 0. As shown in Table
1, there are some 230,000 delivery and nondelivery cases for each vegetable. This provides
the number of observations for our full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation.
Out of the total number of delivery and nondelivery cases, the number of delivery cases
is relatively small, only about 10,000 for each vegetable. Our data set thus suggests that
product delivery is quite limited. It is clear that product delivery therefore is quite local and
tends to concentrate in the local areas neighboring the producing prefectures. This raises
some concern with sample selection. There is an additional concern about these delivery
patterns. If products do not ship to markets directly, then the actual delivery distance will
be much longer than that between the final market and the origin. This will cause over bias
in the distance effects. However, the share of transferred vegetables is low, normally less
than 7 percent according to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Thus, the
influence of transit goods in our data is not significant.
As mentioned, we measure product quality with the local price (the price in the source
region). Because local shocks affect local market prices, we need to control for such specific
effects. If demand shocks occur locally, the price will be higher without any improvement
of quality. We consider this by including region-specific effects in our estimations. When
supply shocks take place—i.e., an increase in production costs—the price will be also higher.
If the cost associated with quality improvement increases, the Baldwin and Harrigan (2011)
framework that we employ will capture it. Conversely, source-region-specific effects reflect
cost shocks unrelated to quality.
5. Empirical Specification
In this section, we specify the functional form of the transport cost functions and other
elements for estimation. We assume that the ad-valorem and specific components are a
function of distance and other factors:
τnj = D
γ1
nj exp(const+ nj) (12)
tnj = D
γ2
nj exp(const+ nj). (13)
As we specify a monotonic relationship between price and production costs, we can invert
this relationship in terms of price and insert it into the trade cost function. For simplicity, we
assume that the remaining elements are common to the ad-valorem and specific cost terms.
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Then, the log of the price differential equation is:
ln(pnj/pjj) = const+ ln(D
γ1
nj +
1
a
Dγ2nj) + nj
= const+ ln(Dγ1nj +
σ − 1
pjjσ
Dγ2nj) + nj. (14)
Thus, using the variations in a (therefore pjj), we separately estimate γ1 and γ2.
We estimate the parameter, θ, with the self-selection condition because qnj = a
1+θ =
(pjj(σ − 1)/σ)1+θ:
lnV = ln(
σ
σ − 1)
1−σ + (1− σ) ln((pjj(σ − 1)/σ)Dγ1nj +Dγ2nj) + (1− σ)(const+ nj)
+ ln(Ynµ) + (σ − 1)((1 + θ)(ln pjj + ln(σ − 1)/σ)− lnσ − (1− σ) lnPn − fj. (15)
We estimate the system of these nonlinear equations using maximum likelihood.
5.1. Distance elasticity of quality for the threshold producer
Producers choose their product quality level according to market conditions. One
of the focuses here is on the relationship between the distance to market and the quality
of goods. As discussed earlier, empirical studies generally show that there is a positive
relationship between these two variables, such that the model provides us with the signs of
the elasticity of quality with respect to the distance to markets for the threshold producer.
For the purpose of discussion, let us begin by deriving the elasticity in the case of no specific
costs. From the zero-profit condition, the threshold value of cost, a∗, is expressed by:
( σ
σ−1)
1−σ(τnja∗)1−σ
q1−σnj
Y µ
σP 1−σn
− f = 0. (16)
By the implicit function theorem, we obtain the elasticity of costs with respect to distance
from:
da∗Dnj
dDnja∗
=
γ1
θ
. (17)
Thus, the elasticity of threshold quality (q∗) with respect to distance is:
dq∗Dnj
dDnjq∗
=
(1 + θ)γ1
θ
. (18)
If trade cost is an increasing function of distance (γ1 > 0) and the speed of quality improve-
ment is relatively high (θ > 0), then this elasticity is positive.
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In the presence of a specific type cost, the zero-profit condition is:
( σ
σ−1)
1−σ(τnja∗ + tnj)1−σ
q1−σnj
Ynµ
σP 1−σn
− f = 0. (19)
Similarly, by the implicit function theorem, the elasticity is:
da∗Dnj
dDnja∗
=
γ1D
γ1e1 + γ2D
γ2e2a∗−1
θDγ1e1 + (1 + θ)Dγ2e2a∗−1
. (20)
The sign of the above elasticity depends on not only γ1 and θ, but also γ2 and 1 + θ. As long
as γ2 > 0 and θ > −1, the elasticity will be positive, even if θ < 0. Thus, the presence of
specific costs relaxes the condition for the positive relationship between quality and distance.
6. Results: Relationship Between Quality and Distance
In this section, we report our estimation results. To compare our results with previ-
ous studies, we conduct our estimations using several different specifications: 1) structural
estimation of a simple Melitz (2003) model, 2) structural estimation with a quality model (as
in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011)), and 3) structural estimation of a firm-heterogeneity model
with quality and specific costs. To compare the results with those in the extant literature,
we begin by specifying no quality dimension and no specific costs.
Columns 1, 4, and 7 in Table 3 report the results of a model without quality dimen-
sion for cabbage, c-cabbage, and lettuce, respectively. The important parameters are the
elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of transport cost with respect to distance. The
substitution parameters are 4.957, 4.138, and 3.355 for cabbage, c-cabbage, and lettuce, re-
spectively. These values are reasonable in the context of studies of individual product data.
The distance elasticity parameters are, 0.227, 0.325, and 0.343 for cabbage, c-cabbage, and
lettuce, respectively. These are also similar to the results in Kano et al. (2013). Thus, the
distance effect is larger than those in the LOP literature, and this is because the sample
selection problem there is not controlled for as here.
=== Table 3 here ===
We now introduce quality as in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011). The results are in
Columns 2, 5, and 8 in Table 3. As shown, the estimates of the distance effect and the
elasticity of substitution are almost identical to those without quality (0.228, 0.325, and
0.345 for cabbage, c-cabbage, and lettuce, respectively). The quality parameters turn out
to be marginally negative, which suggests that high-cost producers produce high-quality
goods. However, the rate of increase of quality is slower than where high-cost producers
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deliver their products to distant markets. While the earlier reduced-form regressions show a
positive link between quality and distance, the results here imply that this is not solely the
result of quality sorting. This may also be because we conduct our analysis using daily data
for agricultural products over only a single year, such that it may be difficult to improve
product quality during the relatively short period.
Finally, we estimate the model incorporating quality and specific costs. Columns 3,
6, and 9 report the results. The distance effects for the ad-valorem term are 0.162, 0.26,
and 0.277 for cabbage, c-cabbage, and lettuce, respectively, whereas those for the specific
cost term are 0.61, 0.665, and 0.792, respectively. Hummels and Skiba (2004) suggest that
ad-valorem trade costs are only tariffs and that specific costs are distance-elastic trade costs.
Our results are at least qualitatively consistent with their specification.
The magnitude of the estimates of the quality parameter is also larger than before,
being −0.158, −0.204, and −0.193 for cabbage, c-cabbage, and lettuce, respectively. As
mentioned, if θ > 0, the model exhibits quality sorting. If −1 < θ < 0, then high-quality
goods are produced by high-cost firms, although the increase in quality is not as rapid
as the increase in costs. Thus, the positive θ is needed for the quality selection without
specific costs. However, as shown in Section 5.1, the positive relationship between quality
and distance may arise with specific costs, even if θ < 0. Hence, when we combine the
results of the distance effects with the negative values of θ, we conclude that the positive
relationship between quality and distance is a consequence of the presence of specific costs.
The Alchian–Allen effects are the driving force here.
As we have seen, without taking specific costs into account, the technology parameter
is marginally negative. However, this is because the estimation of this parameter is biased
without specific costs. If θ is large, high-cost firms produce quite high-quality goods; thus,
they ship their products to costly distant markets. However, the reason that high-quality
goods are shipped to a distant market may be that consumers have relatively high demand
for these goods in costly transport cost markets. Thus, the omitted variable (the specific
cost term) will cause the technology parameter to capture this positive demand-side effect
between distance and quality. Once we can control for specific costs, we can then identify
the true technology parameter. In fact, high costs produce high-quality goods. However,
this effect is not strong enough to account on its own for the quality-sorting mechanism in
our sample.
Two important parameters other than distance elasticity are the elasticity of sub-
stitution and the correlation parameter of the error terms. The elasticity parameters have
values between three and six, which is reasonable when using micro data. The absolute
values of the correlation parameters are all more than 0.8, suggesting strong correlations.
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Thus, sample selection may invoke a serious problem for biased estimates.
7. Quality of Distance Measure
The relationship between quality and distance may also depend on the choice of
distance measure. If the quality and distance relationship is sensitive to the measure of
distance, our results may not be considered robust. Thus, we specify a different measure of
the distance between regions as a robustness check.
In the main analysis, our measure of distance is direct distance. This may differ from
actual road distance, which may be a better proxy for transport costs. For example, Ehime
Prefecture (the author’s hometown) is 666.1 km from Tokyo by direct distance. However,
because these prefectures are located on different islands, the actual shipping distance is
much longer. In fact, the road distance between Ehime and Tokyo is 853.1 km. Thus, direct
distance may cause an over bias in the distance effect. The fact that the distance effect is
large may be simply because the actual distance is in fact longer, so each kilometer does not
impose a significant burden for suppliers. While other transport modes are available (e.g.,
air), the most relevant type of transport in our analysis is truck. Thus, a navigation software
website (navitime.co.jp) is used to calculate the road distance. Primarily, the distance for the
route using only regular roads is calculated. However, where this is not possible, highways
are included in the route. In addition, if there is no bridge between the two prefectures, the
ferry distance is included.4
Columns 2, 5, and 8 in Table 4 report the estimation results using this alternative
distance measure. For the most part, and as expected, the effect of distance here is smaller
than previously found. However, these are similar to those using direct distance. Thus, the
choice of direct or road distance does not represent a serious source of bias in our estimations.
=== Table 4 here ===
With regard to the distance measure, as discussed in the literature, the choice of
internal distance may also be important. We now employ the Head–Mayer measure of
internal distance: Djj = 0.376 ×
√
area. Figure 3 depicts the same relationship as Figure
1, which is the correlation between the origin price and the distance to market. The results
show that the parameter estimates are qualitatively similar to our simple measure of internal
distance used previously, as again there is a positive relationship, as depicted by the solid
line in the figure. Hence, our results are robust to the choice of internal distance measure.
=== Figure 3 here ===
4The data on land route distance between prefectures are available on Professor Tsukui’s website
(www.tiu.ac.jp/˜makiko/Japanese/DATA/distance between prefectures(land route).xls).
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Finally, we adopt a similar specification for the trade cost function as Hummels and
Skiba (2004), in which specific costs are increasing in product value. Because transport costs
can be high for high-value goods, the trade cost will be:
ln qnj = τnj + tij/a = D
γ1
nj + p
β
jjD
γ2
nj/a. (21)
If β < 1, then the specific transport cost increases as the value of the goods increases but
at a slower rate. This again confirms the Alchian–Allen effect. Columns 4, 7, and 10 in
Table 4 report the results of the Hummels and Skiba (2004) specification. The parameter
values for the distance elasticity and the elasticity of substitution are similar to those for the
earlier estimations. The Hummels–Skiba parameters, β, are 0.322 and 0.421 for cabbages
and lettuces, respectively. Hence, our results are also consistent with those of the Alchian–
Allen effect. For c-cabbage, the Hummels–Skiba parameter is 0.009 and is not significant;
hence, our original specification may be the appropriate representation for the specific cost
term.
One remark is worth mentioning. While our estimates reveal the large distance effects,
these may in fact be the lower bounds of distance elasticity. This is because we exclude the
price data, in which there is no information available for local delivery. Because of this, we
cannot calculate the price differentials between the origin and the destination. This means
that price differential data associated with long distances to market are not included in our
analysis, which under biases the distance effect. Consequently, the direction of bias may not
weaken our estimation results.
8. Policy Evaluation
How significant is the impact of policies reducing trade costs? To investigate the gains
from a trade cost reduction quantitatively, we conduct Monte Carlo exercises using a three-
region version of the model. To evaluate the welfare gains, we need to calculate the price
indexes numerically. However, this involves some difficulty in the convergence of a model
including 47 regions, as revealed in Section 4. Fortunately, as our focus is an illustration of
the magnitude of welfare gains, not the replication of the overall Japanese regional gains, we
create a single core region located in the middle and two peripheral regions.
We set up Monte Carlo exercises using the program developed by Irarrazabal et
al. (2013) and available through Khandelwal’s et al. (2013) website. In our model, unit
distance is set to 1.5, so the closest region is 3 and the furthest region is 4.5. Because the
elasticity for the ad-valorem cost is 0.16 and 0.61 for the specific cost, the specific trade cost
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is approximately 20 percent higher than the ad-valorem costs for the closest region and 60
percent higher for delivery from one peripheral region to the other. We conduct 150 exercises
and calculate the average welfare gains by comparing the real wages across three transition
scenarios: 1) the friction to no ad-valorem cost case, 2) the friction to the no-specific-cost
case, and 3) the friction to zero friction case.
Table 5 details the average welfare gains as denoted by the percentage increase in each
scenario. The first row reveals that the removal of ad-valorem costs increases welfare, but
only slightly. In contrast, the reduction in specific costs, which includes a large proportion
of trade costs, has a large impact, being 25 percent for the core region and 22 percent for the
peripheral regions. Finally, the third row shows that the removal of all trade costs increases
welfare by approximately 30 percent in this economy. As expected, when the impact of
specific cost removal is large, the magnitude is substantial. Our Monte Carlo experiment
thus suggests that specific trade costs are a more severe obstacle to trade than ad-valorem
costs, as also shown in Irarrazabal et al. (2013).
=== Table 5 here ===
9. Concluding Remarks
The trade literature uses the iceberg-type trade (or transport) cost function. Under
this specification, quality sorting is a mechanism thought to represent quality and the dis-
tance to markets. However, it is important to incorporate specific costs in this specification
because of the presence of the Alchian–Allen effect. Our study thus attempts to identify the
structural parameters of the quality heterogeneity model.
The main empirical test in the literature is the regression of FOB prices (unit values)
on distance. Our study extends this analysis using a structural model to reveal whether it
is the quality-sorting effect or the Alchian–Allen effect (or both) that drives the relationship
between quality and distance. We also estimate the technical parameter that connects cost
and quality and take into account selection bias associated with the choice of product delivery.
The main findings indicate that specific costs are more distance elastic than ad-valorem costs,
and that the presence of specific costs is the key element in the typical empirical observation
of a positive link between quality and distance.
While our study reveals the importance of specific costs, further study is required.
For example, with CES preferences, monopolistically competitive firms set constant markup
prices to all the markets that they serve. However, pricing behavior may differ across markets.
In addition, because firms may not pass the increase in production costs on to market prices,
the estimation of the distance effect may be biased. Pricing to market behavior also depends
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on market competitiveness and the levels of market income (e.g., Lugovskyy and Skiba
(2012)). Thus, to take into account the effect of distance fully, we need to incorporate
pricing to market behavior. Further research in this area is therefore required.
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Cabbage Cabbage C-Cabbage C-Cabbage Lettuce Lettuce
Distance 0.074 0.007 0.106 0.01 0.046 0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.03) (0.005 ) (0.003) 0.004
Num. of Obs. 15841 15841 10803 10803 11565 11565
R squared 0.065 0.494 0.105 0.504 0.019 0.364
Region-Specific Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table 1: Reduced-Form Estimation Results
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Cabbage C-Cabbage Lettuce
Average market price 77.833 61.628 183.909
Average local price 67.431 50.671 168.855
Product entry
No. of varieties 3 4 7
No. of size categories 63 50 71
No. of grade categories 34 50 46
No. of producing prefectures 47 46 43
No. of distinct product entries 1207 1001 903
Data truncation
No. of Tnj(l) = 1 or 0 369343 241871 239703
No. of Tnj(l) = 1 15841 10803 11565
Table 2: Summary Statistics
70
Cabbage Cabbage Cabbage C-Cab C-Cab C-Cab Lettuce Lettuce Lettuce
Parameter No Q, No S Q, No S Q, S No Q, N S Q, N S Q, S N Q, N Ss Q, N S Q, S
γ1 0.227 0.228 0.162 0.325 0.325 0.26 0.343 0.345 0.277
(0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
γ2 0.61 0.665 0.792
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
θ -0.041 -0.158 -0.038 -0.204 -0.089 -0.193
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
 4.957 4.966 5.219 4.138 4.149 4.374 3.355 3.363 3.491
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.02) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
ρ -0.84 -0.847 -0.847 -0.82 -0.826 -0.829 -0.859 -0.872 -0.87
(0.0023) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Num. of Obs. 369343 369343 369343 241871 241871 241871 239703 239703 239703
Log-likelihood -21404.133 -21344.762 -20234.094 -21404.133 -21344.762 -20234.094 -22296.627 -22151.746 –21571.669
Table 3: Estimation Results
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Cab Cab Cab C-Cab C-Cab C-Cab Lettuce Lettuce Lettuce
Parameter Road Dist HM Dist HS Spec Road Dist HM Dist HS Spec Road Dist HM Dist HS Spec
γ1 0.144 0.222 0.146 0.225 0.36 0.251 0.257 0.337 0.254
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
γ2 0.593 0.653 0.462 0.618 0.714 0.647 0.764 0.846 0.563
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012)
θ -0.173 -0.14 -0.166 -0.213 -0.165 -0.2 -0.206 -0.176 -0.2
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
 5.272 5.089 5.24 4.404 4.252 4.376 3.509 3.456 3.505
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
HS par 0.322 0.009 0.421
(0.018) (0.028) (0.022)
ρ -0.845 -0.841 -0.847 -0.83 -0.825 -0.829 -0.871 -0.865 -0.87
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Num. of Obs. 369343 369343 369343 241871 241871 241871 239703 239703 239703
Log-likelihood -19347.496 -23247.471 -20153.728 -13148.843 -15946.852 -13612.545 -20971.987 -23598.581 -21500.773
Table 4: Estimation Results
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Welfare Gains (% increase) Core Periphery
Friction to No Ad-valorem costs 0.132% 0.07%
Friction to No Specific costs 25.133% 22.131%
Friction to No Friction 30.413% 31%
Size of the trade costs
τ 1.067 1.192
t 1.281 1.955
t/τ (Specific/Ad-valorem cost) 120.017% 163.974%
Table 5: Average Welfare Gains
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Figure 1: Logs of distance and source price relationship
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Figure 2: Logs of distance and source price relationship (Head–Mayer internal distance
measure)
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Figure 3: Kernel densities of estimators of distance and quality elasticities
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The Japanese and Chinese Models of Industrial Organisation:  
Fighting for Supremacy in the Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry1 
 
Mai Fujita 
 
Abstract  
This paper explores the consequences of the emerging rivalry between Japanese and 
Chinese manufacturers. It focuses specifically on industrial organisation, one of the key 
factors that underlie the competitiveness of manufacturing industries. The question to be 
asked is what happens when distinctive models of industrial organisation, coming from 
Japan and China, clash in a developing country. An in- depth longitudinal analysis of the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry adopting a modified version of the global value chain 
governance theory shows that a decade- long industrial transformation resulted in 
organisational diversity. The implications of the analysis for the literature on industrial 
organisation are discussed. 
 
Keywords: industrial organisation, Vietnam, China, Japan, motorcycle industry 
JEL classification: L10, L22, L62 
 
1. Introduction 
In the 1980s, the Japanese manufacturing industry was at the forefront of research on 
economic development and competitiveness. In an attempt to determine the sources of 
Japanese competitive advantage, researchers examined how the distinctive models of 
intra- and inter-firm organisation – characterised by lean production and trust-based 
supplier relations – contributed to the sustainment of superior product development 
and manufacturing performance (Smitka 1991; Clark and Fujimoto 1990, 1991; 
Nishiguchi 1994; Dyer 1996; Fujimoto 1999; Lecler 2004). It is now acknowledged 
worldwide that the hierarchical, captive model of inter-firm organisation consisting of 
                                                  
1  This research was partially supported by Grant‐in‐Aid for Scientific Research (C) on “Assembler‐ 
Supplier Relationship and the Growth of Local Component Suppliers in the Vietnamese Motorcycle 
Industry” (Project No. 20510243) of the Japan Society for Scientific Research. 
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a powerful lead firm and closely aligned suppliers helped Japanese manufacturing 
firms to achieve superior product development and productivity performance; thus, 
establishing leading positions on major world markets, where consumers valued high 
quality, product differentiation, and fast product innovation.  
The influence of the Japanese model was not restricted to the domestic market. As 
Japanese firms expanded abroad via FDI, the original model was transferred and 
adapted to different country contexts. As Japanese and local firms engaged in rounds 
of organisational competition and adaptation in the host country environment, various 
hybrid forms of industrial organisation emerged, which resulted in increased 
organisational diversity (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Sako 1992; Helper and Sako 
1995; Guiheux and Lecler 2000; Ernst 2002; Sturgeon 2007). The Japanese model was 
also adopted independently in both developed and developing countries by local 
producers seeking to improve the productivity of their operations (Kaplinsky 1995; 
Posthuma 1995a, 1995b; Harriss 1995; Humphrey et al. 1998). 
Two decades later, the global industrial landscape has changed. As the growth centres 
of the world’s leading manufacturers have shifted to developing countries, Japanese 
manufacturers face major challenges from Chinese firms, which have attained 
overwhelming cost advantages by means of a distinctive form of industrial 
organisation. The existence of a uniquely Chinese model of industrial organisation has 
not been recognised widely. In a separate paper (Fujita 2013a), based on the literature 
and my own analysis, I sought to establish the key features of the Chinese model of 
industrial organisation, which I found to be characterised by intense price-based 
competition between a large number of lead firms and suppliers engaged in 
arm’s-length transactions. Such an organisational model has enabled Chinese firms to 
attain remarkable levels of price-based competitiveness that challenge the Japanese 
industry leaders.   
This paper investigates the new patterns of rivalry emerging out of the rise of the 
Chinese model of industrial organisation. It does so by examining what happens when 
the two models of industrial organisation, coming from Japan and China respectively, 
clash in a third Asian developing country that seeks to establish its competitive 
industry. Which model is more adaptable to local conditions? Is one superior to the 
other? Do they exist side by side? Does competition open up space for a distinctively 
different model of industrial organisation? How do firm responses vary over time? 
These are the questions that this paper seeks to address. 
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Indeed, the aforementioned questions are at the forefront of research on economic 
development and competitiveness. There has long been a discussion on the relevance 
of models of industrial organisation for the pace and patterns of economic development. 
This line of research asks: how important have models of industrial organisation been 
in their countries of origin; how relevant are they for other countries; can they be 
transferred; and, if so, what adjustments need to be made? These and similar questions 
were raised by a group of researchers in a special issue of World Development in 
1995.2 The overall conclusion reached was that research on industrial organisation 
needs to extend beyond models to analyse the trajectories of diffusion and adaptation 
(Humphrey 1995).  
However, although the importance of analysing trajectories of organisational change is 
widely recognised, this has rarely been done systematically. One of the major obstacles 
in this regard has been the lack of a conceptual device for systematically explaining the 
complex processes of organisational transformation, which are shaped by a myriad of 
factors – technological, strategic, institutional, and social. Nevertheless, recent 
theoretical development in the field of global value chain (GVC) governance perhaps 
offers a way forward (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
The present paper utilises an adapted version of Gereffi et al.’s (2005) framework of 
GVC governance developed by Fujita (2013a) to describe and explain the short- and 
medium-term dynamics of organisational adaptation arising from the clash of Japanese 
and Chinese models. In so doing, it seeks to highlight the challenges and tensions that 
firms might face in the process of organisational transformation, and how such 
problems could be overcome. 
In examining the clash of the Japanese and Chinese models in a third country context, 
the paper takes the context of Vietnam and examines the case of its motorcycle 
industry. The rationale for focussing on this sector is because the motorcycle industry 
is the one in which a direct clash between the two models is most prominent, and 
Vietnam was the first locality outside China in which they clashed head-on and fought 
for supremacy. It is now well known that the massive imports of low-priced Chinese 
motorcycles into Vietnam in the early 2000s had a huge impact on the Japanese 
industry leaders (Cohen 2002). What is less well known is that there were repeated 
                                                  
2  Special issue on ‘Industrial Organization and Manufacturing Competitiveness in Developing 
Countries’, Vol. 23 No.1. 
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rounds of organisational adaptation triggered by the emergence of Vietnamese 
motorcycle assemblers inheriting the Chinese organisational model. The ensuing 
competitive adaptation of both Japanese and Chinese organisational models generated 
enormous industrial dynamism, eventually leading this latecomer developing country 
to emerge in a decade as one of the world’s major motorcycle producers.3  
This paper examines how the Japanese and Chinese models were transformed through 
competitive adaptation in Vietnam over a period of a decade. Specifically, it addresses 
the following main research question:    
How has the clash between Japanese and Chinese organisational models affected 
the organisational transformation of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry? 
This research question is explored through an examination of the Vietnamese 
motorcycle industry over the decade following the late 1990s. The focus is on two sets 
of value chains representative of the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial 
organisation respectively. Drawing on data collected at different periods from 
interviews and surveys of lead firms and suppliers, this study engages in an in-depth, 
longitudinal analysis of how the two sets of value chains were transformed as the 
respective lead firms competed for supremacy in the Vietnamese market.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature, identifies research gaps, and elaborates questions and corresponding 
hypotheses derived from previous research. Section 3 presents the conceptual 
framework. Section 4 discusses the research methodology and operationalises the key 
concepts. Sections 5 and 6 comprise the empirical core of the paper, presenting 
analyses of the dynamic transformation of the Japanese and Chinese models of 
industrial organisation respectively in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry. Section 7 
summarises the findings of the paper and discusses its contribution to the literature on 
organisational models and trajectories.  
2. Literature Review 
                                                  
3  Production of motorcycles in Vietnam began in 1996 (General Statistics Office 1999). In 2006, 
domestic production and sales recorded 2.1 and 2.4 million units, respectively, making the country the 
world’s fourth largest producer of and market for motorcycles after only China, India and Indonesia 
(General Statistics Office 2009; Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 2008).   
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The purpose of this section is to review the existing literature of direct relevance to the 
research question explored in this paper. This covers three main strands of literature: 
the literature on models and trajectories of industrial organisation in general; the 
literature on Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation in particular; and 
the emergent literature on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry. Based on gaps 
identified in the course of this review, the section concludes by refining the research 
question and presenting resultant hypotheses.  
2.1 Industrial Organisation: From Models to 
Trajectories 
The 1980s and 1990s saw a flourish of research on industrial organisation. Spurred by 
the varieties of patterns by which industries were organised – from large and vertically 
integrated business corporations to clusters of small, networked firms, or hierarchical 
networks consisting of a dominant lead firm and layers of smaller suppliers, 
researchers looked into the origins of different patterns and their implications for 
economic competitiveness (Chandler 1977; Dore 1983; Smitka 1991; Womack et al. 
1990; Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Sako 1992; Nishiguchi 1994; Piore and Sabel 1984; 
Langlois and Robertson 1995; Sturgeon 2002). Those patterns recognised as 
particularly successful were codified into models of industrial organisation (Humphrey 
1995). 
Research did not stop at codifying established practices into models but went on to 
analyse how such models were applied in practice. While a model essentially defines 
the key elements of successful experiences, “the experiences upon which the model is 
constructed continue to change” (Humphrey 1995: 151). Moreover, when models are 
transferred, the contexts in which they operate often differ markedly from those upon 
which the experiences were based.  
The existing body of research has looked into how models evolved over time in the 
country of origin in response to changes in external economic conditions, technological 
change, or competitive pressure (Lecler 1999, 2004; Lamming 2000; McCormick 
2004; Sturgeon 2007), and how models transferred to different contexts have gone 
through processes of hybridisation, adaptation, or localisation (Cusumano and Takeishi 
1991; Helper and Sako 1995; Guiheux and Lecler 2000). Very often the result was 
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“neither a copy of the original model nor a replica of existing local patterns, but 
something different” (Westney 1999: 387). The varieties of country and industry 
experiences analysed in the literature clearly demonstrate the importance of going 
beyond models to analyse the trajectories of diffusion and adaptation (Humphrey 1995). 
However, although the importance of analysing trajectories is widely acknowledged, 
this has rarely been done systematically.  
First, few previous studies have illuminated the actual processes by which 
organisations change. What they have done is either to compare the status of an 
organisation at a given point in time in a given setting – often after successful 
transformation has been completed – with the defining features of the original model; 
or to compare prevailing practices among different groups of companies, for example, 
firms of different nationalities located in a certain country or firms of the same 
nationality but located in different countries (Cusumano and Takeishi 1991; Sako 
1992; Helper and Sako 1995).  
As a result, the actual processes of organisational diffusion and adaptation, which is 
where insights relevant for firms and policy makers originate (Humphery 1995), 
remain largely underexplored. With what timing and in what sequence do key features 
of the model change? What tensions and challenges do organisations face in the 
process, and how do they overcome them? Very little of the existing literature 
examines these issues.  
Second, there have been limited attempts to systematically explain why organisations 
evolve in the way they do. On the basis of the existing literature, there seems to be a 
broad consensus that the driver of organisational change typically comes from a lack of 
fit between the elements of organisation and the environment (Westney 1999). The 
problem with such a line of argument is that there has been no incisive debate on what 
precisely is meant by the ‘environment’.  
Existing empirical research mainly refers to the following three dimensions of the 
environment: (1) local market conditions, for example, producer competition and 
consumer preferences (Helper 1991; Lecler 1999, 2004; Humphery 2000; Sturgeon and 
Van Biesebroeck 2010); (2) competence levels and the existence or absence of a local 
component supply base (Sadler 1994); and (3) institutional factors such as legal and 
regulatory environments, capital markets, employment systems, culture, and social and 
moral norms (Dore 1983; Sako 1992).  
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However, given the lack of a systematic attempt to deconstruct the concept of the 
environment into a series of concrete, operational variables, we still do not know 
which factors are most important, how they interact with each other, or how they shape 
the processes of organisational change. Unless these questions are tackled, research can 
hardly be expected to pin down the fundamental factors that trigger (or impede) the 
transformation of industrial organisation. Thus, the mechanisms by which variables 
interact in shaping the processes of organisational transformation remain 
underexplored.   
The above two research gaps seem to stem at least in part from the lack of an 
appropriate theoretical framework for categorising the various forms of inter-firm 
organisation or explaining the circumstances under which they emerge in terms of a 
series of concrete, operational variables. Recent theoretical development in the field of 
GVC governance has made important contributions in this regard. This paper adopts 
the revised version of the GVC governance framework for conducting systematic 
analysis of trajectories of organisational change.  
2.2 Japanese and Chinese Models of Industrial 
Organisation in the Motorcycle Industry 
In studying industrial organisation, particularly illuminating are the industries in which 
contrasting models of industrial organisation coexist because interactions between 
different models often create new dynamics of organisational transformation.4 With 
the long dominance of the Japanese model and the rise of a new organisational model 
emerging from China, the motorcycle manufacturing sector became an example of 
such industries (Fujita 2013a). 
The Japanese model of industrial organisation was developed out of the need to 
effectively achieve incremental product and process improvements in a proprietary 
product. Since motorcycles had an integral product architecture, lead firms took the 
lead in fine-tuning component designs and providing a quality guarantee to their 
consumers for the product system as a whole (Otahara 2009a, 2009b). Accordingly, 
                                                  
4  This seems to explain why the car industry, in which contrasting models of industrial organisation 
have emerged in the US and Japan, has been studied so widely.   
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they adopted a combination of centralised control and generous assistance in governing 
long-term relations with a fixed group of suppliers, which were expected to endeavour 
to achieve performance targets set by the lead firms, often by ceding autonomy (Fujita 
2013a).  
As Japanese manufacturers started to set up overseas production bases from the 1960s 
onwards, the organisational model established in Japan was replicated abroad. Lead 
firms sought to develop long-term relations with local suppliers. Where the local 
component supply base was lacking, this entailed provision of technical assistance to 
the suppliers.5  
Compared to the long-established prominence of the Japanese model, the rise of its 
Chinese counterpart is a recent phenomenon. This model emerged in the early 1990s, 
driven by a large number of indigenous motorcycle manufacturers producing 
low-priced imitations of Japanese models. Contingent on de facto standardisation of a 
few dozen popular Japanese models, large numbers of assemblers and suppliers, both 
of whom were equipped with limited levels of technological competence, engaged in 
arm’s-length transactions. With its strength lying in low costs and flexibility, the 
arm’s-length organisational model enabled Chinese motorcycle manufacturers to 
capture the lion’s share of the huge yet volatile domestic market where consumers put 
priority on low prices and intellectual property rights are only weakly protected.  
The above summary of the existing literature suggests that we now know that the 
Japanese model of industrial organisation rose to prominence in the 1980s, and that it 
was transferred to both developed and developing countries – with manufacturers taking 
the lead in nurturing the pool of competent component suppliers demanded by this 
model. We also know that a second discrete model emerged in China. However, we 
know less about what is emerging out of the rivalry between the two models. Which 
model is superior? Which is more adaptable to third-country conditions; especially in 
the developing world, where the bulk of global motorcycle sales are concentrated 
(Fujita 2007)?  
Such an overarching enquiry can be deconstructed into a series of more specific 
questions. In terms of the Japanese model, the key question is whether it can meet the 
                                                  
5  This occurred not only in developing countries such as Thailand (Higashi 2006) and Indonesia (Thee 
1997; Sato 2011) but also in developed countries such as Italy (Horiuchi 1998). 
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Chinese challenge. Whilst the Japanese model has exhibited extraordinary strength in 
catering to sophisticated customers in the developed world, can it be adapted to compete 
with the Chinese model in developing country markets? With regard to the Chinese 
model, there has thus far been no attempt to study whether it can be successfully 
transferred. What changes are required if it is to work in different contexts? This paper 
attempts to answer these questions.   
2.3 The Dynamics of Organisational Adaptation: The 
Vietnamese Motorcycle Industry 
The Vietnamese motorcycle industry provides an excellent case through which to 
address the research gaps identified above. Vietnam was the first locality – after China 
itself – in which the Japanese and Chinese models clashed head-on. Because Vietnam 
is a new context for both models, neither has an advantage over the other; both must 
adapt to local Vietnamese conditions and fight for supremacy in this emerging market.  
On the basis of the existing research on the Vietnamese motorcycle industry (Fujita 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012; Intarakumnerd and Fujita 2008, 2009; Pham 
Truong Hoang and Shusa 2006; Pham Truong Hoang 2007; Nguyen Duc Tiep 2006, 
2007; The Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007), its development was process can be 
broadly divided into three stages.  
In Stage I (mid-1990s to the end of the decade), three Japanese motorcycle 
manufacturers were the key players. Following the Vietnamese government’s decision 
to launch an import substitution policy to promote the domestic production of 
motorcycles, Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki and Taiwan’s Sanyang established local factories 
(Fujita 2006). As their sophisticated products were priced substantially higher than 
what ordinary Vietnamese consumers could afford, motorcycle sales as a whole 
stagnated, but Japanese–brand motorcycles still accounted for the bulk of the market 
(Figure 1). This small, protected market hardly attracted any scholarly attention at this 
stage. 
It was during Stage II (2000–2004) that the Vietnamese motorcycle industry attracted 
wide interest from businesses, researchers, and policymakers in Vietnam and abroad. 
In the early 2000s, massive volumes of low-priced imitations of Japanese-brand 
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motorcycles were imported from China – a phenomenon often dubbed the ‘China 
shock’ (Fujita 2007). Since the Vietnamese government had prohibited the import of 
assembled vehicles, Chinese imports arrived in the form of knockdown component kits 
that were assembled by more than 50 local firms (hereafter referred to as ‘local 
assemblers’). With prices as low as a third to a quarter of foreign-brand models, these 
imitations quickly penetrated the medium- and low-income consumer markets that had 
hitherto been unexploited by Japanese firms. The market expanded four-fold in the late 
1990s, and local assemblers of Chinese motorcycles commanded roughly 80% of these 
extended sales (Figure 1).  
The China shock provoked a series of reactions from incumbent producers and 
policymakers. As Vietnam became a symbol of an expanded Chinese threat that had 
already become apparent in China, Japanese companies initiated company-wide efforts 
to regain market shares. This culminated in the launching of a new, low-priced model 
by Honda Vietnam (HVN) in 2002. The new model, named Wave Alpha and priced at 
approximately one-third of its previous models, quickly gained popularity as the 
low-quality of Chinese motorcycles had by now become apparent to Vietnamese 
consumers (The Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007).  
The Vietnamese government responded by enacting a series of policy changes to 
restore order and promote the sound development of the industry. However, the 
uncoordinated, sudden, and often arbitrary ways in which policy changes were enacted 
– frequently running contrary to previously announced plans and/or discriminating 
against foreign motorcycle manufacturers (Fujita 2011) – created serious side effects.  
Figure 1. Motorcycle Sales in Vietnam by Manufacturers 
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Notes:  
(1) VMEP (Vietnam Manufacturing and Export Processing Co., Ltd.) is a 100% invested 
subsidiary of Taiwan’s Sanyang Motors, and Lifan Vietnam is a joint venture between 
China’s Lifan Group and a Vietnamese SOE.   
(2) Data on “Honda (Imported)” was available from the Motorbike Joint Working Group 
(2007) up to 2005 but the figures were zero from 2002 onwards. Data on “Imports” was 
provided by General Statistics Office (various years). 
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of the Motobike Joint Working Group (2007), 
Industrial Research Institute (2011) and General Statistical Office (various years).  
First, restrictions on the importation and registration of motorcycles were introduced. 
In September 2002, the Vietnamese government suddenly announced that imports of 
motorcycle components for the year should be limited to 1.5 million units (Cohen 
2002). This was followed by restrictions on motorcycle registration6 and limits on 
investments in expansion of production capacity by foreign motorcycle manufacturers7 
from 2003. Whilst these measures were intended to prevent the uncontrolled 
proliferation of motorcycles on Vietnam’s streets, the consequence was stagnation of 
the overall market growth, with annual sales of motorcycles declining from over 2 
million in 2002 to less than 1.5 million in 2003–4 (Figure 1).  
                                                  
6  Circular 02/2003/TT‐BCA by the Ministry of Public Security dated 13 January 2003 limited motorcycle 
registration to one vehicle per person. Decision 98/2003/QD‐UB by the Hanoi People’s Committee 
dated 14 August 2003 prohibited new motorcycle registration in four central districts of Hanoi.   
7  Prime Minister’s Decision 147/2002/QD‐TTg dated 25 October 2002. 
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Second, in an attempt to encourage the development of local assemblers into fully 
fledged motorcycle manufacturers, the government stepped up the enforcement of 
local content rules, which hitherto had been circumvented by local assemblers,8 and 
instituted standards for motorcycle manufacturers, with the requirement that a 
minimum of 20% of local content had to be achieved by in-house manufacturing of 
key components.9 
Notably, some of the aforementioned policies were implemented in ways that explicitly 
favoured local assemblers. When the government suddenly introduced quantitative 
restrictions on component imports in September 2002, local assemblers received 
favourable allocation of import quotas, whilst insufficient quota allocation to HVN and 
Yamaha Vietnam (YVN) even drove these companies to temporarily suspend their 
production.10 From 2003 onwards, as noted above, the government restricted foreign 
motorcycle manufacturers from investing in the expansion of production capacity 
beyond the original proposals granted by the Vietnamese authorities upon the issue of 
FDI licences. This turned out to be damaging to foreign motorcycle manufacturers 
because the rapid expansion of the market in the 2000s had not been envisaged in the 
1990s. HVN, in particular, suffered because this policy hampered the company’s 
ambitions to use the Wave Alpha to regain lost market shares.  
A new phase of industrial development (Stage III; 2005–2008) began as the end of the 
policy turbulence brought about rapid, FDI-driven growth. Diminishing academic 
interest in the industry notwithstanding, this was in fact the time in which the most 
dynamic development occurred (Fujita 2011). In 2005, the Vietnamese government 
abandoned restrictions on motorcycle registration11 together with the policy that had 
                                                  
8  The local content rules were originally announced at the end of 1998 for implementation from the 
beginning of 1999 (Decision of the Ministry of Finance 1994/1998/QD‐TTg dated 25 December 1998). 
Its full implementation was delayed until the beginning of 2001 due to opposition from local 
assemblers (Ishida 2001).     
9  Prime Minister’s Decision No.38/2002/QD‐TTg dated 14 March 2002. 
10  Of the total of 1.5 million motorcycle component imports permitted for the whole year, local 
assemblers were allocated 900,000 units whilst foreign motorcycle manufacturers only received 
600,000 (Cohen 2002).   
11  Circular No. 17/2005/TT‐BCA of the Ministry of Public Security dated 21 November 2005 rescinded 
legislation limiting motorcycle registration to one vehicle per person and only in the locality for which 
each held household registration. 
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prevented foreign motorcycle manufacturers from investing in additional production 
capacity.12 As a result, domestic motorcycle sales climbed to 2.8 million units in 2007, 
far exceeding figures during the China shock (Figure 1).  
Japanese firms chose to satisfy the growing market in Vietnam via FDI for local 
production, following their conventional approach to the localisation of production in 
countries with large demands for their products.13 Accordingly, they actively invested 
in expansion of production capacity, capturing an increasing share of this fast-growing 
market. In the meantime, local assemblers lost their market share but still held roughly 
one-third of the sales as of 2006 (Figure 1); surviving by catering to low-income 
consumers in the rural areas where Japanese-brand models had still not penetrated. 
Of the three stages of development, the existing literature on industrial organisation 
focuses almost exclusively on Stage II, the period immediately following the China 
shock. Previous studies have emphasised the major changes that both HVN and local 
assemblers implemented to their sourcing practices immediately after the initial clash. 
Pham Truong Hoang (2007), Mishima (2007), and Otahara (2009a) all argue that HVN 
responded to the China shock by significantly diversifying its component sources to 
include non-Japanese suppliers in Vietnam and even local suppliers in China. Pham 
Truong Hoang (2007) also analyses the manner in which local assemblers responded to 
policies requiring local sourcing and investment in in-house manufacturing of 
components. On the basis of case studies of four assemblers, he argues that they shifted 
away from arm’s-length supply systems towards those based on long-term, trust-based 
relations with suppliers.14 
                                                  
12  Official document No. 1854/VPCP‐HTQT issued by the Government Office on 11 April 2005. 
13  From its early years, “to explore the world market, to produce where the demand is” has been at 
the core of Honda’s mission (http://www.honda.co.jp/50years‐history/009.html, accessed 2 October 
2011). 
14  The four case studies nevertheless indicate varieties of ways in which local assemblers responded to 
market and policy challenges: maintaining arm’s‐length linkages, vertically integrating component 
manufacturing, and spurring cooperative relationships with suppliers (Pham Truong Hoang 2007). 
However, the author does not discuss which of these patterns is dominant, a shortcoming that is 
probably due to a failure to provide the reasons as to why the four assemblers were selected in the 
first place. In any case, this research did not include the two assemblers that the present study refers 
to as A1 and A3 – firms it found to be increasingly dominant in Stage III.   
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Nevertheless, the above discussion on the stages of Vietnamese motorcycle industrial 
development suggests that analysing the short-term impact of the China shock may not 
be sufficient for an understanding of the dynamics of the competitive adaptation of the 
two models. First, the existing literature acknowledges that the reactions of HVN and 
local Vietnamese assemblers were devised as emergency measures to cope with the 
immediate competitive threat (to HVN) and policy requirements (for local assemblers). 
It remains to be seen whether these adaptations prove to be sustainable in the longer 
term.  
Second, the period immediately following the China shock was one of policy 
turbulence. Such a distorted and arbitrary legislative environment hardly enabled firms 
to implement long-term, sustainable adaptations to their sourcing practices. Given that 
the period of turmoil was immediately followed by a more stable phase (Stage III), it is 
essential that an analysis of industrial organisation in the Vietnamese motorcycle 
industry should be extended to cover this period. However, no previous studies have 
done this.  
The temporal aspect of observation also raises the question of what factors cause 
industrial organisation to evolve. Virtually all of the previous studies cited above 
assume, explicitly or implicitly, organisational patterns are determined by that lead 
firms depending on the characteristics of the products they produce – whether design 
architecture, prices, or quality levels. Accordingly, their focus has been exclusively on 
the lead firms, whilst suppliers – the other key actor in the value chains – have been 
left out of the analyses.  
In Japanese chains, it was the need for radical cost reduction that compelled HVN’s 
adjustment to sourcing practices (Mishima 2007; Otahara 2009a). In respect of local 
assemblers, the need to raise product quality and policy requirements eventually led 
some assemblers to invest in in-house production of components and/or to adopt 
long-term, trust-based relations with their suppliers (Pham Truong Hoang 2007). 
Owing to its almost exclusive focus on product characteristics, research has hitherto 
overlooked the very essence of industrial organisation, that is, power relations between 
firms, which in turn are determined by the nature and levels of capabilities possessed 
by the respective parties (Sturgeon 2008; Palpacuer 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz 
2008). A lead firm has the capacity to enforce particular types and levels of 
requirement on suppliers. However, such capacity has its limits because some suppliers 
91 
 
may acquire power as they accumulate new competencies that are difficult to replace 
or explore new customers (Schmitz 2004; Sturgeon 2008). The relative power relations 
of lead firms and suppliers are central to research on the dynamics of industrial 
organisation but no previous studies have analysed them.  
2.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In view of the research gaps identified above, this paper will examine the evolutionary 
dynamics of the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation in the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry. It addresses the following overarching research 
question: 
How has the competition between Japanese and Chinese organisational models 
affected the organisational transformation of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry? 
For the purpose of analysis, this question is divided into two sub-questions.  
Sub-question 1: How did the Japanese and Chinese organisational models evolve in 
Vietnam? 
The literature suggests that the two models converged within a few years of their direct 
clash, as Japanese motorcycle manufacturers expanded their component sources to 
include non-conventional sources for the purpose of spurring competition between 
suppliers, and local assemblers developed long-term, trust-based relations with their 
suppliers. 
Hypothesis: The two models converged within a few years of their initial clash in 
Vietnam. 
The second sub-question is concerned with explaining the organisational 
transformation that eventually occurred.  
Sub-question 2: What factors drove the organisational transformation of the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry?  
Existing empirical research emphasises that the nature of the products, which the lead 
firms adjust in order to cope with competitive pressure, is the key variable in 
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explaining the dynamics of an organisational model. 
Hypothesis: Organisational transformation is explained primarily by product 
characteristics determined by the lead firm.  
3. Conceptual Framework and Operationalisation of Key Concepts 
This section develops a theoretical framework for describing and explaining different 
forms of industrial organisation, which is based on a revised version of Gereffi et al.’s 
(2005) theory of global value chain (GVC) governance developed by Fujita (2013a). 
The section begins by introducing the concept of value chain governance, followed by 
a consideration of five dominant governance types. It then discusses the two key 
variables that determine value chain governance and presents a revised framework that 
uses these two variables to explain the emergence of the five aforementioned types of 
value chain governance. The section concludes with operationalisation of the key 
concepts.  
3.1 Industrial Organisation: Meaning and Type 
An industry comprises (groups of) firms engaged in one or more value-adding function 
that is required to bring products to market – typically referred to as a value chain 
(Sturgeon 2001). The literature on industrial organisation has evolved around the broad 
question of how the upstream to downstream functions surrounding a product are 
aligned to different (groups of) firms, and how relations between these firms are 
coordinated. Starting with the literature on large integrated corporations (Chandler 
1977) and transaction cost economics (Williamson 1979), through to theories on 
network forms of organisation (Powell 1990) and the GVC approach (Gereffi et al. 
2001; Schmitz 2004; Gereffi et al. 2005; Sturgeon 2008), the resultant large body of 
work has demonstrated the range of market and non-market mechanisms through 
which inter-firm relations are coordinated. These mechanisms – referred to by the 
GVC approach as types of value chain governance – are important because they 
influence competitive performance of industries and development prospects for local 
firms participating in value chains (Sturgeon 2002; Schmitz 2004).    
While there are myriad patterns of value chain governance, Gereffi et al. (2005) 
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classified value chain governance into five dominant types, which were mapped onto a 
spectrum running from low to high levels of explicit coordination (Figure 2). At one 
end of the spectrum is the arm’s-length market in which transactions are mediated by 
market forces. At the other end of the spectrum there is a hierarchy in which 
coordination takes the form of an internal command structure within a vertically 
integrated corporation. In between these two extremes, there are intermediate or 
network forms of organisation that are neither based on markets nor a hierarchy 
(Powell 1990; Jones et al. 1997). In ascending order of explicit transactional 
governance, these are: 
 Modular chains, in which product standardisation reduces the frequency and 
intensity of interaction, as well as the level of mutual dependence between a 
lead firm and its suppliers     
 Relational chains, which are characterised by complex and intense interaction 
between mutually dependent parties  
 Captive chains, in which a powerful lead firm makes extensive intervention and 
exercises control over smaller and dependent suppliers 
Figure 2. Types of Value Chain Governance 
Degree of Explicit 
Coordination Type Description 
Low Market Arm’s-length transactions mediated by market forces
 
 
 
 
Network 
Modular 
Product standardisation enables firms to exchange 
complex information without intense interaction or 
mutual dependence 
Types Relational Intense two-way interaction and mutual dependence
Captive Lead firms make extensive intervention and exercise control over dependent suppliers 
High Hierarchy Vertically-integrated organisation 
Source: The author, based on Gereffi et al. (2005). 
3.2 Determinants of Value Chain Governance  
Why do different forms of governance such as those discussed above exist? And under 
what circumstances do particular governance forms emerge? The strength of Gereffi et 
al.’s (2005) formulation of GVC governance theory is that it provides a systematic 
device for answering these questions. Specifically, they seek to explain the dynamics 
of value chain governance in terms of three variables: (1) the complexity of 
information exchanged in a transaction; (2) the degree to which such information can 
be codified; and (3) the supplier’s capability level relative to the requirements of a 
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transaction.   
This study follows the overall structure of this framework, but makes the following 
adaptations. First, for the sake of simplicity, the first two variables are grouped into 
one broader category: the nature of product and process parameters exchanged in 
transactions.  
Second, whereas Gereffi et al. (2005) concentrate on the codifiability of parameters, 
this study focuses on the degree to which these parameters are standardised, a related 
yet distinct concept. This is because degrees of product and process standardisation 
constitute one of the essential factors that differentiate the Japanese and Chinese 
models of industrial organisation in the motorcycle industry.15  
Third, the present study’s framework incorporates lead firm capability in addition to 
supplier capability. Because the primary focus of Gereffi et al. (2005) is on the global 
value chains that are coordinated by major transnational corporations (TNCs), they 
implicitly assume that lead firms possess the sophisticated capability necessary to 
coordinate value chains. On the contrary, the present study does not take lead firm 
capability as a given in view of the fact that it addresses the organisational model 
emerging in a developing country context. Rather, it acknowledges that a lead firm 
may be constrained by a shortage of capability in its attempt to establish certain types 
of chain governance.  
Fourth, rather than narrowly focussing on relative levels of capability, that is, whether 
or not supplier capability meets the level required by lead firms, the present study 
highlights the various types of capability that different governance mechanism models 
impose on both lead firms and suppliers.  
The basic structure of this adapted framework is shown in Figure 3, in which value 
chain governance is determined by two variables: the nature of product and process 
parameters communicated in transactions; and the alignment of relevant capabilities 
                                                  
15  This adaptation becomes critical in formulating the conditions under which captive chains emerge. 
Whereas Gereffi et al. (2005) focus on the codifiability of parameters in the form of lead firm 
instructions, the non‐standard nature of product and process parameters turned out to be critical in 
explaining why Japanese motorcycle manufacturers had instituted explicit governance mechanisms in 
coordinating transactions with their suppliers.   
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within the industry. The following subsections examine the two variables individually.   
Figure 3. Value Chain Governance: An Explanatory Framework 
The nature of 
product/process 
parameters
The aligment of 
relevant capabilities  
within the industry
Value chain 
governance
Technological shift,  
changes in consumer 
demand, etc.
Acquisition of new 
capabilities by 
incumbents; entry of 
new firms
 
Source: The author, adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005) and Langlois and Robertson (1995). 
3.2.1 The Nature of Product and Process Parameters 
The nature of product and process parameters determines the need for transactional 
governance. It is not the case that every transaction requires explicit coordination; the 
extent to which transactional governance is required depends primarily on the type of 
product being traded (in this case, motorcycle components). The specific focus will be 
on levels of complexity and degree of standardisation, both of which are influenced by 
factors such as technological innovation and changes in consumer demand.  
In respect of simple products, which also tend to be standardised, there is limited need 
for instituting explicit transactional governance: if components are simple and 
standardised, product/process parameters can be specified and communicated with ease. 
Supplier performance is easily observable in the form of delivered outputs and thus 
detailed monitoring mechanisms are not required. Moreover, as standard products do 
not require transaction-specific investment, there is no need to implement safeguards 
against the risks of opportunism (Williamson 1979). Standard products can also be 
produced by a range of suppliers, sold to a variety of lead firms, or produced for stock 
and supplied as necessary (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
The need for coordination increases as products become complex and differentiated, 
that is, as they start to take on new demands beyond price level (Schmitz 2006; 
Humphrey and Schmitz 2008). Examples include differentiated components that are 
more difficult to design and/or manufacture; higher quality levels; tighter delivery 
requirements in terms of either frequency or punctuality; and additional functional 
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requirements (e.g. suppliers take on design responsibilities in addition to 
manufacturing). Implementing new requirements such as these often constitutes an 
additional burden with regard to the communication of product and/or process 
parameters between the lead firm and its suppliers. It also necessitates additional 
mechanisms to ensure that parameters are adhered to, for example, detailed monitoring 
(Schmitz 2006). 
The need for explicit governance also depends on the extent to which parameters are 
standardised. On the one hand, non-standard parameters require explicit coordination 
because they incur additional coordination costs and transaction-specific investment in 
physical and/or human resources (Williamson 1979). This is particularly the case for 
products with integral design architecture. Because such products are characterised by 
complex mapping from functional elements to physical components and tightly 
coupled interfaces among interacting physical components, they call for fine-tuning 
between the whole product and its component parts if overall product performance is 
to be maximised (Ulrich 1995; Baldwin and Clark 2000). Designing these products 
requires the coordination of detailed design tasks (Ulrich 1995), and their manufacture 
necessitates transaction-specific investment, both of which call for explicit governance 
mechanisms to be in place.  
On the other hand, even when the product is complex, industry-wide product and/or 
process standards may reduce the need for explicit governance (Gereffi et al. 2005). In 
industries that produce products with modular architecture, standards make it possible 
to communicate product and/or process parameters without intense interaction, which 
releases firms from being locked into particular trading relationships (Langlois and 
Robertson 1992, 1995).  
3.2.2 The Alignment of Relevant Capabilities  
The need for transactional governance, however, does not mean that such mechanisms 
can necessarily be implemented in practice. This is where the second variable of the 
alignment of relevant capabilities within the industry comes into play. Governance 
means that a given firm enforces parameters over other firms, a dynamic that demands 
the ability to wield power (Schmitz 2006; Sturgeon 2008). The relative power relations 
between a lead firm and its suppliers, in turn, are determined primarily by the types 
and levels of capability enjoyed by the respective parties (Sturgeon 2008; Schmitz 
2006; Palpacuer 2000). 
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A lead firm’s capacity to impose parameters on its suppliers usually stems from their 
core competencies in strategic value chain functions (Palpacuer 2000; Schmitz 2006). 
In capital-intensive sectors such as the automotive industry, such strategic functions 
typically include product development, marketing, and manufacturing of core 
components. These functions often constitute the key sources of competitive advantage 
enjoyed by the lead firm because they require knowledge- and experienced-based 
assets that are difficult for others to imitate, and because they provide economies of 
scale for the firms that control these functions (Palpacuer 2000: 378).  
A lead firm’s control over strategic value chain functions matters because it tends to 
create two types of dependence on the part of the suppliers. First, lead firm control 
over strategic functions leaves suppliers with non-core functions (Palpacuer 2000), 
rendering them functionally dependent on the lead firm in marketing their products. 
Second, because dominance in respect of product, marketing, and/or branding often 
enables lead firms to gain a high degree of control over the market (Gereffi 1999; 
Kaplinsky and Morris 2000), they often overwhelm suppliers with huge purchasing 
power (Sturgeon 2008), rendering them financially dependent.  
The size of orders takes on particular importance in industries in which product and 
process parameters are non-standard. Because non-standard products often impose the 
additional cost of product-specific investment in physical and human resources, a lead 
firm will face difficulty enforcing non-standard parameters on its suppliers unless 
orders are large enough to make production economically viable.16   
However, it is necessary to analyse lead firm competency in relative terms. Because 
power is relational, suppliers may also acquire it by building core competencies, that is, 
technical or service capabilities that are difficult to replace and become indispensable 
to the lead firm (Schmitz 2006; Sturgeon 2008; Palpacuer 2000). Suppliers can also 
gain the generic capability to assume responsibility for a bundle of functions, such as 
product design, process development, purchasing, and production, which enables them 
to serve a diverse pool of customers and switch customers if necessary (Sturgeon 2008). 
In contrast, where suppliers only possess capabilities that are easily substituted and/or 
are embedded in relations with specific customers, the lead firm retains the capacity to 
choose and replace suppliers, thus keeping supplier power under control (ibid.).  
                                                  
16  Sturgeon et al. (2008) corroborate this point in arguing that the concentrated structure of the car 
manufacturing industry helps each firm to impose its own idiosyncratic standards on suppliers.   
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3.3 The Revised Framework 
Table 1 shows how the five governance types mentioned in Section 2.1 can be 
explained in terms of different combinations of the two variables outlined in the 
previous subsection. When product and process parameters are simple and standardised, 
market-based chains emerge. This type of chain makes limited capability demand of 
lead firm and suppliers alike, the minimum requirements being that they possess 
routine assembly capability and routine component manufacturing capability 
respectively. 
When industry-wide standards of compatibility enable complex parameters to be 
exchanged without explicit coordination, modular chains emerge whereby suppliers 
acquire generic manufacturing capacity and related service capabilities that enable 
them to serve multiple lead firms simultaneously. On the other hand, while the 
minimum requirement of the lead firm is routine assembly capability using mutually 
compatible components sourced from suppliers, modular chains enable it to focus on 
creation, penetration and defence of markets for its end products (Sturgeon 2002).  
As product and process parameters become complex and non-standard, three types of 
chain governance may emerge depending on the alignment of relevant capabilities. The 
first case is one in which the lead firm and its suppliers are equipped with 
complementary competencies that cannot easily be sourced elsewhere. Such a situation 
gives rise to a relational chain whereby the lead firm and its suppliers are engaged in 
intense two-way interaction; the two parties are mutually dependent and the power 
relation is symmetrical (Gereffi et al. 2005).  
Table 1. Types of Chain Governance and their Determinants 
  
Product/ 
Process 
Parameters 
Lead Firm Capability Supplier Capability 
Market Simple 
No specific requirements beyond routine manufacturing/assembly 
capabilities 
Modular 
Complex/  
Standard 
A minimum of routine assembly 
capability suffices. 
Lead firms usually focus on 
creation, penetration and 
maintenance of markets for end 
products. 
Generic manufacturing and 
related service capabilities. 
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Relational 
Complex/ 
Non-standard 
Lead firms and suppliers possess complementary competencies that 
are hard to substitute. 
Captive 
Capacity to exercise dominance 
over suppliers, which usually 
stems from control over 
strategic chain functions. 
A minimum of the basic ability to 
engage in a narrow range of 
simple tasks is required. Suppliers 
develop capabilities in accordance 
with the lead firm’s interventions.
Hierarchical 
Capability to conduct the 
value-adding functions in 
question. 
Supplier capability is withheld. 
Source: Adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005), Sturgeon (2002), Langlois and Robertson (1995), 
Sturgeon et al. (2008), Schmitz (2006), Sturgeon (2008), and Palpacuer (2000). 
The second case is characterised by substantial asymmetry in capability levels between 
a large, competent lead firm and smaller, less competent suppliers. Competence and 
power asymmetry lead to a captive chain whereby the lead firm engages in extensive 
intervention, such as active monitoring and technical assistance; while suppliers 
develop their capabilities – typically, in a narrow range of tasks – under the lead firm’s 
guidance (Schmitz 2004, 2006).  
The last case is one in which limited available external capability makes outsourcing 
unfeasible, meaning that the lead firm is compelled to conduct the required function(s) 
in-house, that is, to create a hierarchy. A hierarchy may also result from cases of 
substantial asymmetry in competence levels (i.e. the second case discussed above) but 
where the lead firm is either unwilling or unable to engage in extensive intervention.  
3.4 Operationalisation of Key Concepts 
For the purpose of empirical analysis, indicators have been developed for the key 
concepts (Table 2). Given the lack of quantifiable indicators for key variables, the 
analysis of trajectories focuses primarily on the direction of change in the status of the 
key variables over time, for example, an increase or decrease in the degree of 
complexity of product parameters. 
The indicators of supplier capability require further explanation. Drawing on the 
technological capability (TC) literature (Lall 1992; Bell and Pavitt 1995), this study 
focuses on the type and level of capability possessed by suppliers. With regard to type, 
reflecting the capability requirements that the Japanese and Chinese organisational 
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models impose on suppliers, the key distinction is between new product introduction 
(product development and design) and production. The latter is further divided into the 
equipment-related and production management dimensions (Sato and Fujita 2009). In 
terms of level, the focus will be on whether suppliers starting at routine operation for 
the domestic market (operational level) can progress to the level at which they are able 
to maintain stable and continuous operations that fulfil the requirements of foreign 
customers (assimilative level), and further to level at which suppliers are able to make 
minor yet original improvement to the existing products or production activities 
(adaptive level) (ibid.).  
Table 2. Operationalisation of Concepts 
(a) Determinants of Governance Types 
Key Concepts Indicators 
Nature of 
Product/ 
Process 
Parameters 
Level of 
Complexity  
General product characteristics (e.g. price levels) 
The way in which the lead firm specifies product/process 
requirements to suppliers 
Level of  
Standardisation  
General product features (e.g., whether product designs are 
proprietary or standardised) 
The way in which the lead firms specifies product/process 
requirements to suppliers 
Structure of 
Relevant 
Capabilities 
within the 
Industry 
Lead Firm 
Capability 
Whether or not the lead firm engages in key functions, e.g. product 
development, marketing, and production of core components 
The scale of orders placed to suppliers 
The capacity to switch suppliers 
Supplier 
Capability 
Changes in the number of suppliers, and types and levels of 
capability possessed 
(For new suppliers) Suppliers’ experience prior to entry into 
respective value chains  
(b) Governance Types 
  Pattern of Dependence Coordinating Mechanism 
Types of Data 
Required 
Lead firm: availability of 
alternative sources of 
components  
Suppliers: number of 
customers; percentage of sales 
to respective lead firms; size of 
orders 
Mechanisms used to communicate 
product/process parameters and ensure 
that they are met 
Markets 
Neither side is dependent on the 
other 
Limited communication of information 
beyond price levels 
Modular 
Communication of complex parameters 
without intense interaction enabled by 
industry-wide standards 
Relational Mutual interdependence  Intense two-way exchange of information 
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Captive Small suppliers dependent on a large lead firm 
Lead firm takes the lead in sharing of 
long- and short-term targets; 
performance monitoring; regular sharing 
of information on products and 
processes; provision of 
technical/financial assistance 
Hierarchy Vertically integrated corporation Firm’s internal command 
Source: The author, with reference to Palpacuer (2000), Schmitz (2006), Sturgeon (2008), 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2000), and Sako (1992). 
4. Methodology 
This section explains the methodology adopted in the empirical research project, that is, 
the retrospective case study method, criteria for selection of cases, and methods of data 
collection and analysis.  
4.1 Research Design: Retrospective Case Study  
In order to analyse the decade-long dynamics of change in industrial organisation, this 
paper adopts the retrospective case study method (de Vaus 2001; Glick et al. 1995; 
Tuma and Hannan 1984). In the present context, this method involves tracing the 
processes of organisational transformation by observing the sequence of historical 
events occurring in specific sets of value chains with several intervals. Table 3 
provides a summary of the overall case study design. In an attempt to illuminate how 
and why the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation were transformed 
in the Vietnamese context over time, this study analyses two sets of value chains 
representative of the Japanese and Chinese models in Vietnam respectively. Each of 
them are analysed by means of an embedded case study design, which combines the 
analysis of the overall context with that of embedded subunits (Yin 2003). In 
accordance with the conceptual framework presented in the previous section, the focus 
is on the lead firm(s) and its/their main first-tier suppliers. 
The transplanted Japanese model is represented by value chains independently 
developed and governed by HVN for the following reasons. First, HVN remained the 
single most important motorcycle manufacturer in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry 
throughout the period of investigation (Figure 1). Second, among Japanese motorcycle 
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manufacturers in Vietnam, HVN was the hardest hit by the China shock but also 
reacted with the most fundamental adjustments. By contrast, YVN’s consistent focus 
on the high-end market limited direct Chinese competition (Fujita 2005); and Vietnam 
Suzuki (VNS)’s market shares were too small for the China shock to have an 
observable impact (Figure 1). 
Table 3. Case Study Design 
  Japanese Model Chinese Model 
Cases HVN chains Vietnamese–Chinese chains as a whole 
Case 
Study 
Design 
Embedded case study design 
Analysis of context: Analysis of 
HVN value chains as a whole 
Analysis of embedded subunits: 
HVN as the lead firm, and major 
Japanese (keiretsu and 
non-keiretsu) and Vietnamese 
suppliers 
Embedded case study design 
Analysis of context: Analysis of the local 
motorcycle assembly industry as a whole 
Analysis of embedded subunits: 
(Stage II) Four major lead firms (Assemblers A1, 
A2, A4, and A5) and their Vietnamese, Taiwanese, 
and Korean suppliers  
(Stage III) Five major lead firms (Assemblers A1, 
A3, A4, A5, A6) and their Vietnamese, Chinese, 
Taiwanese and Korean suppliers 
Data 
Sources 
Context: interviews with Honda’s 
various units in Vietnam, Thailand 
and Japan; published and 
unpublished statistics; company 
website 
Embedded cases: interviews, 
factory visits, company websites, 
reports, newspapers 
Context: published and unpublished Vietnamese 
government statistics; reports; newspapers 
Embedded cases: interviews, factory visits, 
questionnaire surveys, company websites  
Source: The author. 
The case study of HVN’s value chain combined investigation of the overall context 
and that of embedded subunits including HVN as the lead firm, and major Japanese 
and Vietnamese suppliers. A total of 11 Japanese and 10 Vietnamese suppliers were 
purposefully selected as embedded subunits on the basis of the following criteria. First, 
cases were limited to suppliers of components that usually had model-specific designs, 
which, therefore, required close coordination between lead firms and suppliers. These 
included suppliers of metal and plastic components, dies, and moulds. Second, for the 
purpose of highlighting structural changes within the chains, cases were selected based 
on the requisite level of diversity: keiretsu and non-keiretsu suppliers among Japanese 
suppliers; state-owned and private companies among Vietnamese suppliers; and 
suppliers that had joined HVN value chains at various stages of industrial development. 
Third, an attempt was made to ensure that a sufficiently large number of cases were 
covered. The study ultimately selected 10 out of a total of 18 Vietnamese suppliers and 
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11 out of a total of 26 Japanese suppliers operating in HVN's value chain as of 2007.17  
The Chinese model is represented by Vietnamese–Chinese chains developed by local 
Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers.18 Unlike the analysis of the Japanese model, the 
focus is not limited to those value chains developed by specific lead firm(s) because 
their small size, repeated entry into and exit from the market, and the emergence of a 
shared supply base serving the local motorcycle assembly industry at large (see 
Section 6.2) calls for coverage of Vietnamese–Chinese chains as a whole.19  
Analysis of the Chinese model also combines that of context and embedded subunits. 
The former relies on analysis of the local motorcycle assembly industry as a whole. In 
respect of the latter, six local assemblers were selected from lists of those operating as 
of 2000 and 2006 respectively20 according to the following criteria. The first one was 
the critical case criterion, in which priority was given to assemblers that were 
sufficiently large in terms of the scale of production.  
Second, selection was based on two types of replication logic in case study research: 
literal replication (predicting similar results across cases) and theoretical replication 
(predicting contrasting results but for predictable reasons) (Yin 2003). Since 
assemblers’ product strategies and performance started to diverge at a late stage of 
industrial development, cases were selected to include assemblers adopting different 
product strategies and sourcing practices. On the basis of the author’s previous 
research (Fujita 2006), the key distinction was between one group of assemblers that 
concentrated on the production of low-priced imitations of Japanese-brand motorcycles, 
                                                  
17  These include Vietnamese suppliers V1‐9 and V13 and Japanese suppliers J1‐11. 
18  Lifan Vietnam, the only Chinese‐invested motorcycle manufacturer, was not selected on account of 
its small market shares and its focus on engine production rather than motorcycle assembly (The 
Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007: 27).   
19  The distinction between Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains is similar to the contrast drawn 
by Sturgeon and Lee (2005: 35) in reference to supplier networks in the automotive sector whereby 
Toyota’s supplier network competes with that of General Motors’ and the electronics industry, in 
which strategic outsourcing by groups of lead firms has led to the rise of a shared supply network. A 
striking feature of the present case is that contrasting supplier networks have emerged within a single 
industry.       
20  The 2000 list was provided by the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry, and the 2006 list was provided 
by the General Statistics Office.   
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and another group that prioritised quality improvement, and the development of own 
designs and brand names often at the expense of higher prices.  
Third, cases were selected so as to make use of data obtained from the author’s 
previous fieldwork, and accessibility to assemblers for additional rounds of fieldwork. 
Since data from previous fieldwork only included information on three assemblers (A1, 
A4 and A5), attempts were made to incorporate additional embedded case assemblers 
that were known to have played major roles in stages II and III. Assembler A2, which 
in 2000 had had the largest turnover of 51 local assemblers,21 and assemblers A3 and 
A6, which were found to be expanding sales in Stage III, were added as embedded 
cases.  
As a result of the selection process, the author ended up with six assemblers (A1-6) as 
embedded subunits. Assemblers A1, A2 and A3 belonged to one category of 
assemblers concentrating on the production of low-priced imitations of Japanese-brand 
motorcycles. Assemblers A5 and A6 were typical examples of the other category of 
assemblers prioritising the development of own designs and brand names and quality 
improvement. Assembler A4 fell somewhere in between the two categories. 
Suppliers were also analysed as embedded subunits in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain. 
Data were obtained for a total of 24 suppliers of different nationalities (5 Chinese, 7 
Taiwanese, 1 Korean, and 11 Vietnamese).22 Attempts were made to ensure that cases 
included suppliers playing key roles in value chains developed by both of the 
aforementioned emergent groups of assemblers.  
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
In an attempt to analyse the trajectories of organisational transformation over the 
decade from the late 1990s, this study combined three main sources of data. The first 
dataset derived from the author’s previous fieldwork conducted in 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004 and 2005. Since the industry in question had undergone dramatic transformation 
involving many entries and exits, high staff turnover, and the frequent personnel 
                                                  
21  Based on the list of local assemblers provided by the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry. 
22  These include Chinese suppliers C1‐5, Taiwanese suppliers T1‐7, Korean supplier K1 and Vietnamese 
suppliers V13‐23.   
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changes typically observed in foreign affiliate, the present study would not have been 
possible without data from these previous rounds of fieldwork. Although they were 
driven by different research questions, they provided a great deal of information on 
lead firm production strategies and sourcing practices, lead firm–supplier relations, and 
the development of suppliers’ capabilities.  
Data obtained in previous rounds of fieldwork were compiled in the form of interview 
recordings, transcriptions, and notes (mainly from Vietnamese companies); interview 
notes (mainly from Japanese, Taiwanese, Korean, and Chinese companies); 
questionnaire surveys; notes taken during factory visits; company brochures and 
presentation materials; and other materials provided by firms. The present study 
therefore commenced with the interpretation and coding of existing materials in 
accordance with the operationalised indicators presented in Section 3. 
Second, additional rounds of fieldwork were conducted specifically for the present 
study in order to collect data on new developments after 2005 and, wherever possible, 
to obtain retrospective data on earlier years. The basic strategy was to follow up with 
lead firms and suppliers approached in previous fieldwork, but attempts were also 
made to incorporate those that had not been included in the earlier studies but had 
come to play important roles in Stage III.23 Additional interviews with HVN and local 
assemblers, as well as their key suppliers, were also conducted between 2007 and 
2009.  
The fieldwork study of local assemblers requires further explanation. A major 
challenge was the difficulty in accessing assemblers for additional rounds of fieldwork 
(A3, A4, and A6 agreed to be interviewed whilst A1 and A5 refused). The challenges 
were addressed by the following measures. One was to conduct questionnaire surveys 
of local assemblers in collaboration with the Vietnam Institute of Economics, Vietnam 
Academy of Social Science in 2007, to which A1, A3, A4, A5 and A6 agreed. Another 
was to access a former employee. Since access could be made to the former 
procurement manager (2002–4) of assembler A2, a series of interviews was conducted 
to obtain information on the company in the early 2000s.  
                                                  
23  Examples include local assemblers A3 and A6, and suppliers J10, J11, C1, V7, V9, and V16. 
Information on newly‐emerging companies was obtained from newspapers and interviews with firms 
and industry experts.   
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In order to complement limited amount and quality of data on local assemblers, the 
author also interviewed Taiwanese, Korean, Chinese and Vietnamese suppliers that had 
worked closely with these local assemblers over the years. The former transpired to be 
easier to access and became precious sources of information on Vietnamese–Chinese 
chains. Towards the last stage of the fieldwork, the author presented the main lines of 
argument on Vietnamese–Chinese chains to these suppliers and other industry experts 
and asked for their feedback. This exercise helped to confirm the validity of arguments 
and indicate where adjustment was necessary.  
The third source of data was that on local supplier capability which was collected for a 
different part of this research project focussing on trajectories of supplier capability 
formation.24 Of the 21 suppliers covered in the fieldwork on local suppliers, data for 
18 of them were revealed to be suitable for the present study.25 In-depth interviews 
were conducted with these 18 suppliers to identify the types and levels of capability 
acquired by such firms in Japanese and Vietnamese–Chinese chains at different stages 
of industrial development.  
The full list of firms interviewed and surveyed is included in Appendix. In addition to 
interviews and questionnaire surveys, this study also made use of the following 
additional data sources: published and unpublished statistics, Vietnamese and Japanese 
newspapers, reports and research papers on the industry, and presentations and lectures 
given by representatives of firms analysed as embedded cases.  
All the fieldwork materials were coded and tabulated using the indicators presented in 
Section 3. The following sections will present the results of the analysis as a synthesis 
of insights obtained from various levels of analysis. While individual firm-level case 
reports had been prepared in the course of the analysis, the details of the individual 
cases will be included only where necessary.  
5. The Emergence and Transformation of the Japanese Model in Vietnam 
Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical analyses of the transformation of Japanese and 
                                                  
24  See Paper III in Fujita (2013b).   
25  The remaining three were second‐tier suppliers to Japanese motorcycle manufacturers, which were 
beyond the scope of this study.   
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Chinese organisational models respectively in Vietnam. Each is structured in 
chronological order, with subsections running from earlier to later stages of industrial 
development. Each subsection begins by discussing the features of the two 
determinants of industrial organisation – namely, the nature of the product and the 
alignment of relevant capabilities – in the respective value chain at each stage of 
industrial development. It then goes on to analyse the form of industrial organisation 
that emerged under the prevailing conditions.   
Section 5 focuses specifically on how Honda, the leading global motorcycle 
manufacturer, transferred its conventional organisational model to Vietnam, and how it 
was transformed in the short- and the medium-term after its clash with the Chinese 
model. The discussion proceeds in the following order: 
 Stage I: the industry’s start‐up phase, designed to observe the status of the 
transferred Japanese model before its clash with the emergent Chinese model   
 Stage II: the period of the China shock and its repercussions, designed to observe 
the immediate response of actors in Japanese chains to the direct clash with the 
Chinese model   
 Stage III: the period of FDI‐led development, designed to observe the 
medium‐term impact of the clash with the Chinese model and the situation after 
unstable policy conditions impeding organisational adjustments were cleared   
5.1 Stage I: A ‘Foster Parent’ Variant Emerges 
The empirical analysis of the Japanese model begins with the assessment of Honda’s 
relations with its suppliers in the early years of its operation in Vietnam when the 
market was small and the local component supply base was underdeveloped. The 
following subsections examine how the company attempted to cope with the initial 
challenges and assess the key features of the emerging form of industrial organisation. 
5.1.1 The Need for Explicit Coordination: Non-standard Designs and High Quality 
Upon launching local production in Vietnam, Honda basically sought to replicate the 
conventional product strategy it had perfected in Japan and earlier overseas investment 
locations: launching its own sophisticated models developed at home and 
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manufacturing them locally to high quality standards. In the 1990s, HVN launched two 
models in Vietnam, both of which carried proprietary (and thus non-standard) designs 
developed at the company’s R&D headquarters in Japan.26 One was adapted from an 
existing model produced in Thailand, and the other was developed exclusively for the 
Vietnamese market, carrying components customised to this particular model. The 
company also instituted its own component quality standards to be applied at its 
production bases in Asia.27  
Not only were product/process parameters idiosyncratic, they were also complex. 
HVN’s emphasis at this stage was clearly not on price competitiveness, the two models 
launched in the 1990s being priced as high as US$2,000.28 This reflected not only high 
quality levels but also a lack of scale economies, dependence on imported components, 
and monopoly rents.29 Unsurprisingly, sales stagnated as price levels were far above 
the reach of ordinary citizens; while the limited number of consumers who could afford 
the high prices opted for Honda-brand motorcycles imported from Thailand that were 
priced at broadly similar levels (Nguyen Tran Que and Hoa Huu Lan 1998). However, 
this did not lead HVN to adjust its product strategy at this stage.  
HVN’s emphasis on the non-price dimensions of competitiveness was confirmed by its 
suppliers. Detailed drawings provided by the company specified detailed product and 
process parameters (interviews with V1 #2, #4; V2 #1; V3 #1). As will be discussed in 
more detail below, none of the suppliers interviewed by the author were asked to 
reduce their prices at this stage.  
Apparently, Honda made limited effort to adapt its product strategy to the demands of 
Vietnamese consumers. After all, Vietnam was still a small, emerging market and the 
only major competitors were Honda-brand motorcycles imported from Thailand. 
Stagnating sales notwithstanding, the company was not compelled to seriously 
reconsider its product strategy.   
                                                  
26  This discussion of models launched in the1990s is based on an interview with HVN #2. 
27  Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun (Nikkei Business Daily) Newspaper, 25 May 1999. 
28  The prices were US$1,990 and US$2,044 respectively (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 234). 
29  A Vietnamese government inspection in 1998 found that HVN had earned profits of US$18,154,000 
– or US$221 per vehicle sold (calculation by the author) – in the company’s second full year of 
operation (Ha Huy Thanh et al. 2003: 332).   
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5.1.2 Misaligned Capability/Power Structure 
As one of the world’s leading manufacturers of motorcycles since the 1960s, Honda 
enjoyed product and branding leadership that had remained unchallenged for decades. 
The company also controlled virtually all key value chain functions, including product 
development, designs of all components other than a limited number of core items, 
marketing, and branding (Fujita 2013a). As of the late 1990s, the company’s operations 
in Vietnam focussed on production, while product development and design were 
undertaken in Japan.  
Yet, even such product, technological and marketing leadership transpired to be 
insufficient for HVN to gain control over the Vietnamese market. As stated above, 
since its products were out of the reach of ordinary Vietnamese consumers, motorcycle 
sales stagnated in the 1990s (Figure 1). The fact that it was the single largest 
motorcycle manufacturer in Vietnam notwithstanding, HVN’s production in the 1990s 
remained small (Figure 4); indeed, far lower than 300,000 units per year – the level 
generally recognised by Japanese manufacturers of motorcycle components as the 
minimum scale needed for efficient production (Mishima 2007). 
The Vietnamese government demanded that foreign motorcycle manufacturers expand 
local sourcing of components.30 To meet this requirement, Honda adopted its 
conventional approach of sourcing from the following two types of suppliers 
(interview with HVN #1), both of which transpired to be in short supply in Vietnam. 
First, Japanese suppliers – especially members of the Honda Group (keiretsu) – were 
preferred because of their proven record of manufacturing competence in serving 
Honda in Japan and abroad. However, despite indications that Honda explicitly or 
implicitly asked keiretsu suppliers to establish production bases in Vietnam 
notwithstanding (interviews with J6 #1; J7 #1), few of them did so because the country 
was still regarded as risky investment location (JETRO 1996; Ichikawa 2001) and the 
anticipated size of orders was too small.  
Figure 4. HVN’s Annual Motorcycle Production 
                                                  
30  Circular of the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment 1536/UB‐VP dated 11August 1994.   
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Source: Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (various years).  
Second, Honda also sought to mobilise relatively large, well-established local 
companies. However, given the underdeveloped status of Vietnam’s mechanical 
industries at this stage,31 only four such firms were initially admitted into HVN’s value 
chain (Table 4). Even though they were relatively large and well-established by 
Vietnamese standards, none of them had previous experience of manufacturing 
machinery components or serving foreign customers. This is evident from Table 5, 
which shows production capabilities possessed by Vietnamese suppliers in Japanese 
chains including three of the four suppliers that were admitted into HVN’s chains in 
the 1990s (V1, V2 and V3).  
Consequently, HVN’s value chain remained underdeveloped. As of 1998, the local 
content ratio was only approximately 44% (Table 4), which included components that 
HVN manufactured in-house, the majority of parts being necessarily imported, mainly 
from Japan. In 1998, HVN’s supply networks in Vietnam only consisted of 16 first-tier 
                                                  
31  This is evident from remarks made by experts who visited local Vietnamese companies engaged in 
processing metal, plastic and rubber products in 1995. Having visited nine major local companies, they 
remarked, “Visiting…local companies for the first time, we were surprised to find that their levels were 
far [lower] than the component manufacturers we have known and have instructed [in other Asian 
countries] in the past. We have come to think that instructing these companies will require a great deal 
of patience and new ideas” (JETRO 1996: 1). 
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suppliers: 12 Japanese companies, 5 of which belonged to the Honda Group,32 and 4 
local firms.  
Table 4. HVN’s Local Sourcing 
  1998 2001 2004 2007 
Local Content Ratio 44% 52% 83% 90% 
Total Number of Suppliers in Vietnam 16 20 43 58 
Japanese Suppliers 12 15 18 26 
  of which members of Honda Group 5 6 6 11 
Taiwanese and Korean Suppliers 0 0 12 14 
Vietnamese Suppliers 4 5 13 18 
  of which members of VEAM 0 0 1 3 
Note: VEAM (Vietnam Engine and Agricultural Machinery Corporation) is a state-owned business 
group that contributes 30% capital to HVN. 
Source: The author’s interviews with HVN (#1, #2, #3). Suppliers belonging to the Honda Group 
and VEAM were respectively enumerated by the author on the basis of Toyo Keizai Inc. (2009) 
and VEAM's website (http://www.veam.com.vn/?act=thanhvien, accessed 1 August 2012). 
Table 5. Production-related Capabilities Acquired by Vietnamese Suppliers in 
Japanese Chains 
  Before Stage I Stage I Stage II Stage III 
V1 Production of household plastic items Operational (n/a) Adaptive 
V2 Production of bicycle components Operational Operational - assimilative 
Assimilative- 
adaptive 
V3 Production of household metal items Operational Operational Assimilative 
V5 Production of household plastic items Operational Operational- assimilative 
V6 Production of wire harnesses for export to Japan Assimilative Adaptive 
V7 Production of machinery components for SOEs Operational Assimilative 
V8 (not yet established) Assimilative 
V9 Production of machinery components for SOEs Operational 
V13 Production of machinery components for SOEs Operational Assimilative 
Notes:  
(1) n/a = data not available. 
(2) For the period prior to entry into a Japanese chain (the unshaded area), main lines of 
business are shown. 
(3) For the period after entry into a Japanese chain (the shaded area), the level of 
equipment‐related and production management capabilities acquired by each supplier is 
shown. In case levels of the two types of capabilities differed, the lowest and highest 
                                                  
32  Suppliers J2, J6 and J10 even enjoyed direct capital investment from Honda’s Thai affiliate. 
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levels.   
Source: The author’s interviews with suppliers (Fujita 2013b).  
In short, Honda’s global leadership in product, technology and branding 
notwithstanding, the company had yet to establish sufficient market power to exert 
control over the albeit limited number of suppliers that possessed low levels of 
manufacturing competence.  
5.1.3 The Lead Firm as a Generous Provider of Assistance  
Limited lead firm control over the market combined with Vietnam’s dearth of 
component suppliers to constrain HVN in its attempts to exercise dominance. The 
result was a ‘foster parent’ variant of the captive model, whereby the lead firm relied 
primarily on the assurance of long-term orders, and the provision of technical and 
financial assistance to induce the suppliers’ commitment to meet its requirements.  
The key features of the emerging organisational model are evident from the pattern of 
lead firm–supplier dependence. On the one hand, the need to increase local contents in 
accordance with government requirements, combined with the difficulty of finding 
alternative domestic sources of components, meant that HVN was dependent to a great 
extent on its incumbent suppliers. Given non-standard product parameters and demand 
below the minimum level required for efficient production, orders were commissioned 
straight to a fixed group of suppliers.  
On the other hand, supplier dependence on HVN varied (Table 6). Even with modest 
orders, Japanese suppliers were largely dependent on HVN as they had no other major 
customers. This was particularly the case with regard to members of Honda Group, 
who invested in Vietnam specifically with the aim of doing business with Honda.33 By 
contrast, local Vietnamese suppliers typically maintained the output of their traditional 
products. This was the practice of all of four Vietnamese suppliers interviewed by the 
author that entered the HVN value chain in the 1990s; while business with HVN 
accounted for a relatively minor proportion of their sales (Table 6).  
                                                  
33  Three of the four Honda Group suppliers interviewed by the author explicitly mentioned that they 
invested in Vietnam with the aim of serving Honda (interviews with J2 #1, #2; J6 #1; J7 #1). No 
information was available on the remaining supplier (J3). 
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As stated above, in order to induce suppliers’ commitment to achieve its targets, HVN 
played the role of a ‘foster parent’ – a generous provider of assistance. The company’s 
extensive use of assistance at this stage is evident from the author’s interviews with 
suppliers. For members of the Honda Group, patronage took the form of financial 
support. This was a means by which HVN could reward its suppliers for taking the risk 
of investing in the equipment and/or training required specifically for serving Honda; 
given that the company was unable to provide suppliers with what they most wanted: 
large and stable orders. Two of the four Honda Group suppliers interviewed (J2 and J3) 
pointed out that HVN had applied preferential prices for the first few years so that they 
could gain a quick return on their investments. As a result, supplier J3 recorded a profit 
as early as the second year of operation (interview #1), and supplier J2 completely 
eliminated its losses by the early 2000s (interview #2). 
For local Vietnamese suppliers, patronage took the form of technical assistance. 
Without the provision of such help over an extended period, it was virtually impossible 
for local Vietnamese companies to meet HVN’s requirements. All of the four 
Vietnamese companies selected by HVN as first-tier suppliers upon the launch of its 
local production were interviewed by the author at different times. They had all 
received technical assistance, typically in the form of repeated visits of experts to their 
factories over a few years to provide advice and suggestions (interviews with suppliers 
V1 #1; V2 #1, #2; V3 #1, #2; V4 #1). 
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Table 6. Suppliers’ Dependence on HVN 
(a) Japanese Suppliers 
Name 
Honda 
Group
Start 
of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by Turnover Dependence on HVN and Changes in the Volume/Content of Orders 
2002 2006 Stage I Stage II Stage III 
J1 * 1997 
Steel/ 
aluminium 
components 
2nd 
(reorganised 
into J10) 
100% 
dependent on 
HVN. 
100% dependent on HVN. Orders for 
increased variety of components and 
types of processing required.  
(Reorganised into supplier J10 in 2005.) 
J2 * 1997 Silencers 3rd 3th 
100% 
dependent on 
HVN. 
100% dependent on HVN and its 
suppliers. Orders for increased variety 
of components. 
100% dependent on HVN and its suppliers. 
Further increase in variety of components. 
J3 * 1997 
Brake 
system 
7th 7th 
Highly 
dependent on 
HVN. 
Highly dependent on HVN but started 
exporting components to Japan.  
Dependent on HVN for 52% of sales while 
exports increased to 23%. Increased orders 
for sophisticated components from HVN. 
J4   1997 
Dies and 
moulds 
(not 
included) 
(bankrupt in 
2004) 
(n/a) 
Highly dependent on HVN but traded 
with VNS, YVN and manufacturers of 
consumer electronic products.  
(Bankrupt in 2004.) 
J5   1997 
Plastic 
components 
 
(not 
included) 
 
(not included) (n/a) 
Dependent on HVN for 40% of sales 
but traded with YVN and consumer 
electronics manufacturers. 
Dependence on HVN decreased to 20%. 
Increased production of electronic 
components. 
J6 * 1998 
Shock 
absorbers 
4th 1st 
Almost 
completely 
dependent on 
HVN 
Highly dependent on HVN but also 
supplied limited quantities to YVN and 
VNS. Lost orders for certain types of 
components upon the launch of the 
Wave Alpha but recovered them within 
a few years. 
Dependent on Honda for 95% of sales 
(including HVN for 85% and exports for 
10%). Orders for increased variety of 
components. 
J7 * 1998 
Electronic 
components 
5th 2nd (n/a) Dependent on HVN for 65% of sales. (n/a) 
J8   1998 
Plastic 
components 
(not 
included) 
(not included)
Many 
customers in 
other industries
Many customers in electronics and other 
industries. 
(n/a) 
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Table 6. Continued     
Name 
Honda 
Group
Start 
of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by turnover Dependence on HVN 
2002 2006 Stage I Stage II Stage III 
J9 
 
2001 
Aluminium 
components 
(not 
included) 
(not included) (n/a) (n/a) 
90% of sales in 2006 from motorcycle 
components, including supply to HVN and 
YVN. Volume and variety of orders from 
HVN reduced by 2008. 
J10 * 2004 
Steel/ 
aluminium 
components 
(not yet 
established) 
4th 
(not yet 
established) 
100% dependent on HVN and its 
suppliers. 
100% dependent on HVN and its suppliers. 
J11 * 2005 Transmission 
(not yet 
established) 
35th 
(not yet 
established) 
(not yet established) 100% dependent on HVN and its suppliers. 
(b) Vietnamese Suppliers 
Name 
VEAM 
Member
Start of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by Turnover Dependence on HVN and Changes in the Volume/Content of Orders 
2002 2006 Stages I to II Stage III 
V1   1997 
Plastic 
components 
and moulds 
(not 
included)
(not 
included)
Dependence on HVN increased 
from 16% in 2001 to 41% in 2002. 
Dependent on HVN for 40% of sales in 2008. Orders for 
high-precision components and moulds since 2006. Orders from 
buyers in other industries also increased. 
V2   1997 
Metal 
components 
(not 
included)
13th 
Dependence on motorcycle 
components increased from 22% in 
1998 to 85% in 2003 (mostly 
HVN). 
Dependent on motorcycle components for 87% of sales in 2008. 
Increased volume and variety of orders from HVN and its suppliers. 
V3   1997 
Metal 
components 
12th 
(not 
included)
Dependent on motorcycle 
components for 60% of sales in 
2001 (mostly HVN). 
Dependent on HVN for 50–60% of sales. Volume of orders increased 
but concentrated on components requiring relatively simple 
processing. 
V4   1997 
Metal stamped 
components 
(not 
included)
(not 
included)
Dependence on HVN increased 
from 30–40% in the 1990s to 70% 
in 2002. Volume and variety of 
orders increased. 
Dependence on HVN reduced to 40–45% in 2008. Volume and 
variety of orders not increased while supplier expanded transactions 
in other products. 
116 
 
Table 6. Continued     
Name 
VEAM 
Member
Start of 
Trans- 
actions 
Components 
Ranking by Turnover Dependence on HVN and Changes in the Volume/Content of Orders 
2002 2002 Stages I to II Stage III 
V5   2000 
Plastic 
components  
(not 
included)
(not 
included)
Dependent on motorcycle 
components for less than 10% of 
sales in 2002 (mostly HVN). 
Dependence on HVN increased to 40% in 2007. Orders falling by 
2008 and concentrated on components requiring relatively simple 
processing. 
V6  2001 Wire harnesses
(not 
included)
(not 
included)
(n/a) 
Dependent on HVN for 40% of sales in 2008. Volume and content of 
orders unchanged. 
V7 * 2001 
Metal engine 
components 
(not 
included)
(not 
included)
Dependent on HVN for 42% of 
sales in 2002. 
Dependent on HVN for 60% of sales in 2008. Orders increased, 
including processing for high-precision engine components. 
V8 2004 
Dies and 
moulds 
(not 
included)
(not 
included)
(not yet established) Dependent on HVN for virtually 100% of sales in 2008. 
V9 * 2005 
Metal engine 
components 
(not 
included)
(not 
included)
(not yet started transactions with 
HVN) 
Dependent on HVN for one-third of sales in 2008. Orders increased, 
including processing for high-precision engine components. 
V13 * 2004 
Metal 
components 
(not 
included)
45th 
(not yet started transactions with 
HVN) 
Dependent on HVN for 80% of sales in 2008. Orders increased in 
volume and variety. 
Notes: 
(1) ‘Ranking by Turnover’ indicates placement of respective suppliers among all registered motorcycle component suppliers included in lists 
provided by the General Statistics Office.   
(2) ‘Not included’ indicates that the supplier was omitted from the list, which typically occurred when suppliers were registered under other 
industries because their main product lines were not motorcycle components. 
Source: The author’s interviews. 
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For its part, HVN made relatively limited use of its ability to impose demanding 
requirements on its suppliers – a key feature of the captive model. While HVN’s 
quality stipulations constituted a challenge to most local suppliers, they were given 
ample time to study procedures and strive to reach the requisite standards (interview 
with V2 #1). The small volume of orders also meant that delivery requirements were 
loose, a factor that is evident from the author’s interview with supplier J3, one of the 
Honda Group suppliers. 
In those days [the 1990s], when we could not make the delivery deadline specified 
by HVN, our local staff even requested them to adjust their production timetable. 
Now [at the time of the interview i.e. 2004] it is difficult to imagine that such a 
practice was going on.       (J3 #1) 
In summary, HVN’s differentiated, proprietary products called for explicit governance 
mechanisms. Even though HVN remained the sole coordinator of its value chain, the 
limited volume of orders and an underdeveloped local component supply base 
constrained it in the establishment of its dominance in terms of imposing challenging 
targets on its suppliers. The outcome was that HVN adopted the role of a ‘foster parent’ 
in attempting to nurture the capabilities of its suppliers. Moreover, in the absence of 
major competitors, HVN was not compelled to reconsider its strategies at this stage. 
5.2 Stage II: Partial Transformation of the ‘Foster Parent’ 
Variant 
This subsection considers Honda’s short-term response to the new challenges posed by 
the China shock. Faced with the need to spur price-based competitiveness, HVN 
sought to adjust its organisational model but such an attempt only produced limited 
progress at this stage. The following examines the factors that drove HVN’s 
organisational adjustment as well as those that impeded it, and discusses the form of 
industrial organisation that emerged out of the adjustment.  
5.2.1 Impetus for Transformation: Radical Price Reduction 
The impetus for organisational change came from a radical shift in emphasis of HVN’s 
product strategy from non-price to price-based competitiveness. When the Vietnamese 
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market began to be flooded with massive numbers of low-priced imitation motorcycles, 
for the first time, Honda realised the huge unexploited demand at the bottom end of 
low-income markets like Vietnam. This led Honda to initiate a company-wide effort to 
develop a low-priced model in an attempt to prevent the entry of Chinese motorcycles 
into Southeast Asia, where the Japanese company had held market leadership for 
decades (Higashi 2006; Sato 2011). In collaboration with the R&D headquarters and 
mother factory in Japan and production base in Thailand, Honda’s regional R&D base 
in Thailand developed a low-priced model with exceptional acceleration (Ohara et al. 
2003; Ohara 2006b). Priced at approximately one-third of HVN’s existing models,34 
the Wave Alpha was launched in Vietnam in January 2002.  
The launch of this low-priced model had significant impact on parameters imposed on 
suppliers. On the one hand, the complexity of parameters was reduced. Price reduction 
targets demanded by HVN upon the launch of the Wave Alpha on four of the Honda 
Group suppliers of core components interviewed by the author ranged between 40% 
and 50% (Table 7), which was far beyond the targets achieved by routine incremental 
improvements in productivity.  
Table 7. Responses of Honda Group Suppliers to the Launch of the Wave Alpha 
Name 
Price Reduction 
Margin 
Requested by 
HVN 
Supplier’s Response to HVN’s 
Requests Results 
J2 40% 
Priority was to avoid loss of orders. 
The supplier decided to accept 
HVN’s targets before actually 
coming up with ways of meeting 
them.  
The supplier won orders for all 
existing types of component.  
J3 50% 
Priority was to avoid loss of orders, 
even if the supplier initially incurred 
losses.  
The supplier won orders for all 
existing types of component. It 
later came up with ways to 
achieve cost reduction. 
J6 (n/a) 
The supplier made internal attempts 
at cost reduction and suggestions for 
specification changes to HVN.  
The supplier only won orders 
for 3 of 16 existing types of 
component. 
J7 40% 
The supplier provided quotations in 
accordance with the extent of cost 
reduction it could achieve.  
The supplier lost orders for one 
of two existing types of 
component but won orders for 
other components as it was able 
to meet HVN’s target price. 
                                                  
34  Upon its initial launch, the price of the Wave Alpha (US$719) was 36% of the official price of HVN’s 
most popular model, the Super Dream, in 2000 (US$1,990) (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 234). This was 
followed by the launch of a low‐priced model in Thailand in June 2002, the Wave 100.   
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Source: The author’s interviews (J2 #1; J3 #1; J6 #1; J7 #1). 
In the meantime, in order to achieve such a radical cost reduction, Honda reduced its 
product specifications to the levels considered necessary for the Vietnamese market. 
For example, the maximum driving speed applied in defining product and process 
parameters for the Wave Alpha was set at 80 kilometres per hour. Even though this was 
much lower than standard levels applied to Honda’s other overseas markets, it was 
considered sufficient for use in the Vietnamese context where traffic congestion 
prevented motorcycle use at higher speeds (Amano and Shintaku 2010: 799).  
On the other hand, the non-standard nature of parameters was maintained. With the 
aim of reducing product development costs, Honda made extensive use of component 
designs utilised in its existing models (Ohara et al. 2003) rather than renewing the 
whole vehicle system – the conventional Japanese approach to product development 
(Fujita 2013a). However, the Wave Alpha was still non-standard in the sense that 
component designs were customised to Honda.     
In summary, HVN’s priority shifted from quality to price reduction. The company’s 
product and process parameters were still non-standard but less complex than in the 
previous stage, and thus could be communicated between the lead firm and its 
suppliers with relative ease.  
5.2.2 Lead Firm Attempts at Realigning Capabilities 
The shift in HVN’s production strategy was accompanied by corresponding changes to 
the structure of the company’s value chain. In order to reduce component procurement 
costs, HVN sought to substantially expand sources in Vietnam and abroad (interview 
#2). Apart from the need to exploit new sources of lower-priced components, 
expanding local sourcing became a priority, as this enabled HVN to save on import 
tariffs and to conform to the local content stipulations implemented by the Vietnamese 
government in the early 2000s. Increasing the number of suppliers – especially those 
with high levels of price-based competitiveness – was also expected to put competitive 
pressure on incumbent suppliers.35 
                                                  
35  This effect is clearly illustrated in an interview with Japanese keiretsu supplier J2 #1 in 2002. Noting 
that Honda was engaged in an extensive search for new suppliers, the general director commented 
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Since one could hardly expect Japanese FDI in component manufacturing to increase 
immediately (Ichikawa 2001), HVN inevitably had to depend on non-conventional 
component sources in expanding local supply. The remarkable increase in HVN’s local 
content ratio from 52% in 2001 to 83% in 2004 (Table 4) was achieved primarily by 
incorporating non-Japanese suppliers into the company’s value chain. As Honda 
engaged in an extensive search for suppliers in Vietnam by mobilising experts from 
Japan,36 numerous Taiwanese, Korean and Vietnamese suppliers were admitted into 
the company’s value chain (Table 4). Another noteworthy development was that HVN 
sought to import components for the first time from China. Upon the launch of the 
Wave Alpha, HVN sourced 27 types of component from local Chinese companies 
servicing Honda’s joint venture motorcycle manufacturer in China (interview #2).  
While the above developments might look impressive, the key question is the extent to 
which such adjustments changed the alignment of relevant capabilities and power 
relations between lead firm and suppliers. Apparently, HVN hoped to achieve two aims 
simultaneously: to enhance its purchasing power, and to spur price-based competition 
between suppliers. Both conditions had to be met if HVN were to exploit market forces 
whilst maintaining its non-standard product and process parameters. However, this 
strategy only achieved partial success at this stage because the company was prevented 
from realigning the necessary structure of capabilities to achieve these aims.  
On the one hand, by reducing prices, HVN sought to rapidly expand its sales volume, 
which would not only enable the lead firm and its suppliers to realise economies of 
scale but also allow HVN to exercise purchasing power over its suppliers. Indeed, this 
seemed a likely scenario in 2002.37 However, HVN’s ambitions were blocked by a 
series of restrictions introduced by the Vietnamese government from 2002 onwards on 
                                                                                                                                                  
that the price‐based competitiveness of local suppliers would pose a real threat to Japanese 
companies.     
36  The search for potential suppliers conducted in the years 2001–2 was the most extensive in HVN’s 
history to date, covering as many as 80 companies (interview with HVN #4). 
37  A few Japanese suppliers noted that in 2002 they had been requested by HVN to prepare for rapid 
capacity expansion (interviews with J2 #1; #2; J4 #1), which clearly demonstrates HVN’s ambitions 
before quantitative restrictions on imports of components were imposed (Section 2.3). Also, when 
HVN’s annual production exceeded one million units in 2007, the company’s administrative manager 
noted, “We could finally achieve what we had endeavoured to achieve for a long time” (interview HVN 
#3). 
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motorcycle registration and the capacity expansion of foreign invested motorcycle 
manufacturers (as discussed in Section 2.3). The resultant slow growth of the market as 
well as HVN’s inability to invest in expansion of production capacity meant that the 
company’s annual production increased modestly. In fact, it had only reached some 
400,000 units by 2004 – above the 300,000-unit minimum level required for 
economically viable non-capital-intensive production but barely sufficient for the lead 
firm to exercise purchasing power over suppliers.  
On the other hand, HVN’s attempt to increase the number of suppliers was aimed at 
breaking its dependence on incumbent suppliers and spurring competition between 
them as well as new ones. Again, this strategy was thwarted by the limited 
manufacturing capabilities of newly admitted suppliers together with the 
aforementioned small purchase volume. While some Taiwanese suppliers had good 
track records of supplying components to Honda in Taiwan (interview with HVN #2), 
only one of the four Vietnamese suppliers interviewed by the author and admitted to 
HVN’s value chain in Stage II had ever served foreign customers (Table 5).  
The shortage of supplier capability had to be dealt with by lead firm intervention in the 
form of technical assistance. However, as will be discussed below, quality problems 
recorded by several suppliers – those in China in particular – were so serious that HVN 
was eventually compelled to stop placing orders with them (interview #2) – the sort of 
decision Honda makes only in truly exceptional circumstances (interview #3). By 2004, 
only a few types of components – as opposed to 27 upon the initial launch of the Wave 
Alpha – were imported from China (interview with HVN #2).  
In the meantime, the radical price reduction targets announced by HVN upon 
launching of the Wave Alpha compelled the incumbent suppliers – including those 
belonging to Honda Group – to take urgent measures to reduce production costs. All 
such suppliers interviewed by the author, both Japanese and Vietnamese, eventually 
achieved HVN’s price reduction targets with their own cost reduction efforts.38 For 
instance, supplier J6 won contracts for only three out of the sixteen types of 
components upon the initial launching of the Wave Alpha, but because of significant 
                                                  
38  Examples of measures taken by interviewed suppliers to achieve targets include the localisation of 
imported components and materials; productivity improvement in plant operations; and downward 
adjustments to product and/or process specifications (subject to Honda’s approval) (interviews with J2 
#1; J3 #1; J6 #1). 
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productivity improvements, company won back contracts for all of the remaining 
thirteen types of components by 2004 (interview #1). 
In short, HVN’s attempt at realigning capability within its chain with the aim of 
achieving substantial cost reduction was only partially successful at this stage; first, 
because government policy impeded HVN in expanding production; and second, 
because supplier capabilities took time to develop. 
 
5.2.3 The Constant Struggle to Introduce Market Forces 
As a result of the partial realignment of capabilities, the emerging pattern of 
transactional governance was shaped by a tension between the need to achieve radical 
price reduction – which called for increased use of market forces – and absence of the 
capability alignment required for the effective functioning of market forces. 
HVN’s attempts at making use of market forces may be clearly observed in the 
company’s ordering procedure upon the launch of the Wave Alpha, orders being no 
longer commissioned straight to a fixed group of suppliers but based on competition 
determined by price. Prior to the launch of the new model, HVN announced radical 
price reduction targets and asked for quotations from an increased number of suppliers 
(interviews with J2 #1; J3 #1; J7 #1). Table 7 summarises the responses of four 
incumbent suppliers, all of which had direct capital relations with Honda. They were 
thus compelled to meet a price reduction target ranging between 40% and 50% or risk 
losing orders. In this regard, in 2004, the general director of supplier J6 recalled: 
“[Upon launching of the Wave Alpha,] we received pressure [from Honda that they] 
would switch to Taiwanese, Korean, or Chinese suppliers if we could not achieve the 
target prices” (interview #1). In August 2002, the general manager of supplier J2 
indeed admitted that the decision was whether to accept the cost reduction target 
presented by Honda or to lose orders (interview #1). 
However, responses varied. Suppliers J2 and J3 strove to meet targets on the 
understanding that they would be obliged to sacrifice profits or even incur losses 
during initial years. On the other hand, suppliers J6 and J7 gave up supplying some of 
the components for which they were asked by HVN to provide quotations. The fact 
that even supplier J6, with which Honda had direct capital and personnel relations, 
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won orders for only 3 out of the 16 types of component that the company had 
previously supplied to HVN illustrates the lead firm’s determination to trade with the 
cheapest available source regardless of nationality or keiretsu ties.39 This marked an 
important shift away from Honda’s conventional sourcing practices. Indeed, suppliers 
were expected to independently come up with measures to meet the stringent targets 
imposed on them, financial support previously granted to such suppliers having been 
terminated by this stage.   
Although the above changes in HVN’s ordering practices might look impressive, the 
new alignment of lead firm and supplier capabilities prevented the sustained operation 
of price-based competition, a situation that eventually led to the revival of previous 
patterns of dependence. First, HVN’s limited purchase volume meant that dual 
sourcing was not feasible: to the extent that non-standard component designs were 
maintained, parts could be simultaneously sourced from more than one supplier only 
when the size of production was sufficiently large to allow each of the suppliers to 
exploit economies of scale. HVN regarded this threshold to be the annual production of 
one million units (interviews #3, #4), an output level that, as discussed above, had not 
been reached by the end of Stage II.  
Second, as noted in Section 5.2.2, the limited manufacturing capability of newly 
admitted suppliers posed a serious constraint to HVN’s attempts to use them to spur 
competition between suppliers. This, combined with the efforts of incumbent suppliers 
to meet HVN targets, resulted in the revival of the traditional mutual dependence 
between the lead firm and its old suppliers.  
Third, limited supplier capabilities also forced HVN to continue to act as a ‘foster 
parent’ or provider of technical assistance. New entrants were offered technical 
assistance in the form of periodic monitoring and joint problem-solving exercises 
(interviews with V5 #1; V7#1); although the time frame of assistance was found to be 
generally shorter than it had been in respect of suppliers entering HVN value chain in 
the 1990s, the former – as discussed above – extending for between one and two years, 
while the latter was approximately six months (interviews with V5 #1; V7#1).  
                                                  
39  An important point to note is that most of the components adopted in the Wave Alpha carried 
designs previously developed for Honda’s pre‐existing models (Ohara et al. 2003). The fact that 
suppliers had not participated in component design processes is likely to have been a key consideration 
behind the sourcing approach adopted for this particular model.   
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The above findings show that the magnitude of short-term adjustment was not as 
substantial as the existing literature suggests after all. While HVN’s response to the 
China shock did include a number of radical changes to conventional sourcing 
practices, they were largely emergency measures intended to deal with immediate 
needs. Within a few years, it became apparent that the existing capability structure 
constrained the sustained functioning of market forces, the result being the revival of 
traditional patterns of dependence and persistence of lead firm assistance. 
 
5.3 Stage III: Transformation into an ‘Institutionalised 
Competition’ Variant 
As the industry entered the phase of rapid FDI-led development, fundamental changes 
took place in HVN’s value chain. The company’s attempts to introduce market forces 
into transactional governance, which had only partially succeeded in the previous stage, 
culminated in what the present study refers to as an ‘institutionalised competition’ 
variant of the captive model. This variant of the captive organisation systematically 
combines the advantages of long-term, close relations with a fixed group of suppliers 
and the benefits of market forces with the aim of extracting constant performance 
improvement out of suppliers. The following subsections describe and explain the 
transformation of HVN’s value chain during this most dynamic stage; analysis that no 
previous study has explicitly attempted.  
5.3.1 Shifting Market Demand: The Increasing Complexity of Parameters 
The third stage of industrial development was characterised by increasing 
sophistication of consumer demand. As a result of rising levels of income and serious 
quality problems experienced with Chinese motorcycles in the early 2000s, urban 
Vietnamese consumers began to aspire to a better quality of motorcycle, while demand 
for low-priced imitations was limited to low-income consumers in rural areas (The 
Motorbike Joint Working Group 2007).  
In response to the changing market landscape, Honda implemented a number of 
important adjustments to its product strategy. First, the complexity of product 
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parameters increased. Reflecting the growing market, the number of new models 
launched by HVN increased substantially by Stage III (Table 8). In order to respond to 
the increasing sophistication of consumers, HVN launched a greater number of models 
that adopted new component technologies, higher precision levels, and/or renewed 
external styling (interview with HVN #4). These changes were reflected in price levels: 
HVN models launched between 2006 and 2008 were priced between US$932 and 
US$1,564 – higher than the increased price of the Wave Alpha (US$807) in 2007.40 
Second, process parameters also grew more complex. HVN’s emphasis shifted from 
the one-off radical price reduction in the previous stage to incremental yet continuous 
improvement in overall QCD levels. Of these three criteria, the highest priority was 
attached to quality levels. Asked about the company’s focus in 2007, HVN’s manager 
remarked:  
[Of QCD], quality is the most important. Since Vietnamese consumers demand 
very high levels of quality, we need to keep on paying close attention to [our] 
quality levels…We emphasise quality at source. That is, we ask suppliers to 
guarantee quality levels within their production processes.      (HVN #3) 
 
Table 8. New Models Registered by Year 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
HVN 2 1 5 6 9 17 27 35 102
Local Assembler A1 28 11 4 28 105 112 191 66 545
Local Assembler A2 19 15 0 10 8 8 15 0 75
Local Assembler A3 10 1 5 25 43 56 112 8 260
Local Assembler A4 8 6 4 8 23 16 9 9 83
Local Assembler A5 19 9 4 7 8 21 15 3 86
Local Assembler A6 0 1 2 5 10 12 10 1 41
Source: The author, from data obtained from the Vietnam Register (http://www.vr.org.vn), 
accessed 6 January 2009. 
It is worth emphasising that HVN began to demand that suppliers ensure quality at 
source. This was in sharp contrast to the company’s standards in Stage II, when it 
tolerated defects in components imported from China so long as price advantages 
outweighed the cost of inspecting 100% of the parts (interview with HVN #2). 
However, such preoccupation with quality does not mean that price was no longer 
                                                  
40  Prices quoted in various issues of Oto‐Xe May (Automobiles and Motorcycles). 
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important. Unlike the one-off cost reduction in the early 2000s, suppliers were now 
requested to achieve incremental cost reductions of 5% every year (interview with 
HVN #5). With a growing volume of orders (see below), delivery deadlines also 
became increasingly tight, most Japanese and some Vietnamese suppliers being 
required to implement ‘just in time’ delivery several times a day.41  
In terms of degree of standardisation, the non-standard nature of product parameters 
was maintained. However, since approximately 2004, the company’s regional R&D 
base in Thailand started to make extensive use of common component designs for 
internal parts across models to be launched in Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam 
(interview with Honda R&D Southeast Asia #1). Whilst this marked a significant move 
away from the Honda’s conventional approach to the renewal of most component 
designs when launching new models, the fresh approach enabled the company to 
develop large varieties of models at low cost, while realising economies of scale in 
manufacturing (ibid.).  
In short, HVN’s product and process parameters became increasingly complex, 
extending to non-price dimensions and demanding in terms of requisite levels. While 
component designs continued to be specific to Honda, the use of common parts across 
models laid the foundations for the realisation of economies of scale in manufacturing 
and lead firm purchasing power over suppliers.  
5.3.2 Full Realignment of the Capability Structure 
Whilst shifting demand certainly influenced the direction and degree of organisational 
transformation, even more important was the driver for change coming from within the 
value chain: the shifting alignment of capabilities. This occurred partly as a result of 
HVN’s active attempt to create the necessary conditions for transforming its ‘foster 
parent’ model of industrial organisation, and partly as a result of incidental changes in 
Vietnamese government policy that were beyond the company’s control.  
On the one hand, the policy changes discussed above led to significant expansion of 
the market as a whole, as well as HVN’s market shares in particular. As the 
government abandoned a series of legislation that had repressed the overall market 
                                                  
41  The frequency of deliveries in 2007–2008 ranged between 5–8 times a day (interviews with 
suppliers J2 #2; J3 #3; J6 #2; J10 #1; V1 #3). 
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growth, sales of motorcycles increased rapidly, even exceeding levels during the China 
shock (Figure 1). Japanese lead firms expanded their shares as they were released from 
constraints on expansion of production capacity. HVN’s annual production in 
particular exceeded one million units by 2007 (Figure 4). This was an important 
landmark because such purchase volume not only exceeded the minimum efficient 
scale even for components requiring capital-intensive production processes, but also 
called for the dual sourcing of each type of component (interviews with HVN #3, #4). 
Accordingly, HVN started to exercise huge purchasing power over its suppliers.  
On the other hand, the number of suppliers in Vietnam as well as their overall 
capability levels increased remarkably. First, as a consequence of the rapid market 
expansion, FDI from component suppliers with established records of serving Japanese 
motorcycle manufacturers increased, including Honda Group suppliers that had 
previously been hesitant to invest in Vietnam. Of the total of 38 investment licences 
granted to Japanese motorcycle component manufacturers between 1992 and 2007, as 
many as 20 projects were licensed between 2004 and 2007.42  
Second, as a result of HVN’s attempts to mobilise and nurture local suppliers from the 
late 1990s, the capability levels of Vietnamese firms improved substantially. This is 
clear from the author’s in-depth case studies of HVN’s first-tier Vietnamese suppliers 
(Table 5). By Stage III, most of the suppliers had reached the assimilative level whilst 
some even progressed to the adaptive level for one or more dimension of their 
production activities. Such improvement in the production-related capabilities of local 
suppliers is corroborated by the assessment of HVN managers. In 2009, the company’s 
procurement manager remarked that, with a number of exceptions, local Vietnamese 
suppliers were generally able to meet its requirements without the hands-on technical 
assistance (interview #5).  
As a result of the increased number of suppliers in Vietnam and their improved 
capability levels, HVN’s local content ratio and number of suppliers increased rapidly, 
with the former reaching 90% and the latter reaching 58 by 2007 (Table 4). However, 
even more significant were the structural changes within the value chain. Having 
obtained the ability to switch suppliers, HVN reorganised its value chain, adopting 
differentiated approaches to the following three different groups of suppliers – with 
                                                  
42  Calculated by the author using data provided by the Ministry of Planning and Investment of Vietnam, 
which is available in tabulated form in Fujita (2008). 
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emphasis on what HVN manager referred to as “group suppliers” (interview #5).  
The first group consisted of Honda group (keiretsu) suppliers. Among the embedded 
cases, J2, J3, J6, J7, J10 and J11 belonged to this category. Having proprietary 
component design and/or manufacturing competencies that Honda relied upon, their 
parent companies in Japan had developed a long-term association with the former 
mediated by capital and personnel relations.  
The second group was Honda’s joint venture partner, Vietnam Engine and Agricultural 
Machinery (VEAM) Corporation, a state-owned business group consisting of more 
than 20 member companies, traditionally specialising in the production of diesel 
engines and agricultural machinery. Among the embedded cases, suppliers V7, V9, 
V13, and V14 belonged to this business group. Although VEAM members did not 
possess complementary competencies, HVN started to attach growing priority to them 
as an integral part of its extended corporate group (interview #5). Apart from direct 
capital ties, high levels of manufacturing competence relative to other local suppliers, a 
sense of trust that had been built through long-term relations as a joint venture partner, 
and the executive with a good understanding of Japanese management practices and 
willing to expand business with Japanese companies also account for HVN’s 
preference to outsource key components to VEAM members (interview with HVN #5).   
The third group consisted of suppliers of non-core components, of all nationalities. 
These suppliers were expected to provide external manufacturing capacity. Suppliers 
J4, J5, J8, J9, V1–6 and V8 fell under this category.  
Suppliers belonging to the first two groups received increasing priority in Stage III. 
They not only accounted for nearly half of suppliers newly admitted into HVN’s value 
chain between 2004 and 2007 (Table 4) but also began to receive a mounting 
proportion of HVN’s expanded orders. Indeed, Honda Group suppliers received 
increasing orders not only for core- but also non-core components that had previously 
been subcontracted to Group 3 suppliers.43 In localising the production of 
                                                  
43  In addition to Table 6, the following case provides a clear illustration. After J10 – 100% owned by 
Honda – was established in 2005 to manufacture a large variety of components, supplier J9 – a 
Japanese non‐keiretsu provider of non‐core components – was requested to supply sub‐components to 
J10 instead of directly to HVN as the company had done previously. Supplier J9 lost further orders for 
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high-precision engine components, HVN designated two VEAM suppliers (V7 and 
V9) to undertake the initial processing of these components (interviews with HVN #4, 
#5). 
In addition to the shifting alignment of supplier capability, progress in Vietnamese 
trade liberalisation provided HVN with potential access to overseas sources of 
suppliers, although they remained an unused option at this stage. As part of the 
country’s bid to become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Vietnam 
had dismantled local content rules by the end of 2003, and, in accordance with the 
tariff reduction schedule under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Free Trade Area (AFTA), Vietnam reduced its tariffs on most motorcycle components 
imported from ASEAN-6 countries from 50% in 2005 to 5% in 2006.44  
Although the high levels of HVN’s local content ratio after 2006 are an illustration of 
the company’s preference to source the bulk of its motorcycle parts locally, the 
company now had the option of importing components at competitive prices from 
Thailand and Indonesia – the two countries with the most advanced automotive 
component supply bases in Southeast Asia.45 Moreover, with the expectation that trade 
liberalisation under the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area would progress in the 
not-too-distant future, Honda was eager to make a second attempt at sourcing 
components from China. Its procurement manger emphasised that limited 
manufacturing capabilities possessed by suppliers in China – the main reason for the 
failure of the first trial upon the launch of the Wave Alpha – had improved to a 
considerable extent by 2008 (interview with HVN #4).  
To sum up, the distribution of lead firm and supplier capabilities changed substantially 
                                                                                                                                                  
sub‐components after 2007 as supplier J10 started to manufacture them in‐house (interview with J9 
#1).   
44  ASEAN‐6 includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. While 
motorcycle components had long been excluded from Vietnam’s tariff reduction schedule for AFTA, 
the Vietnamese government announced a schedule for these items for the first time at the end of 2004 
(Government Decree 213/2004/ND‐CP dated 27 December 2004). 
45  Thailand has established itself as the hub of the Southeast Asian automotive industry (Lecler 2002; 
Higashi 2006). With the largest motorcycle market in Southeast Asia and a longer history of 
industrialisation, Indonesia is also more advanced than Vietnam in terms of the development of the 
component industry (Sato 2011).   
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as a result of both HVN’s active attempts to realign capabilities within the industry and 
incidental policy changes. With its huge purchasing power and accumulating supplier 
capability, HVN gained the capacity to reorganise its suppliers in accordance with its 
requirements. 
5.3.3 An ‘Institutionalised Competition’ Variant Emerges 
The shifting capability alignment enabled HVN to implement organisational 
adjustments to meet changing product and process requirements. The result was a form 
of organisation referred to as an ‘institutionalised competition’ variant of the captive 
chain. Key changes in transactional governance were three-fold.  
First, the level of supplier dependence on HVN increased substantially regardless of 
the type of supplier. The large volume of orders meant that suppliers were increasingly 
dependent on HVN for their sales. By Stage III, this was the case not only with Honda 
Group suppliers but also local Vietnamese suppliers. Local suppliers like V2, V3, V7, 
V8, and V13 depended on HVN and its related companies for between 50% and 100% 
of their sales (Table 6).  
Second, HVN’s provision of technical assistance diminished and was substituted with 
less generous forms of lead firm engagement with suppliers: collaborative initiatives 
for achieving incremental productivity improvement, referred to as value analysis (VA) 
and value engineering (VE);46 systematic monitoring of supplier performance; and 
joint problem-solving exercises in the cases of troubles (interviews with HVN #4, #5). 
All three of the aforementioned groups of suppliers were subject to stringent QCD 
performance targets, which were incrementally upgraded every year (ibid.). Since most 
suppliers were more or less capable of reaching such targets, technical assistance 
beyond systematic monitoring and troubleshooting was offered only selectively with 
regard to strategically important targets. Group 2 suppliers became strategic targets as 
they were subcontracted high-precision engine components calling for sophisticated 
production-related capabilities (ibid.).  
                                                  
46  VA and VE refer to activities designed to obtain the best value of a component by analysing its 
function and cost. In Japanese manufacturing industries, these techniques have been widely applied by 
lead firms and suppliers as joint problem‐solving exercises aimed at mutual gain (Asanuma 1989; Sako 
1992; Nishiguchi and Brookfield 1997).     
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Third, HVN’s made use of what this study refers to as ‘institutionalised competition’ 
among a pool of carefully selected suppliers.47 This form of competition is 
distinguished from market competition in arm’s-length organisation in that (1) the 
scope of competition is limited to those suppliers that pass a careful selection process, 
the lead firm essentially maintaining long-term relations with each of them; and (2) 
selection of suppliers is not based principally on price but rather on comprehensive 
ratings of QCD performance, the assessment of VA and VE proposals submitted by 
suppliers, and the lead firm’s policy on the allocation of business shares48 (Sako 1992; 
Asanuma 1989).  
In practice, the implications of institutionalised competition varied according to type of 
supplier. Those of non-core components (Group 3) faced increasingly intense 
competition, and since alternative sources could be found for them, HVN retained the 
capacity to actually switch suppliers. Moreover, even after a contract was awarded, 
HVN sought to maintain supplier diligence by adjusting its order volume dependent on 
QCD performance (interview #5). Supplier V2 remarked that the company had to think 
carefully in submitting quotations to HVN as it had approximately ten competitors all 
bidding to supply the lead firm (interview #2). Among suppliers of plastic components, 
V1 was in receipt of increasing orders for high-precision parts and moulds, while V5 
still focussed on relatively simple components and faced diminishing orders 
(interviews with V1 #2, #4; V5 #2).   
By contrast, the substantive degree of competition faced by suppliers in first two 
groups was apparently weaker. To the extent that HVN opted to expand local sourcing, 
it had to depend on these suppliers as there were no domestic alternatives equipped 
with similar levels of capability to supply core components to the required standards. 
Moreover, with regard to Honda Group suppliers, the fact that the manufacturer had 
long depended on the component design capabilities of parent companies in Japan or 
affiliates in Thailand certainly remained a key consideration in HVN’s sourcing 
decisions. As of 2008–09, Honda Group members and VEAM suppliers continued to 
                                                  
47  “Institutionalised competition” is a term coined by Sako (1992); Richardson (1993) alludes to 
“parallel sourcing”; while Fujimoto (1999) refers to patterns of supplier competition in the domain of 
product development in the Japanese automobile industry as “development competition”. Similar 
practices are also discussed by Asanuma (1989).     
48  Asanuma (1989) does not discuss what lead firm “policy” specifically means, but HVN’s emerging 
priorities in terms of Honda Group and VEAM suppliers are typical examples.   
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receive orders from HVN for 100% of the components they specialised in (interviews 
with HVN #4, #5; J2 #2; J3 #2; J6 #2; J10 #1; J11 #1).  
However, there were indications that even these suppliers were beginning to 
experience growing competition. By Stage III, HVN had started to solicit quotations 
even for core components from multiple sources – typically suppliers in China – with 
the aim of applying pressure to the candidates (interview #3). Indeed, all Honda Group 
suppliers interviewed by the author between 2007 and 2009 expressed concern about 
growing competition with overseas suppliers, including subsidiaries of their parent 
companies located in other Southeast Asian countries. For example the general director 
of supplier J3 noted that the company was stepping up its efforts to reduce costs in the 
face of competition not coming only from Thailand and Indonesia but also from China 
in the longer term (interview #2). And the general director of J2 remarked: “So far 
HVN has only asked for quotations from us, but they tell us that they will buy from 
whichever source offers the lowest price; we face intense price-based competition” 
(interview #2).  
In short, the shifting capability alignment enabled HVN to fully adjust its value chain 
to meet changing product requirements. The result was an ‘institutionalised 
competition’ variant of the captive organisational model, which not only combined the 
benefits of long-term, collaborative relations with suppliers and the advantage of 
market forces, but also incorporated adaptations to meet market, industrial and policy 
conditions prevailing in Vietnam. The preferential sourcing approach in respect of the 
VEAM Corporation and the soliciting of quotations from companies located abroad are 
examples of such modifications.  
5.4 Summary and Discussion 
The in-depth empirical analysis in this section shed light on the dynamic 
transformation of HVN’s value chain over a decade from the late 1990s. In terms of the 
first sub-question, it was argued that the seemingly radical organisational shift 
immediately after the China shock emphasised in the existing literature transpired to be 
short-lived, while a more dynamic and longer-lasting organisational transformation 
occurred in the medium term. By this time, HVN’s value chain had been transformed 
from a ‘foster parent’ variant of the captive model into an ‘institutionalised 
competition’ variant – a hybrid organisational form that systematically combined the 
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conventional advantages of long-term relations with suppliers and the benefits of 
market forces. In the end, Honda managed to weather challenges emanating from 
China by modifying its organisational model rather than transforming it into something 
different.  
With regard to the second sub-question, the empirical analysis demonstrated that the 
nature of the product was not sufficient to explain the trajectory of organisational 
transformation. While HVN was quick to adjust its product strategy, the functioning of 
the market forces it had intended to introduce was constrained by the existing 
alignment of lead firm and supplier capabilities. HVN’s production volume was critical 
in removing this obstacle. By lowering prices, it sought to increase its scale of 
production but this happened only after the Vietnamese government reversed its 
restrictive policy towards foreign motorcycle manufacturers.  
When HVN’s production was finally permitted to expand, it started to exert huge 
purchasing power over its suppliers. As an increasing number of foreign firms were 
attracted to the growing market, supplier capabilities also started to accumulate. An 
important point to note is that even though some suppliers could not be substituted 
domestically, the capabilities they possessed were not indispensable to HVN in the 
sense that there were regional alternatives. This explains why the accumulation of 
supplier capabilities did not result in a shift to a relational chain. Rather, it was the 
combination of HVN’s huge purchasing power and growing supplier capabilities – but 
not complementary competencies – that allowed HVN to exploit institutionalised 
competition to extract constant improvement in manufacturing performance out of its 
suppliers.  
On the whole, the analysis in this section has demonstrated that the Japanese 
organisational model in its original form was not readily adaptable to the emerging 
Vietnamese market. Although HVN was quick to adjust its product strategy in response 
to the China shock, and actively sought to realign the capability structure in order to 
create conditions conducive to the effective functioning of the market forces it 
intended to introduce, these attempts failed to produce immediate results. This is 
because the government introduced policies that explicitly discriminated against 
foreign motorcycle manufacturers, and supplier capabilities took time to be nurtured or 
realigned. It was eventual incidental policy change as well as medium-term progress in 
accumulation of supplier capabilities that laid the foundations for the dynamic 
transformation of the Japanese model in Stage III, a shift that enabled HVN to establish 
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itself as an increasingly dominant actor in the Vietnamese market. 
6. The Emergence and Transformation of the Vietnamese–Chinese Chain in 
Vietnam  
This section turns the focus to the Chinese organisational model. Rather than being 
transplanted by a major TNC – as had been the case with the Japanese model – the 
Chinese model emerged spontaneously in Vietnam in the early 2000s, as Chinese 
exporters of motorcycle components, Vietnamese assemblers of imported components, 
and component suppliers of different nationalities independently reacted to growing 
business opportunities. Local Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers emerged as lead 
firms that initially assembled imported Chinese components, but gradually expanded 
local sourcing as the government stepped up its enforcement of local content rules. 
In an attempt to examine the dynamic trajectories of organisational transformation, the 
analysis now focuses on the second and third stages of Vietnamese motorcycle 
industrial development: 
 Stage II (2000–2004), when the Chinese model emerged in Vietnam   
 Stage III (2005–2008), when the model was transformed as lead firms and 
suppliers reacted to challenges posed by Japanese motorcycle manufacturers 
6.1 Stage II: The Emergence of Market-based Chains  
The empirical analysis begins by examining the features of the Chinese model as it 
emerged in the early 2000s. Taking account of the dispersed structure of this sector of 
the industry at this stage, the emphasis is on sector-level analysis, which is 
complemented by analysis of embedded cases of several relatively large assemblers.  
6.1.1 Minimal Coordination Requirements: Low Quality and De facto 
Standardisation 
The types of motorcycles produced by local Vietnamese assemblers were strikingly 
different from the Japanese-brand vehicles that had prevailed in the domestic market, 
the product and process parameters of the former being highly standardised and 
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simple.  
First, the high level of standardisation requires elaboration. The existing literature on 
Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers points out that modularisation allowed 
arm’s-length networks to prevail in this sector (Pham Truong Hoang 2007; Nguyen 
Duc Tiep 2006; The Motorbike Working Group 2007). However, the present study 
found otherwise. Rather than transforming motorcycles from integral to modular 
design architecture, Chinese manufacturers used several popular Japanese models as de 
facto standards for duplicative imitation of the external configuration (Ohara 2001; Ge 
and Fujimoto 2004) – the phenomenon that this paper refers to as the de facto 
standardisation of Japanese models. As argued in Fujita (2013a), standardisation of this 
sort is at best partial because full compatibility of components can only be guaranteed 
insofar as they are manufactured in precise accordance with the original Japanese base 
model drawings. This was not the case in China, where uncoordinated duplicative 
imitation gave rise to components that were not strictly compatible.  
The present study found that a similar situation prevailed in Vietnam in the early 2000s. 
In this period, de facto standardisation centred on an even smaller number of Honda’s 
popular models than in China. The author’s interviews of motorcycle retailers in Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City in August 2002 found that the overwhelming majority of 
products imitated two of Honda’s most popular models, Dream and Wave, most of 
them featuring C100 or C110 engines with Chinese brands.49 Embedded cases of 
assemblers also confirmed de facto standardisation of a limited number of Japanese 
models. As of the early 2000s, all three assemblers for which detailed data were 
available (A1, A2 and A4) produced imitations of Dream and/or Wave (interviews 
and/or factory visits at A1 #1; A2 #1; A4 #3).  
As had been the case in China, de facto standardisation of Japanese models in Vietnam 
failed to ensure component compatibility because duplicative imitation took place not 
on the basis of a single, detailed drawing but was invariably the result of uncoordinated, 
repeated duplication of products available on the market, many of which themselves 
carried minor modifications to original designs (Pham Truong Hoang 2007), with 
varying yet generally low levels of precision (interviews and/or factory visits at V15 #1, 
                                                  
49  The most ubiquitous imitation brands (e.g. ‘Hongda’) and/or popular Chinese brands such as Loncin, 
Lifan and Zongshen were displayed on engine covers (the author’s field visits, and interviews with 
motorcycle retailers in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi in August 2002).   
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#2; V18 #1; V19 #1).  
The second feature is simple product and/or process parameters. This was confirmed 
by the lack of lead firm requirement beyond price level. The two embedded assemblers 
for which detailed interview data are available (A2 and A4) only specified the names 
of base models or provided samples for replication at best, and neither provided 
detailed drawings or specifications in terms of precision levels, materials, or 
production processes (interviews with A2 #1; A4 #3). These findings are corroborated 
by the author’s interviews with suppliers, as they were not offered the sorts of detailed 
lead-firm specifications discussed in the previous section. Suppliers of engine parts 
explicitly stated that they adopted a single preconfigured design for all their customers 
(interviews with V17 #1; V19 #2; T6 #1), while suppliers of other components were 
typically provided with samples for replication (V15 #2; V23 #1; T7 #2). 
Rather, the focus of assemblers was overwhelmingly on cost. From 2000 to 2001, the 
prices of their products ranged between US$445 and US$565,50 which was roughly a 
quarter of the official price of HVN’s most popular model, the Super Dream 
(U$S1,990) in 2000 (Nguyen Duc Hien 2004: 234). It was also much lower than the 
price of the Wave Alpha (US$719), the budget model that HVN launched in 2002. The 
average price of motorcycles produced by the case assemblers in 2004 was US$470 
(Table 9).   
In summary, de facto standardisation and emphasis on price-based competitiveness 
significantly reduced the need for explicit coordination. However, to the extent that de 
facto standardisation failed to ensure full component compatibility, the need for 
coordination could not be eliminated completely. 
 
6.1.2 Dispersed Structure, Limited Capabilities 
To begin with, the Vietnamese–Chinese chain had a fragmented structure consisting of 
a large number of assemblers and a moderately large number of suppliers, both of 
which were small in scale and possessed limited capability. None of these firms held 
sufficient capability to exercise power over others.  
                                                  
50  ‘The unpredictable fever’ (Saigon Times Weekly dated 17 November 2001); ‘Glut of imported 
motorbikes sparks worries about congestion, accidents’ (Viet Nam News dated 14 December 2001). 
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The overall structure of assemblers in the early 2000s can be confirmed on the basis of 
official statistics as well as embedded cases. As of May 2002, 51 Vietnamese 
motorcycle assemblers were in operation.51 Forty-one such firms assembled less than 
40,000 units in 2000, while the largest firm (A2) accounted for just 8.8% of the total 
turnover of all local assemblers. They had limited knowledge of products and/or 
production processes: of the 51 assemblers registered as of 2002, only 7 had initial 
investment in own-production capacity (Ha Huy Thanh et al. 2003: 335). 
None of the embedded case assemblers, which were known to be among the largest in 
the early 2000s, had manufacturing experience prior to starting motorcycle production 
(Table 9). Their focus on the assembly of imported or purchased components also 
meant that they did not take on product development, design, manufacturing of key 
components, marketing, or branding.  
Based on official statistics, the total number of suppliers participating in the 
Vietnamese–Chinese chain in 2002 is estimated to be about 50.52 However, it is 
suspected that the actual figure was much larger as hundreds of companies entered into 
the production of relatively simple motorcycle components for local assemblers.53 
With the exception of Taiwanese firms – most of which were specialised providers of 
components already incorporated into Taiwanese and/or Japanese chains (Chen and 
Jou 2002) – suppliers in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain possessed limited design 
and/or manufacturing capabilities.  
Virtually all Vietnamese suppliers selected as embedded cases were companies 
previously engaged in the small-scale production of replacement components, bicycle 
parts, or household metal and plastic products for the domestic market, and they only 
acquired rudimentary capabilities in Stage II (Table 10).   
                                                  
51  Data provided by the Ministry of Industry of Vietnam. While this number is smaller than the number 
of assemblers in China – where Ohara (2006a: 22) notes there were 154 motorcycle manufacturers in 
2003 – it can still regarded as very large given the much smaller size of the Vietnamese market.   
52  The author’s estimate based on a list of firms producing motorcycle components in 2002 provided 
by the General Statistics Office, excluding Japanese, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese companies that were 
known to have participated in the Japanese chain.       
53  Nguyen Duc Hien (2004: 238), citing the report by the Economic and Financial Committee of the 
National Assembly in 2001, notes that around 550 firms produced motorcycle components.   
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Unlike the Japanese chain, assembler–supplier relations in the Vietnamese–Chinese 
chain were fluid. Table 11 shows several suppliers that received orders from local 
assemblers over short periods of time ranging from a few months to a few years (T1, 
V13, V14, and V19). This table also indicates that the majority of suppliers 
simultaneously traded with a large number of assemblers. Suppliers V16, V17, V20, 
K1, and T6 specifically emphasised that they had no main customer even though they 
traded with some of the largest local assemblers.  
In summary, the Vietnamese–Chinese chain consisted of a large number of assemblers 
and a fairly large number of suppliers, both of which were small in scale and possessed 
limited capabilities. Inter-firm relations were fluid and none of them exercised power 
over others.  
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Table 9. Profiles of Local Assemblers Selected as Embedded Case Studies 
Assembler  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Stages for which detailed data are available  Stages II and III Stage II only Stage III only  Stages II and III Stages II and III Stage III only 
Experience prior to entering into motorcycle assembly 
Trading consumer 
electronics 
Diverse 
(trading, 
tourism, real 
estate, etc.)  
n/a 
Trading 
(motorcycles and 
other products) 
Trading 
(motorcycles and 
other products) 
Motorcycle 
dealer 
Market share 
2000 
% 8.5% 8.8% 3.8% 1.9% 1.3% (not on the list) 
Ranking 3rd 1st 5th 17th 31st (not on the list) 
2006 
% 23.1% 1.8% 8.3% 1.6% 5.1% 2.8% 
Ranking 1st 17th 4th 19th 7th 9th 
Annual production (units) 
2000 148,000 107,900 72,450 23,731 34,600 (not on the list) 
2007 300,000 (n/a) 95,000 24,000 20,469 30,000 
Average price of motorcycles 
(US$) 
2004 365 451 * (n/a) 439 622 (n/a) 
2007 310 (n/a) 279 373 745 497 
Number of new models 
registered 
2001–04 71 44 41 26 39 8 
2005–07 474 31 219 57 47 33 
Local content ratio (%) 2003 (n/a) (n/a) (n/a) 85 80 (n/a) 
Number of suppliers 2007 100 (n/a) 55 60 80 48 
Notes:  
1) n/a = not available 
2) ‘Market share’ denotes the percentage of the market and rank of respective suppliers of all registered Vietnamese motorcycle assemblers 
included in lists provided by the Ministry of Industry (for 2000) and the General Statistics Office (for 2006).   
3) ‘Number of new models registered’ denotes the number of new models registered with the Vietnam Register for sales in the domestic market.     
4) * The A2 average price is for 2003, while the data for all other assemblers are for 2004. 
Sources: 
1) Turnover: Ministry of Industry (for 2000) and the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (for 2006).   
2) Number of new models registered: The author, based on data from the Vietnam Register (http://www.vr.org.vn), accessed 6 January 2009. 
3) All other data obtained from the author’s interviews and questionnaire surveys conducted in collaboration with the Vietnam Institute of 
Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science.     
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Table 10. Capabilities Acquired by Vietnamese Suppliers in Vietnamese–Chinese 
Chains 
  Before Stage I Stage I Stage II Stage III 
V13 Machinery components for SOEs Operational (Prd) (Shift to other chains)
V14 Machinery components for SOEs Operational (Prd) (Shift to other chains)
V15 Bicycle components Operational (Prd/Eq) (Shift to other chains)
V16 Bicycle components Adaptive (Prd) 
V17 Trading  Operational (Eq/PM) (Shift to other chains)
V18 Bicycle components Operational (Prd/Eq/PM) (Shift to other chains)
V19 Bicycle components Operational (Prd/Eq) (Shift to other chains)
V20 Replacement components Operational (Prd/Eq) Operational (Prd/Eq)
V21 Trading Operational (Prd/PM)
V22 Trading Operational (Prd/PM) (Shift to other chains)
Notes: 
(1) For periods prior to entry into or after exit from the Vietnamese–Chinese chain (the 
unshaded area), main lines of business are given. 
(2) For periods after entry into the Vietnamese–Chinese chain (the shaded area), the level of 
new product introduction and production‐related capabilities acquired by each supplier 
in Vietnamese–Chinese chain by the respective stage is shown.   
(3) Types of capability are abbreviated as follows: Prd = new product introduction capability; 
Eq = equipment‐related capability; PM = production management capability. 
Source: The author’s interviews with suppliers (Fujita 2013b).  
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Table 11. Suppliers’ Dependence on Local Assemblers   
Supplier 
Entry 
into 
V-C 
chain 
Types of 
Components 
Ranking by 
Turnover 
Transactions with Case Assemblers Number of Customers, Patterns of Dependence 
2002 2006 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 Stage II Stage III 
Suppliers that expanded transactions with Group 1 assemblers in Stage III 
V16 2000 Silencers 
not 
included 
53rd X   X     X 
Traded with 30 local assemblers in 
2002, accounting for 80-90% of the 
local sales. 
Traded with 20 local assemblers in 2008, 
accounting for 50% of the total sales. 2006 was 
the peak year. A1, A3, A6 among five largest 
customers.  
V20 1997 Silencers 27th 116th X   X     X 
Traded with a total of 46 companies between 1997 and 2008. As of 2008, had 3 customers, 
accounting for 10% of sales.  
V21 2004 
Shock 
absorbers 
not 
included 
not 
included
X     X   X (Not yet established)  
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 2009, 
accounting for 95% of sales. During the peak year, 
had 50 customers. 
C1 2001 
Plastic 
covers, 
frames, 
lights 
not 
included 
6th & 
38th 
X   X X X X (n/a) 
Traded with 43 local assemblers in 2007. A1 
largest. 
C2 2002 Clutches 
not 
included 
24th X         X 
Traded with 24 companies in 2004, 
accounting for 50% of sales. A1 and 
A6 among largest. 
Sales to local assemblers accounting for 56% of 
sales (number of local assemblers unknown). A1 
among largest. 
C3 2002 Frames 
not 
included 
62nd     X       (n/a) 
Traded with 19 local assemblers in 2008. A3 
largest. No products/customers other than 
motorcycle components/local assemblers. 
C4 2003 
Electric 
components  
not 
included 
60th       X   X 
Traded with 30 assemblers in 2004. 
A4 and A6 among largest.  
Traded with 50 assemblers in 2008. 
Suppliers that had shifted from Vietnamese–Chinese chains to Japanese chains by Stage III 
T1 1999 
Stamped 
components 
not 
included 
9th 
&11th 
(n/a) 
Traded with local assemblers only 
during 1999–2001. No transactions with local assemblers in 2007. 
T2 1998 
Shock 
absorbers 
not 
included 
17th (n/a) (n/a) 
Traded with more 10 local assemblers in 2007, 
accounting for 25% of sales.  
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Table 11. Continued 
Supplier 
Entry 
into 
V-C 
chain 
Types of 
Components 
Ranking by 
Turnover 
Transactions with Case Assemblers Number of Customers, Patterns of Dependence 
2002 2006 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 Stage II Stage III 
T3 1997 
Electric 
components  
not 
included 
21st X   X     X (n/a) 
Traded with 16 local assemblers in 2005, 
accounting for 10% of sales. Only A6 placed 
regular orders in 2009. 
T4 2004 
Electric 
components  
not 
included 
25th (n/a) 
Expanded sales to local assemblers in 
2002–2003. Accounted for one-third 
of sales in 2004. 
Traded with 4 local assemblers in 2008, 
accounting for less than 1% of sales.  
T5 2000 Silencers 
not 
included 
33rd           X 
Traded with local assemblers only 
during 2000–2004. Accounted for 
less than 5% of the total sales. A6 
among the main customer. 
(n/a) 
K1 1999 Switches 9th 46th     X   X X 
Traded with local assemblers in 
2004, accounting for 50% of sales. 
Six relatively large customers. 
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 2008, 
accounting for 5% of sales. A6 among main 
customers.  
V13 2000 Bearings 
not 
included 
45th X X         
Traded with local assemblers only 
during 2000–2003, accounting for 
20-30% of sales. 
No transactions with local assemblers in 2008. 
V14 2003 
Engine 
components 
not 
included 
not 
included
(no transactions with any of the six 
assemblers) 
Traded with 3 local assemblers only 
in 2003, accounting for 10% of sales.
No transactions with local assemblers. 
V15 2001 
Aluminium 
die-cast 
components 
not 
included 
not 
included
(no transactions with any of the six 
assemblers) 
(n/a) 
Traded with 5 local assemblers in 2008, 
accounting for 20% of sales. Maintained 
long-term transactions with 5 customers.  
V17 2001 Clutches 
not 
included 
not 
included
X     X X   
Traded with very large number of 
customers in 2001, accounting for 
100% of sales. A1, A4, and A5 
among main customers. 
No transactions with local assemblers in 2008. 
Suppliers that had shifted from Vietnamese–Chinese chains to other products/industries by Stage III 
V18 1997 
Steel 
components 
20th 
not 
included
(n/a) 
Traded with a total of 36 companies between 1997 and 2006, accounting for 100% of 
sales. 
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Table 11. Continued 
Supplier 
Entry 
into 
V-C 
chain 
Types of 
Components 
Ranking by 
Turnover 
Transactions with Case Assemblers Number of Customers, Patterns of Dependence 
2002 2006 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 Stage II Stage III 
V19 1999 
Engine 
components 
not 
included 
98th X     X     
Traded with 10 assemblers in 2002, 
accounting for 60% of sales. 
The number of customers reduced to 2-3. Share of 
local assemblers in total sales 5-7% in 2008. 
V22 2000 Chains 
not 
included 
not 
included
X           
Traded with two local assemblers in 
2000–1, accounting for 50% of sales. 
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 2009, 
accounting for 30% of sales.  
V23 2002 
Wire 
harnesses 
51st 
not 
included
 X           
Traded with 12 local assemblers in 
2004, accounting for 20% of sales. 
No main customer could be 
identified. 2002 was peak year. 
No transactions with local assemblers in 2008. 
Suppliers for which developments after Stage III is unknown 
T6 2001 Hubs 6th 
not 
included
(n/a) 
Traded with very large number of 
customers in 2004, accounting for 
42% of sales. Neither total number of 
customers nor main customers could 
be identified. 
(n/a) 
T7 (n/a) Chains 
not 
included 
66th         X   (n/a) 
Traded with 30 local assemblers in 2005, 
accounting for 12% of sales.  
C5 2002 
Plastic 
covers 
not 
included 
133rd (n/a) 
Traded with 10 local assemblers in 
2004. 
(n/a) 
Notes:  
1) Nationality of suppliers can be identified by initial letters of supplier codes as follows: C = Chinese; T = Taiwanese; K = Korean; V = Vietnamese. 
2) ‘Ranking by turnover’ indicates placement of respective suppliers among all registered motorcycle component suppliers included in the lists provided by the 
General Statistics Office.   
3) ‘Not included’ indicates that the supplier was omitted from the list, which typically occurred when suppliers were registered under other industries because their 
main product lines were not motorcycle components.   
4) ‘Transactions with case assemblers’ indicate whether the respective supplier conducted business with the respective assembler at any time.   
Source: The author’s surveys and interviews. 
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6.1.3 Arm’s-Length Linkages in Need of Coordination 
The discussion in Section 6.1.1 showed that although standardised and simple parameters 
prevailed in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain, the requirement for explicit coordination was 
not eliminated entirely. Specifically, the following two types of coordination requirement 
remained:  
 Coordination needs around product parameters remained to the extent that de facto 
standardisation only partially ensured component compatibility.   
 Low quality requirements notwithstanding, even lower levels of supplier 
manufacturing competence resulted in coordination needs around process 
parameters.   
The following examines how assemblers and their suppliers coped with these coordination 
needs via in-depth examination of the three assemblers for which detailed data could be 
obtained: A1, A2 and A4. 
Some assemblers opted for vertical integration. Assemblers A1 and A4 conducted in-house 
manufacturing of components in cooperation with Chinese and Taiwanese partners 
respectively. Although investment in in-house manufacturing was often made in response to 
the government policy (see Section 2.3), the fact that it was a costly option for those with 
small production capacity notwithstanding, these assemblers explicitly noted the 
advantages of the practice. In this regard, assembler A4 noted: 
We want to produce low-price but good-quality motorcycles for [our] customers. 
Therefore, we face many difficulties in sourcing components locally – the quality is not 
stable. So, we need to produce some components even though it is not efficient and 
drives up costs.        (A4 #1)  
Asked to compare sourcing components from China, sourcing locally, and manufacturing 
them in-house, a manager of assembler A1 responded:  
Manufacturing components in-house is the best option – in terms of advantages in both 
cost and quality. The key is that we endeavour to increase the quality of our products. 
        (A1 #1)  
Implicit in the above comment is that this company saw no possibility of implementing 
mechanisms for imposing its quality requirements on external suppliers.  
However, even with these assemblers, in-house manufacturing was typically limited to a 
few types of component only. In the main, lead firms engaged in arm’s-length transactions 
with their suppliers in the sourcing of the majority of components.  
First, two assemblers interviewed by the author (A2 and A4) explicitly noted that they 
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adopted a trial-and error approach, switching suppliers whenever they found one to be 
unsatisfactory. This is evident from remarks made by the former procurement manager of 
assembler A2, the largest assembler in 2000: 
Back in the early years [2000–2001], the number of suppliers was limited and thus it 
was difficult to switch suppliers. However, we still tried different suppliers in search of 
those that were stable – in terms of quality, payment, prices and delivery.  
         (A2 #1)  
Second, a lack of explicit governance is also evident from the ordering procedure.54 Given 
the very small scale of production, local assemblers placed orders on an ad hoc basis.55 
Transactions typically began with the assembler providing the supplier with either a sample 
for replication or very simple component specifications (e.g. type of component, type of 
base model, and/or colour). The supplier then provided the lead firm with a sample together 
with a price quotation. If the lead firm accepted both the sample and the price, the two 
parties signed a ‘basic contract’, which normally lasted for a year but did not bind the 
assembler in terms of either volume or frequency of orders.  
Clearly, arm’s-length transactions of the sort discussed above failed to provide solutions to 
coordination needs around product and process parameters. However, although the problem 
of low quality could simply be left unresolved, the lack of component compatibility posed a 
serious problem because assemblers were often faced with components that could not be 
assembled. These instances were typically dealt with by ad hoc, ex post adjustments by 
suppliers with the sole intention of making the components assemblable. Suppliers were 
often asked by customers to modify components once delivered as they were incompatible 
with adjacent parts (interviews with V13 #1; V15 #2; K1 #2). Nevertheless, such piecemeal 
modifications fell short of full component compatibility, leading to products that were 
inferior in quality and performance to original models.  
In short, limited lead firm and supplier capabilities resulted in a situation in which 
coordination issues arising from the shortcomings of de facto standardisation were left 
unattended. Market-based transactions characterised by ad hoc coordination achieved low 
prices but at the expense of low quality.  
6.2 Stage III: Emergence of Coordination from Below 
This section analyses the responses of local assemblers to fresh challenges in a new stage of 
industrial development: the rapid growth of foreign motorcycle manufacturers combined 
with increasing sophistication of market demand. Since the sector began to take a 
concentrated structure, the analysis starts by briefly discussing the overall structure of the 
                                                   
54  Unless otherwise noted, the description of ordering procedure in this paragraph is based on interviews 
with assemblers A2 #1; A4 #4 and suppliers V13 #1; V15 #2; V17 #1; V19 #2; V23 #1; T6 #1; T7 #1. 
55  Even in assembler A2, which recorded the largest turnover in 2000, the average size of each order was 
only 100–200 units (interview #1). 
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industry and then proceeds to detailed analyses of a limited number of the largest 
assemblers and their key suppliers.  
6.2.1 Meeting the Japanese Challenge: Two Contrasting Approaches  
As the new stage of industrial development commenced, local assemblers were faced with 
fresh challenges. First, HVN’s penetration of the middle-income market now posed a real 
threat as it actively invested in production capacity expansion after 2005 (Section 5.3.2). 
Second, the upward shift in consumers’ preferences discussed in Section 5.3.1 put pressure 
on local assemblers to increase the quality of their products. Having experienced serious 
quality issues with Chinese motorcycles, Vietnamese consumers were no longer willing to 
accept low prices at the expense of poor quality. 
Local assemblers responded to the new challenges with two distinct approaches.56 One 
group of assemblers focussed on producing a larger variety of models carrying imitated 
designs at low costs, targeting the low-income rural market that the Japanese manufacturers 
had not penetrated. Another group of assemblers prioritised the improvement of product 
quality, developing own product designs and/or brand names, even if this should be at the 
expense of higher prices.  
The two contrasting approaches can be observed in the embedded cases of the five 
assemblers for which detailed data are available for Stage III (Table 9). Assemblers A1 and 
A3 belong to the former category. They are similar in that they kept product and process 
parameters simple and standardised, specifying few requirements beyond price level. A 
number of suppliers explicitly noted that assemblers in this category – A1 in particular – 
specified limited quality requirement (C1 #2, #3; V16 #2; V21 #1). The low prices of their 
products are also an indication that their target was low-income consumers. As Table 9 
shows, the average price of these assemblers’ products in 2007 was less than half that of the 
Wave Alpha, US$801.  
These assemblers continued to capitalise on Japanese designs as de facto benchmarks. 
However, unlike the case in Stage II, these assemblers started to make minor (largely 
cosmetic) modifications to several key components. Alterations to plastic covers and frames, 
which affected the external appearance of the motorcycle, were of particular importance 
(interviews with assembler A4 #4; supplier C1 #2, #3).  
The above approach to the modification of de facto standard models enabled these 
assemblers to achieve a remarkable expansion of product variety, as well as speed and 
flexibility in launching new models. This is most clearly observed in assemblers A1 and A3. 
Table 8 shows that the number of new models registered by these assemblers increased 
rapidly after 2005. By this stage, assemblers exploited not only Honda’s two most popular 
                                                   
56  This finding was initially derived from the author’s in‐depth analysis of a small number of assemblers 
(Fujita 2006) but it was corroborated by interviews with suppliers operating in the Vietnamese–Chinese 
chain, particularly C1 #2, #3; K1 #3; T3 #2; V16 #2; and V21 #1. 
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motorcycles but also a much larger range of Japanese models – including new ones 
launched after 2005 – as de facto standards for duplicative imitation (interviews with 
supplier C1 #2, #3). Moreover, they launched a large number of new products by mixing 
and matching components with minor modifications (interviews with suppliers C1 #3; K1 
#2, #3). Supplier K1, which simultaneously traded with HVN and local assemblers, 
described the strength of this group of assemblers as the flexibility and speed with which 
they were able to adjust product strategy: 
[They] are sensitive to market information. They try to obtain information on Honda’s 
future models using their connections with the Ministry of Industry, and replicate these 
products in advance. To cope with the regulations on intellectual property, they 
combine different types of components. Honda cannot change its product strategy 
quickly, but [local assemblers] can change [product strategy] within a week.  
     (K1 #2) 
Assemblers A5 and A6 belonged to the latter category of assemblers. Unlike those in the 
other group, notable changes were observed in their products. The complexity of product 
and process parameters increased as these assemblers attached priority to quality. Suppliers 
to these assemblers noted that – although by no means on the scale exacted by Japanese 
manufacturers – they were more demanding in terms of quality, for which they were willing 
sacrifice economy of price (interviews with C1 #2; T3 #2; V21 #1). Accordingly, the 
average prices of their products were higher than those of the assemblers in the former 
category (Table 9). Product parameters also grew less standardised as these assemblers 
sought to develop their own designs and brands.57 Assembler A6 in particular had adopted 
customised designs for some of its models by 2007, for the manufacture of which suppliers 
were provided with design drawings together with samples (interviews with assembler A6 
#1 and A6’s supplier, T3 #2).  
Assembler A4 fell between the two categories, in that it did not opt to develop own-product 
designs or brands and kept product parameters standardised. However, the company did 
seek to increase the quality of its products, resulting in higher prices than those of 
assemblers A1 and A3 (interview with A4 #4).  
In short, two discrete groups of local assemblers emerged in Stage III, each of which 
adopted a different product strategy. Yet, the question remains as to which of the two came 
to represent the dominant actor within the industry. This puzzle is addressed in the next 
subsection. 
6.2.2 Consolidation of Assemblers and Rise of Supplier Capabilities 
In Stage III, the local assembly sector of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry was 
substantially restructured, assemblers being consolidated into a small number of large 
                                                   
57  Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy (2007: 39) also notes A5 and A6 are among those assemblers 
that invest in own‐product designs and brands.   
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companies. By 2006, the number of active local assemblers had been reduced to 28, 
roughly half that of 2000.58 Accordingly, the market grew more compact, and it was those 
assemblers that concentrated on price-based competiveness (the first group discussed 
above) that captured the bulk of the sales share. As Table 9 shows, the largest assembler 
(A1) accounted for 23% of the total turnover of local assemblers in 2006, and the four 
largest firms (inclusive of assemblers A1 and A3) together enjoyed a 50% share.59 In 
contrast, assemblers that focussed on non-price-based competitiveness (the second group 
discussed above) accounted for a much smaller market share.  
However, there was little indication that either group of assemblers had amassed new 
capabilities. Those in the second category developed their own products by mobilising 
external capabilities rather than building their own internal capabilities: A5 collaborated 
with Chinese partners (questionnaire survey in 2007), while A6 outsourced product design 
to overseas companies (interview #1). 
Consolidation progressed on the suppliers’ side as well. As local content rules were relaxed 
in 2003, local assemblers as a whole began to depend increasingly on imported components 
(Table 12), relying on local sourcing only when parts were available at competitive prices. 
Table 11 classifies suppliers in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain according to their positions 
in Stage III. Of those interviewed by the author, several quickly expanded sales to local 
assemblers, the largest firms in particular such as A1 and A3 (V16, C1, C2, C3, and C4). At 
the same time, the remaining suppliers faced diminishing sales to local assemblers, and 
they either shifted to the Japanese chain or other industries.  
Table 12. Value of Imported Components per Vehicle Sold (Unit: US$) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
HVN 692 641 275 231 203 218 
Local Assemblers 506 338 181 179 420 396 
Source: The author, based on data provided in Institute for Industry Policy and Strategy (2007).  
What is striking is the size of turnover and the number of customers the first group of 
suppliers served at this stage. Supplier C1 had two factories registered as independent 
companies, which in 2006 ranked as 6th and 38th respectively in terms of turnover of all 
operational motorcycle component manufacturers in Vietnam, including the largest 
Japanese suppliers that served 100% of HVN’s growing orders. In 2007, this supplier sold 
over 860,000 units of plastic covers and frames (interview with C1 #1), which more or less 
accounts for the total number of motorcycles produced by local assemblers in that year 
(Figure 1). Moreover, these suppliers simultaneously served 20 to 50 local assemblers in 
Stage III (Table 11), which was in fact more than the aforementioned number of officially 
                                                   
58  Based on a list of motorcycle assemblers operational in 2006 provided by the General Statistics Office.   
59  Based on a list of motorcycle assemblers operational in 2006 provided by the General Statistics Office.   
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registered local assemblers in 2006.60  
Suppliers expanding their sales to local assemblers are particularly notable for the extent to 
which they built design and manufacturing capabilities. Moreover, unlike suppliers under 
the Japanese model, the accretion of new capabilities in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain was 
achieved primarily through suppliers’ independent volition rather than as the result of 
explicit demand from or assistance of lead firms. As the most prominent example, C1 had 
invested in generic manufacturing competencies in order to achieve reasonable quality, 
prompt delivery, and low prices, whilst mobilising the capability of the company’s R&D 
centre in China to reverse-engineer existing component designs and conduct minor 
cosmetic modifications (interview #1). The ability to conduct large-scale manufacturing to 
reasonable quality standards was developed by importing equipment and machinery from 
China and mobilising Chinese engineers (ibid.). The huge production volume also enabled 
the company to exploit economies of scale.  
Likewise, V16, a Vietnamese supplier of silencers, was one of the few local suppliers 
continuing to operate in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain in Stage III. This firm was the only 
local supplier subjected to in-depth analysis by this study that had acquired an adaptive or 
basic innovative level of new product introduction capability (Table 10). Whereas it had 
replicated existing products in the 1990s, it subsequently gradually started to make 
cosmetic and functional modifications to standardised designs (interviews #1, #2). This was 
achieved through its own R&D efforts and attempts to engage with assemblers. The 
supplier independently established an R&D department, investing in design equipment, 
software, and testing and measuring equipment, as well as training its own design engineers 
(interview #1).  
In short, the local motorcycle assembly sector was consolidated into those assemblers that 
focussed on price-based competitiveness in standardised models with minor external 
modifications. Consolidation also progressed on the suppliers’ side, which resulted in the 
rise of those with manufacturing and design competencies.  
6.2.3 The Rise of Supplier-Driven Coordination 
The result of the rapid consolidation of lead firms and suppliers amounted to de facto 
mutual dependence between large assemblers and large, competent suppliers. The results of 
questionnaire surveys conducted in 2007 show that assemblers A1, A3, A4, A5 and A6 
developed relatively long-term relations with a limited number of key suppliers that 
extended for between three and six years, suggesting that the relations between lead firms 
and suppliers had stabilised.  
However, this does not imply Japanese-type organisation in which lead firms and suppliers 
are locked into particular relations. Assemblers expressed strong preference to avoid 
                                                   
60  This is likely to be because some assemblers had shifted their focus to other lines of business where they 
were officially registered, yet continued to produce motorcycles on a small scale.   
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dependence on specific suppliers. Table 13 shows that all of five assemblers under study 
cited the optimum number of suppliers for each type of component as two to three in order 
that they should not be dependent on specific firms. Remarkably, no major differences were 
observed between the two groups of assemblers. Neither were suppliers locked into 
relations with specific customers, a finding that is clearly illustrated by the large number 
served by suppliers surviving to Stage III (Table 11).  
Table 13. Assemblers’ Preferred Number of Suppliers of Each Component 
Number of suppliers* Reason 
A1 2–3 Competition based on quality and price is beneficial 
A3 2–3 Allows the assembler to take the initiative. 
A4 2–3 Allows suppliers to compete based on quality and price. 
A5 2–3 Allows the selection of suppliers based on price, quality and delivery. 
A6 2–3 Avoids passivity and defensiveness. 
Note: * Assemblers were asked to choose between one, two to three, or more than three. 
Source: The author’s questionnaire survey conducted in 2007 in collaboration with the Vietnam Institute 
of Economics, Vietnam Academy of Social Science.  
Thus far, it has become clear that the local motorcycle assembly sector came to be 
dominated by a small number of large assemblers producing low-priced, standardised 
models with minor external modifications. While their success is plausible given that they 
catered to the extreme low-end section of the Vietnamese market that even HVN’s budget 
model had not penetrated, the question remains as to how they managed to resolve 
coordination issues around product and process parameters. First, the limits of de facto 
standardisation – as discussed at length in Section 6.1 – remained in place. These 
assemblers should have been able to achieve at least reasonable quality levels since their 
target consumers were no longer willing to accept low quality just because the products 
were cheap. Second, the assemblers were able to make minor modifications to original 
Japanese component designs, a factor that compounded coordination requirements. The 
question is therefore one of how firms met the necessary level of coordination. 
This question was explored via in-depth analyses of the embedded cases assemblers A1 and 
A3, and their largest suppliers. The findings suggest that it was the suppliers rather than the 
assemblers that took the lead in dealing with coordination issues. By dealing systematically 
with non-compatibility problems arising from de facto standardisation and making 
modifications to component designs on behalf of their customers, these suppliers became 
the key force driving the transformation of the Vietnamese–Chinese chain.  
Such supplier-driven changes are demonstrated by the in-depth analysis of suppliers C1 and 
V16 discussed above. C1 rapidly expanded sales to local assemblers by utilising design 
competencies and generic large-scale manufacturing capacity to provide the complete, 
fine-tuned component modules that were most critical to the assemblers; incorporating 
minor cosmetic modifications, and processing them to reasonable quality, prompt delivery, 
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and low cost standards. Although the supplier produced a large variety of motorcycle 
components, it focussed most sharply on plastic covers, frames and lights (interview #2). 
This is because local assemblers attached the highest importance to these component 
modules in terms of product differentiation, meaning that their manufacture called for 
exacting design work given that they essentially determined the external appearance of the 
whole vehicle.61 Each year, C1 launched an average of four designs incorporating minor 
modifications to these most necessary modules (interview #1). The three types of 
component that comprised the modules were fine-tuned with each other in order to 
maximise the performance of the module as a whole. Moreover, unlike the ad hoc, ex post 
adjustments typically observed in Stage II, supplier C1 systematically adjusted the 
interfaces of these modules with adjacent components at the initial stages of contact with 
assemblers (interview #2).  
V16 provides another case in point. Its main products, silencers, were critical to local 
assemblers because they affected both the product’s performance and its external 
appearance. This supplier continued to operate in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain in Stage 
III as it made effective use of its design and manufacturing capabilities to conduct minor 
cosmetic and/or functional modifications to the existing designs of this important 
component on behalf of its customers, because “local assemblers did not have design 
drawings and did not know anything about technical parameters” (interview #1). Based on 
surveys of local assemblers, motorcycle dealers, and final consumers, V16 regularly 
launched new designs which reflected the latest market trends and policy requirements and 
carried the company’s own brand name (interviews #1, #2).  
In contrast, there was little indication that the sourcing practices of assemblers A1 and A3 
were substantially different from those that had prevailed in Stage II, which suggested that 
the impetus for organisational innovation did not come from lead firms. Apart from the fact 
that their relations with key component suppliers had stabilised and been sustained over the 
long term, there was no evidence that the procedure for placing orders had changed in 
comparison to the previous stage as described in Section 6.1. Suppliers that continued to 
trade with either assembler A1 or A3 in Stage III, namely, C1, V16 and V21, noted that the 
manner in which these assemblers specified and monitored component quality and 
precision levels remained unchanged (interviews with C1 #2; V16 #2; V21 #1). None of 
these suppliers were provided active monitoring by assemblers A1 or A3, as noted by 
supplier C1: 
As for assemblers like A1 and A3, because the size of their orders is very large, they do 
not check the quality of the components carefully. Their complaints mostly concern 
wrong colours.       (C1 #2) 
The result of these supplier-driven changes was ‘coordination from below’, which 
                                                   
61  Interviews with supplier C1 #3 and assembler A4 #4. Ge and Fujimoto (2005: 98–9) note that this was also 
the case in China.     
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addressed those coordination issues arising from the limitations of de facto standardisation 
without assemblers or suppliers being locked into particular relations or having to engage in 
intense communication. With the ability to conduct reverse engineering, design 
modification, and large-scale manufacturing, the two suppliers discussed in detail above 
together with several others formed a “shared supply base” (Sturgeon and Lee 2005) for 
local assemblers as a whole, including major assemblers such as A1 and A3 as well as other 
firms operating on a smaller scale.  
Although the above features of this emerging industrial organisation apparently resembled a 
modular chain (Sturgeon 2002; Gereffi et al. 2005), the coordination pattern emerging in 
Stage III of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry should be distinguished from such a chain 
because: (1) de facto standardisation was partial in that it did not do away with coordination 
requirements; and (2) standardisation did not extend to the whole vehicle. Because of this 
partiality, suppliers C1 and V16 still had to adjust component interfaces for each of their 
customers, although they managed to reduce the time and cost of modifications by 
implementing them systematically.  
Nevertheless, albeit partial, supplier-driven coordination was the form of organisational 
adaptation best suited to the market conditions and capability alignment prevailing in 
Vietnam at the time. For suppliers, exploiting de facto standardisation to serve numerous 
customers made economic sense because in Vietnam’s fragmented market, pooling orders 
from multiple assemblers was the only way to achieve sufficient economies of scale (Fujita 
2011). For assemblers who lacked both design and manufacturing competencies, relying on 
competent suppliers was the easiest and fastest route to solving the immediate problems of 
non-compatibility; increasing product variety by achieving cosmetic modifications to 
several key components; and exploiting the cost advantage of large-scale production.  
6.3 Summary and Discussion 
This section analysed the emergence and transformation of the Chinese model in Vietnam. 
In respect of the first sub-question concerning the trajectory of organisational 
transformation, the findings presented in this section did not render support to the argument 
of the empirical research to date, which has focussed on a small number of assemblers 
operational up to Stage II to argue that they started to develop long-term, trust-based 
relations with their suppliers.  
Conversely, the foregoing analysis showed that in Stage III several powerful suppliers took 
the lead in addressing coordination needs on behalf of their customers without lead firms or 
suppliers having to engage in intense communication or being locked into particular 
relations. This suggests that even assuming a lead firm-driven shift towards trust-based 
relations had obtained among a certain group of assemblers in Stage II, it was still likely to 
be a transitory. The limited knowledge of products and production processes possessed by 
local assemblers also suggests that such networks even if they had existed were unlikely to 
have been sustainable. The research design adopted in this paper was critical in showing the 
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overriding trend of organisational transformation in this sector of the Vietnamese 
motorcycle industry; that is, empirical research based on the integration of industry-level 
and firm-level data facilitated the analysis of changes in the operations of both lead firms 
and suppliers over an extended period of time.  
With regard to the second sub-question concerning the determinants of organisational 
transformation, it was argued that the product characteristics emphasised in the existing 
literature are in themselves insufficient to explain the phenomenon. De facto 
standardisation of Japanese models and low quality requirements reveal why arm’s-length 
linkages prevailed in the early 2000s but do not account for the emergence of 
supplier-driven coordination in Stage III.  
The empirical findings showed that the driver for change came primarily from the rise of 
supplier competencies. This was in sharp contrast to the Japanese chain, in which the lead 
firm actively sought to realign the capability structure to create conditions conducive to the 
effective functioning of its organisational adjustment. By independently accumulating 
complementary competencies in conducting minor design modifications to existing models 
and manufacturing them in large quantities to reasonable standards, a small number of 
suppliers – including those analysed in depth as embedded case studies – formed a shared 
supply base for large and small assemblers seeking to increase the product variety of 
low-priced, standardised models aimed at the low-income market still unexploited by HVN.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper began by highlighting the challenges that the newly emerging Chinese model of 
industrial organisation posed to the conventional Japanese model. What can we learn from 
the rivalry between these two models in a third country context? How does its analysis 
contribute to the literature on models and trajectories of industrial organisation? By 
integrating extensive primary and secondary data collected at different points in time, this 
paper sought to describe and explain the decade-long organisational transformation in the 
Vietnamese motorcycle industry resulting from the direct clash of two contrasting models 
of industrial organisation. This concluding section summarises the empirical findings 
corresponding to the two sub-questions, and discusses the contribution of this paper to the 
wider body of literature on industrial organisation.  
First, this paper asked a ‘how’ question on the dynamic evolution of industrial organisation 
in the Vietnamese motorcycle industry: How did the Japanese and Chinese organisational 
models evolve in Vietnam? The literature suggests that these two models converged; 
however, the present study found that such convergence was short-lived. What seemed like 
important changes in both Japanese and Chinese models in the early 2000s were eventually 
abandoned, while more dynamic, long-lasting changes got underway at a later stage of 
industrial development. In the end, the Japanese model shifted from one variant to another 
variant of the same captive model of industrial organisation. The Chinese model essentially 
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remained one of loosely coordinated organisation throughout the period of analysis; 
although it came to be characterised by several competent suppliers playing partial yet 
critical coordinating roles in later years. Fundamental differences between the two models 
continued to persist in the medium term.  
Second, this study examined the reasons for these organisational changes; that is, what 
factors drove the organisational transformation of the Vietnamese motorcycle industry? 
The literature emphasises the nature of the product that respective lead firms manufactured. 
Yet, the longitudinal analysis in the present paper found that explaining short- and 
medium-term trajectories of organisational transformation required another variable – that 
of the changing capability alignment in the respective value chains.  
The transformation of the Japanese model into an institutionalised competition variant can 
be explained in terms of changing capability alignment in both the lead firm and its 
suppliers, that is, lead firm acquisition of purchasing power and increasing supplier 
capabilities but not complementary competencies. It was HVN that took the lead in 
nurturing the necessary capabilities – not only its own but also those of its suppliers – 
although it took time and the dismantling of policy constraints before such initiatives 
started to produce the desired results. Conversely, the transformation of the Chinese model 
can be explained primarily in terms of the formation of supplier capabilities, that is, the rise 
of specialist suppliers with design modification and large-scale manufacturing 
competencies.  
In addition to empirical findings specific to the Vietnamese motorcycle industry, this paper 
also makes an important contribution to the broader body of literature. First, by 
systematically tracing the long-term transformation of two industrial organisational models, 
this paper shed new light on the processes through which organisations evolve over time. 
The empirical findings showed that organisational transformation was far from a smooth 
and automatic process. In practice, such processes involved challenges, struggles and 
tensions. The results were diverse hybrids or intermediate forms of industrial organisation 
that did not necessarily correspond to the five most typical governance forms. The 
empirical findings indicate that the captive model – the conventional form of Japanese 
industrial organisation – can in practice be implemented as two distinct variants, each with 
strikingly different implications for competitiveness and supplier development. 
‘Coordination from below’ in the Vietnamese–Chinese chain is another example of a hybrid 
form of organisation. Albeit partial, this provided effective means for local assemblers and 
suppliers to meet Japanese challenges under the conditions prevailing in Vietnam.  
Second, this study systematically explained the trajectories of organisational change in 
terms of two elaborate and operational variables: the nature of product/process parameters 
and the alignment of relevant capabilities. While much of the previous theoretical and 
empirical research has focussed on chain governance in its most orthodox forms, these 
patterns emerge only where specific combinations of these two variables are present. Where 
models are transferred to different contexts or where they meet new competitive challenges, 
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there may be many instances in which ideal sets of conditions for intended organisational 
adaptation are unavailable. It is indeed such misalignments of variables that created the 
aforementioned challenges, struggles and tensions.  
Indeed, contrary to Gibbon et al.’s (2008) contention, the two variables did not transpire to 
be structural constraints to transactions. These variables were heavily influenced by the 
strategic actions of firms in the value chain, and it was in fact such actions of lead firms 
and/or suppliers aimed at realigning these variables – albeit with limitations – that drove 
industrial organisation to full or partial transformation. HVN made active attempts to 
realign the capability structure in order to create the necessary conditions for the effective 
functioning of the market forces it sought to introduce. In Vietnamese–Chinese chains, 
coordination needs arising from the partial nature of de facto standardisation were simply 
left unattended in the early years because none of the actors had the capacity to deal with 
them. These needs were eventually met by the rise of competent suppliers that had both the 
will and the capacity to play a partial yet critical role in implementing the requisite 
coordination.  
Finally, the empirical findings of this study also provide important insights into the 
emerging rivalry between the Japanese and Chinese models of industrial organisation. In 
terms of its capacity to exploit the potential (unrealised) market demand and to capitalise on 
the existing alignment of relevant capabilities, the Vietnamese case demonstrates that the 
Chinese model initially proved more adaptable to developing country conditions. However, 
in the medium term, the Japanese model gained supremacy over the Chinese model as 
Japanese lead firms made certain – but not fundamental – adjustments to the nature of their 
products, while actively realigning the capability structure. Conversely, while the Chinese 
model lost supremacy in the medium term, it nevertheless continued to function in an 
adapted form as suppliers gained the complementary competencies required by local 
assemblers. The result of repeated rounds of organisational adaptation was enhanced 
organisational diversity. After a decade, the two models continued to exist side by side, 
both retaining the essential features of the original models yet incorporating important 
adjustment. 
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 Appendix List of Firms, Interviews, and Surveys 
 
1. Interviews in Thailand  
Firms Code Interview details 
Honda R&D Southeast Asia #1 President on 11 January 2010. 
 
2. Interviews in Vietnam 
(1) Honda Vietnam (HVN)  
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Code Interview details 
#1 General Director at the factory on 31 July 2001. 
#2 
Director of Production and Director of Administration/Chief Financial Officer on 21 
September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
#3 Director of Administration/Chief Financial Officer on 20 November 2007. 
#4 Director and Senior Manager of Purchasing Department on 19 September 2008. 
#5 Director, Senior Manager, and Manager of Purchasing Department on 7 March 2009. 
 
(2) Vietnamese assemblers  
Firms 
Interviews 
Surveys 
Code Details 
A1 
#1 
Head of Administrative Department on 22 September 2004 (includes 
factory visit). 2004/ 2007 
  
#2 
Head of Administrative Department on 1 August 2005 (includes 
factory visit). 
A2 
#1 
Former procurement manager (2002-2004) at a café in Tokyo on 24 
February 2009. 
– 
#2 
Former procurement manager (2002-2004) at the Institute of 
Developing Economies, Chiba on 27 February 2009. 
A3 #1 
Officer of Administrative Department on 23 November 2007 
(includes factory visit). 
2007 
A4 
#1 Vice General Director on 23 September 2004. 
2004/ 2007 
  
  
  
  
#2 Vice General Director on 2 August 2005. 
#3 
Vice General Director and Factory Manager on 4 August 2005 
(includes factor visit). 
#4 General Director and Deputy Director on 22 November 2007. 
#5 General Director on 4 March 2009. 
A5 – (Requests for interviews were rejected in 2004 and 2007.) 2004/ 2007 
A6 #1 
General Director and Deputy General Director on 26 November 
2007 (includes factory visit). 
2007 
 
 
(3) Vietnamese suppliers  
Firm Code Interview details 
V1  
#1 Director of Planning Department on 17 October 2003. 
#2 Deputy Director on 3 September 2008. 
#3 
Chairman; General Director; and Manager of Planning Department on 24 November 
2008 (includes factory visit). 
#4 
Chairman; General Director; Deputy General Director; Factory Manager; and five 
other managers on 3 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
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V2  
#1 
President/General Director and Deputy manager of Personnel Department on 5 
September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#2 
Director of Technical Department at the factory on 19 November 2008 (includes 
factory visit). 
V3  
#1 General Director on 17 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#2 Deputy Manager of Technical Department on 20 November 2008. 
V4  
#1 Vice General Director on 23 August 2002 (includes factory visit). 
#2 Vice General Director on 3 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
V5  
#1 General Director on 16 October 2003 (includes factory visit). 
#2 
General Director and Director of Technology Department on 9 March 2009 
(includes factory visit). 
V6 #1 General Director on 17 November 2009. 
V7 
#1 
Director of Production and Director of Finance on 25 September 2004 (includes 
factory visit). 
#2: General Director on 11 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#3 Two Vice General Directors on 11 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
#4 General Director at VEAM’s office in Hanoi 13 January 2010. 
V8  
#1 General Director at the company's factory on 20 November 2008. 
#2 General Director at the company's factory on 5 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
V9 
#1 Deputy General Director on 16 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#2 Manager of Engineering Department on 21 November 2008 (includes factory visit).
#3 General Director at the VEAM’s office in Hanoi on 13 January 2010. 
V10  
#1 Managing Director on 28 July 2005 (includes factory visit). 
#2 President on 15 November 2008 (includes factory visit). 
V11 #1 General Director and Director on 9 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
V12 #1 
Manager of Finance and Deputy Manager of Sales on 12 March 2009 (includes 
factory visit). 
V13 
#1 Deputy General Director on 16 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#2 
Managers of Technical Department, Equipment Department, Manager of Quality 
Control Department, and Technical Department No.2 on 21 November 2008 
(includes factory visit). 
V14 #1 
Director and Manager of Technology Department at the company's factory in Ho 
Chi Minh City on 13 March 2009 (include factory visit). 
V15 
  
#1 
General Director at the company's factory in Hanoi on 3 August 2005 (includes 
factory visit). 
#2 
General Director at the company's factory in Hanoi on 5 September 2008 (includes 
factory visit). 
V16 
#1 General Director on 24 November 2008. 
#2 General Director on 5 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
V17 
  
#1 
General Director and Director of Sales Department on 12 September 2008 (includes 
factory visit). 
166 
 
#2 
General Director and Manager of Accounting Department on 22 November 2008 
(includes factory visit). 
V18 #1 Director on 4 September 2008 (include factory visit). 
V19  
#1 General Director on 2 August 2005 (includes factory visit). 
#2 General Director on 8 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#3 General Director on 10 March 2009. 
V20 
#1 General Director on 15 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
#2 General Director on 10 March 2009. 
V21 #1 General Director on 4 March 2009.  
V22 #1 Managing Director and Factory Director on 14 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
V23 #1 Deputy Director on 25 September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
 
(4) Japanese suppliers  
Firms Code Interview details 
J1 #1 General Director on 1 August 2005 (includes factory visit). 
J2 
#1 General Director on 23 August 2002 (includes factory visit). 
#2 General Director on 26 November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
J3 
#1 General Director on 20 September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
#2 General Director on 19 November 2007. 
#3 General Director on 18 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
J4 #1 General Director on 22 May 2003. 
J5 #1 
General Director and Factory Manager on 11 November 2003 (includes factory 
visit). 
J6 
#1 General Director on 20 November 2004 (includes factory visit). 
#2 
General Director, Director and Manager of Purchasing Department on 20 November 
2007 (includes factory visit). 
J7 #1 General Director on 4 September 2002. 
J8 #1 General Director on 27 July 2001 (includes factory visit). 
J9 #1 General Director on 26 November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
J10 #1 General Director on 17 September 2008 (includes factory visit). 
J11  #1 General Director on 15 January 2010 (includes factory visit). 
 
(5) Chinese suppliers  
Firm 
Interviews 
Surveys 
Code Details 
C1 
#1 General Director on 23 November 2007 (includes factory visit). 
– #2 Manager of Sales Department at a café in Hanoi on 2 March 2009. 
#3 Manager of Sales Department at a café in Hanoi on 11 March 2009. 
C2 – – 2004/2007
C3 – – 2004/2007
C4 – – 2004/2007
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C5 – – 2004 
 
(6) Taiwanese suppliers  
Firm Code Interview details 
T1 
#1 Japanese Technical Advisor on 26 July 2005 (includes factory visit). 
#2 Deputy General Director on 28 November 2007. 
T2 #1 Sales and Import Assistant Manager on 27 November 2007. 
T3 
#1 General Director on 3 August 2005. 
#2 General Director on 6 March 2009 (includes factory visit). 
T4 #1 Deputy General Director and Manager of Sales Department on 27 November 2007. 
T5 #1 Deputy General Director on 29 July 2005. 
T6 #1 Director of Finance Department on 10 September 2004 (includes factory visit). 
T7 #1 Deputy General Director on 28 July 2005 (includes factory visit). 
 
(7) Korean supplier  
Firm Code Interview codes and details 
K1 
#1 Chief of Financial Department on 10 September 2004. 
#2 General Director on 29 November 2007. 
#3 General Director on 13 March 2009. 
 
(8) Industry experts 
Organisations Code Interview details 
Vietnam Association of Bicycles 
and Motorcycles (Vinacycle) 
#1 Specialist on 23 September 2004. 
#2 
Chairman and Chief of Administrative Office on 21 
November 2007. 
#3 Chief of Administrative Office on 15 January 2010. 
 
(9) Motorcycle retailers  
Organisations Interviews  
Hanoi 
Several motorcycle retailers on Hue Street, Hanoi interviewed on 27 August 
2002. 
Several motorcycle retailers on Hue Street, Hanoi interviewed on 13 January 
2010. 
Long An Province Several motorcycle retailers in Tan An, Long An on 25 July 2005. 
Ho Chi Minh City Several motorcycle retailers in Ho Chi Minh City on 11-12 September 2004. 
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VNU University of Economics and Business 
 
Abstract: The paper analyzes trade between Vietnam and ASEAN+3 countries including trade 
structure, intra-ASEAN+3 trade and trade with the rest of the world in the period 2000-2014. 
Indicators of potential containing reveal comparative advantage(RCA) and trade complementary 
index are calculated to see potential goods and markets for Vietnam exports. In addition, the 
paper employs Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade (IIT) for total trade, each SITC 
product categories and some key export products. The result shows that trade integration in the 
framework of ASEAN+3 contributes to promote Vietnam-ASEAN+3 trade in both traditional and 
non-traditional commodities. IIT index of Vietnam’s primary products is relatively high, which 
indicates that economies of scale in the production of primary goods have not been fully 
exploited. The result also reveals that there is an increase in  IIT index of manufactured products 
of Vietnam. This reflects trade integration has promoted investment and shifted production 
network toward potential markets such as Vietnam.  
Key words: ASEAN+3, RCA index, TC index, IIT index, trade integration 
 
1. Introduction 
International economic integration has become an inevitable trend in the world. Economic 
integration brings about a great deal of benefits for countries such as promoting trade and 
investment. Hence, many countries have made great effort to negotiate and sign bilateral and 
multilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA), especially regional FTAs. Cooperation between 
ASEAN and three Northeast Asian countries including Japan, Korea and China (ASEAN + 3) is 
considered as an efficient cooperation mechanism. Efficient economic integration contributes to 
promote trade among ASEAN + 3 countries. In particular, trade between Vietnam and ASEAN + 
3 also increased by nearly 9.3 times during the period 2000-2014. In several studies, trade 
integration between Vietnam and ASEAN + 3, namely the ASEAN Free Trade Area (Vietnam 
signed in 1995), ASEAN- China FTA, ASEAN – Korea FTA, ASEAN – Japan CEP, Vietnam – 
Japan EPA (signed respectively in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2009) has been assessed to affect 
Vietnam's trade (Urata and Okabe, 2013; Nguyen Anh Thu at el, 2015; Nguyen Anh Thu, 2011). 
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Vietnam - ASEAN +3 trade impact assessment studies basically adopted various methods such 
as trade indicators and regression models... However, analysis and evaluation of trade between 
Vietnam and ASEAN + 3 using intra-industry trade index (IIT) for each SITC code in the period 
2000 to 2013 are limited. Therefore, this paper combines potential trade indicators including 
RCA, and TC with IIT calculation, contributing to  analyze more clearly trade between Vietnam 
and ASEAN + 3, particularly intra-industry trade in the period 2000 -2014. 
2. Overview of Vietnam and ASEAN+3 Trade 
ASEAN + 3 is an attractive destination for Vietnam to promote trading activities. Favorable 
geography location and preferential treatments from Free Trade Agreements signed within 
ASEAN +3 have played an important role in boosting Vietnam's trade with ASEAN +3 countries. 
According to statistics from UN Comtrade, ASEAN + 3 accounted for more than 50% of total 
import and export of Vietnam during 2000-2014. 
2.1. Vietnam - ASEAN +3 trade from 2000 to 2014 
 
 
Figure 1. Vietnam – ASEAN +3 Trade from 2000 to 2014 (Unit: Billion US dollars) 
Source: UN Comtrade and Vietnam General Department of Customs 
Trade values between Vietnam and ASEAN +3 countries increased rapidly during the given 
period (Figure 1). In 2000, Vietnam and ASEAN + 3 trade was 16.99 billion US dollars and then 
increased by nearly 9.3 times to reach 157.3 billion US dollars in 2014.. However, in 2009, due 
to  the world economic crisis, Vietnam- ASEAN +3 trade decreased by 11.74%. After that, 
thanks to positve signs of global economy recovery as well as commitment to cut down tariff and 
non-tariff barriers from FTAs in the region, Vietnam – ASEAN + 3 trade values continued to 
increase until now. In the recent years, Vietnam- ASEAN + 3 trade has annually increased by 
10%-14%, and is likely to follow a downward trend.  The trend to slow down trade growth rate 
in 2013 and 2014  has occured not only in Vietnam-ASEAN +3 trade but also Vietnam's total 
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trade with the whole world. World economy and international trade activities have recently 
tended to grow but still at low rates (WTO, 2015). Continuous fluctuations in world petrol and 
oil price are the main reason considerably affecting world trade in general and ASEAN +3 trade 
in particular.  
During the period of 2000-2014, Vietnam consistently had trade deficit with ASEAN +3. 
The level of trade deficit climbed rapidly over time. In 2000, trade deficit of Vietnam with 
ASEAN +3 was 2.82 billion US dollars but this figure amounted to 45.49 billion US dollars in 
2014. The reason was that Vietnam mainly exports raw and low value added products such as 
electronic components, machinery components, equipment and parts, crude oil, rice, textile and 
fisheries,... to the ASEAN + 3. Besides, that ASEAN countries and Vietnam exported the similar 
labor-intensive products to ASEAN+3 such as rice and  textiles also resulted in low export 
values of Vietnam. Meanwhile, Vietnam primarily imported high-value commodities such as 
petroleum, computers, electronic products, machinery, wood and input materials ... from ASEAN 
+ 3. 
2.2. Trade structure of Vietnam – ASEAN+3 by market 
 It is clearly seen that ASEAN + 3 countries are important partners of Vietnam, accounting 
for over 50% of Vietnam's trade in 2013 and 2014. In addition, Vietnam's trade with countries 
outside ASEAN + 3 increased by 1.17% as compared with 2013 (Statistics from UNComtrades). 
 In ASEAN + 3, Vietnam's trade with ASEAN countries accounted for the highest 
proportion from 2000 to 2009 (Figure 2). However, from 2010 up to now, China has outweighed 
ASEAN to become the largest trading partner of Vietnam in ASEAN + 3. By 2014, the 
proportion of Vietnam's trade with ASEAN, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan in Vietnam’s total trade 
values with ASEAN +3 decreased. By contrast, the proportion of Vietnam-China trade increased 
by 2.13% compared with 2013. The reason was that Vietnam-China trade increased significantly 
in 2014 (nearly 8.6 billion US dollars). However, trade between China and Vietnam increased 
mainly due to a rapid increase in Vietnam's imports from China. Hence, China was also the 
partner that Vietnam had the largest trade deficit in the ASEAN + 3. Regarding to exports, 
ASEAN and Japan were the largest partners of Vietnam in the region. While Vietnam had trade 
deficit with ASEAN trade, Vietnam consistently had trade surplus with Japan. In 2013 and 2014, 
the trade balance of Vietnam -Japan was nearly 2 billion US dollars in surplus. 
Intra-ASEAN trade plays an important role in Vietnam's trade (Nguyen Hong Son et al, 
2015). In ASEAN, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia are the main partners of 
Vietnam. In the years of 2000-2001, Singapore was the largest partner of Vietnam in ASEAN 
(over 50%). However, trade growth of Vietnam-Singapore then decreased. From 2010 to 2014, 
Thailand became the largest partner of Vietnam in ASEAN. 
 
172 
 
 
Figure 2: Structure of Vietnam's trade with ASEAN + 3 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UN Comtrade and Vietnam General 
Department of Customs 
 
2.3. Trade structure of Vietnam - ASEAN + 3 by commodity 
In terms of trade by commodity, trade between Vietnam-ASEAN + 3 is mainly in machinery 
and transport equipment (S7), accounting for 38.64% of Vietnam-ASEAN+3 trade in 2013. Next 
is the manufactured goods classified by material (S6), constituting 20.81% (Statistics from 
UNComtrades). 
To be more specific, the export structure of Vietnam to ASEAN + 3 changed markedly over 
the period 2000-2013. Before 2006, raw and preliminarily processed products accounted for a 
high proportion of total exports of Vietnam to ASEAN + 3 (56%-60%). Since 2007, the 
proportion of preliminarily processed products decreased whereas the share of processed 
products increased rapidly, accounting for over 60% of Vietnam's exports to the ASEAN + 3. 
According to statistical data from UN Comtrade, agricultural products, textiles, fisheries, 
electronics, and crude oil are the main export products of Vietnam to ASEAN + 3. Table 1 below 
shows that the export values of these commodities increased significantly during the period 
2000-2013. In particular, electronic products exported to ASEAN + 3 witnessed a rapid growth 
from 444.9 million USD in 2000 to 10433.8 million USD in 2013, an increase of 23.5 times. 
This is also the sector accounting for over 20% of Vietnam's exports to ASEAN + 3 in 2013. 
Exports of high-tech commodities to ASEAN + 3 also increased over time, making up of 17.78% 
of total export to ASEAN + 3 in 2013. Groups of traditional products such as agricultural 
products, textiles and fisheries have remained a key role in Vietnam's exports to ASEAN + 3 but 
tended to gradually decrease (Nguyen Anh Thu et al, 2014; Nguyen Hong Son et al, 2015). The 
shift is consistent with the trend of economic restructuring of Vietnam. 
Regarding to imports, from 2000 to now, Vietnam's imports from the ASEAN + 3 have seen 
no major changes. Processed products are mainly imported items of Vietnam from the ASEAN + 
3. Preliminarily processed products account for only a small share in the import structure due to 
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Vietnam’s advantage of producing these products. Electronics are important import products of 
Vietnam. Imports of electronic goods of Vietnam from the ASEAN + 3 increased rapidly, from 
861.5 million USD in 2001 to 27545.4 million USD in 2013 (nearly 32 times). Also, according 
to data from Vietnam's General Department of Customs, commodities such as petroleum, 
machinery, tools & parts, computers, etc. are the leading import items of Vietnam from the 
ASEAN + 3. 
Table 1: Share of exports and imports of some commodities  
between Vietnam and ASEAN + 3 
Unit: % 
 2000 2003 2006 2009 2011 2012 2013 
Export Agricultural products 26.19 26.92 25.82 24.82 24.88 22.90 21.33
Garments and Textiles 12.44 9.72 8.06 9.97 11.50 11.01 13.30
Resources intensive 
products 6.88 9.16 9.95 10.99 12.63 11.58 10.85
High-tech commodities 9.04 7.91 7.93 9.94 10.80 14.70 17.78
Fisheries 12.23 11.43 8.21 6.22 5.02 4.56 4.65 
Electronic products 6.28 8.66 8.49 10.78 12.14 16.52 20.07
Import  Agricultural products 6.13 8.15 7.09 6.32 6.79 6.13 5.57 
Garments and Textiles 10.72 11.62 9.80 9.32 10.18 9.86 9.98 
Resources intensive 
products 25.47 23.78 26.57 20.01 19.51 17.07 13.21
High-tech commodities 13.10 10.24 11.02 16.05 17.39 23.81 29.14
Electronic products 10.91 9.73 9.73 14.20 17.53 25.32 30.47
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from UN Comtrade 
3. Merchandise trade integration between Vietnam and ASEAN+3: Trade indicators 
approach 
3.1 Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
Following the International Trade Commission, revealed comparative advantage is measured 
by formula: 
ܴܥܣ ൌ 	
݆ܺ݅
ܺ݅ݐܺݓ݆
ܺݓݐ
 
Where: 
 Xij and Xwj are export values of good j of country i and  the world. 
 Xit and Xwt are total export turnover of country i and the world. 
If RCA is greater than 1, country i has comparative advantage in good j, otherwise country I 
does not have comparative advantage in good j..  
 
174 
 
Industries Vietnam has comparative advantage in 
Some main export commodities of Vietnam to ASEAN + 3 such as agricultural products, 
textiles and fisheries are those that Vietnam has comparative advantages in (Table 2). However, 
RCAs of these traditional export commodities tend to decrease. It is because the proportion of 
these commodities in Vietnam's total exports decreased over the years. Indeed, competition in 
exporting of these goods is increasing. In addition, Vietnam is pushing up exports of non-
traditional items such as electronics and furniture, which provide high-value exports. 
Results also indicated that Vietnam, China and some ASEAN countries such as Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia have comparative advantages in the exports of traditional commodities 
while these items are not advantage of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. Therefore, trade 
integration will significantly and positively influence on Vietnam's exports of these commodities 
to Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. In fact, they are also main export partner of Vietnam in 
fisheries, textile and agriculture products. 
 
Table 2: RCA in Vietnam's comparative advantage industries1 
Industry Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agriculture 
products 
Vietnam 2.81 2.71 2.88 3.00 2.88 2.79 2.49 2.62 2.53 2.43 1.82
Singapore 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.28
Thailand 2.08 2.09 1.98 2.13 2.01 2.14 1.95 2.04 2.36 2.03 2.01
Indonesia 1.65 2.02 1.99 2.22 2.49 2.83 2.24 2.55 2.65 2.65 2.66
Malaysia 1.22 1.23 1.17 1.24 1.44 1.67 1.41 1.63 1.88 1.66 1.64
Japan 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16
 China 0.55 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.33
Korea 0.02 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.22
Garments 
and 
Textiles 
Vietnam 3.40 3.46 3.34 3.59 3.97 4.02 4.07 4.31 4.04 3.85 3.77
Singapore 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.15
Thailand 1.18 1.26 1.29 1.23 1.19 1.17 1.17 1.18 1.14 1.23 1.5 
Indonesia 2 1.99 2 1.94 1.91 1.7 1.59 1.59 1.48 1.55 1.67
Malaysia 0.43 0.46 0.5 0.5 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.51 0.52
Japan 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.29
China 3.15 3.03 3.05 3.20 3.12 3.19 3.07 3.04 3.04 3.01 2.95
Korea 1.37 1.13 0.99 0.87 0.80 0.77 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.65
Fisheries Vietnam 13.75 12.51 12.14 12.66 12.41 12.22 10.27 10.19 9.36 6.39 6.94
Singapore 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11
Thailand 6.80 5.89 5.80 6.02 5.82 6.28 5.68 5.13 5.11 5.01 4.16
Indonesia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.33 2.26 2.70 2.89
Malaysia 0.56 0.63 0.63 0.59 0.66 0.66 0.56 0.58 0.56 0.51 0.46
Japan 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.32 0.38
 China 1.68 1.58 1.42 1.40 1.21 1.21 1.19 1.20 1.29 1.26 1.21
Korea 0.71 0.62 0.52 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.43
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from UN Comrade  
 
 
                                                            
1 Countries in bold have comparative advantage (RCA>1) 
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Industries Vietnam does not have comparative advantage in 
Table 3 illustrates RCA of industries in which Vietnam does not have comparative advantage, 
including electronics, steel, machinery & transport equipment  that are all high-value 
commodities. RCA of these items are low but have increased over the years, which shows a 
positive signal in the process of restructuring production and export of these commodities in 
Vietnam. In addition, RCA of electronics is larger than 1 from 2011. This is consistent with the 
fact that electronics exports have increased rapidly over time, becoming one of the major export 
products of Vietnam in recent years. 
 
Table 3: RCA of industries Vietnam does not have comparative advantage in 
Industry Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Electron
ics 
Vietnam N/A 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.56 0.53 0.63 0.83 1.22 1.76 2.14
Singapore 3.16 3.06 2.98 3.06 3.03 2.92 2.80 2.83 2.68 2.60 2.64
Thailand 1.79 1.65 1.49 1.41 1.39 1.31 1.25 1.24 1.22 1.14 1.13
Indonesia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.50
Malaysia 2.44 2.74 2.70 2.47 2.45 2.33 2.44 2.35 2.48 2.35 2.32
Japan 1.85 1.71 1.63 1.57 1.57 1.60 1.58 1.43 1.44 1.42 1.32
China 1.70 1.71 1.80 1.86 1.93 2.06 2.08 2.02 2.12 2.12 2.21
Korea 2.38 2.26 2.25 2.09 2.05 2.03 2.04 1.97 1.94 1.94 2.11
Steel Vietnam 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.80 0.34 0.62 0.74 0.72 0.83
Singapore 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.31
Thailand 0.50 0.51 0.46 0.43 0.68 0.42 0.36 0.34 0.28 0.48 0.43
Indonesia 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.49 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.33
Malaysia 0.45 0.48 0.40 0.48 0.47 0.40 0.57 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.39
Japan 1.48 1.32 1.42 1.41 1.31 1.45 1.92 1.83 1.81 1.88 2.05
China 0.43 0.75 0.78 1.02 1.15 1.27 0.71 0.84 0.94 0.90 0.94
Korea 1.57 1.47 1.55 1.48 1.38 1.52 1.72 1.76 1.84 1.90 1.80
Machine
ry, 
transpor
t 
equipme
nt 
Vietnam 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.44 0.57 0.78 0.68
Singapore 1.49 1.49 1.48 1.50 1.44 1.43 1.44 1.43 1.35 1.31 1.34
Thailand 1.06 1.09 1.13 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.13 1.18 1.11 1.17 1.21
Indonesia 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.35 0.35
Malaysia 1.38 1.34 1.37 1.37 1.28 1.22 1.29 1.23 1.14 1.10 1.10
Japan 1.62 1.61 1.62 1.66 1.66 1.75 1.61 1.66 1.72 1.73 1.68
China 1.04 1.11 1.17 1.23 1.24 1.33 1.37 1.38 1.40 1.36 1.36
Korea 1.52 1.55 1.54 1.54 1.53 1.56 1.58 1.58 1.59 1.52 1.58
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from UN Comtrade and WTO  
 3.2 The trade complementary index (TC) 
Index: TCkj = 100 - ∑abs (mik – xij)/2 
Where: mik is the proportion (%) of goods i in total imports of country k 
  xij is the proportion (%) of goods i in total exports of country j 
TC shows intra-regional trade perspectives by pointing out the complementary in the export 
structure of a country with imports of another country. There is a need to calculate this index for 
potential FTAs, compare this with that of other FTAs and their efficiency. If the result is 0, no 
goods exported by a country yet to be imported by its partner country and the value of 100 means 
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the exports and imports of two partners complement each other. The higher value is, the better 
FTA will be. 
The results show that Vietnam's export structure is largely complementary with import 
structure of Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and lowest complementary 
with those of Cambodia and China. The opposite direction shows that the exports of Singapore, 
Malaysia, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines are largest complementary with the imports of 
Vietnam. Thus, in terms of trade in both directions, in ASEAN, the export and import structure 
of Vietnam and Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines has a high degree of complementary. 
Besides ASEAN, Japan and South Korea have large degree of complementary to the import and 
export activities of Vietnam because Vietnam has an advantage in exporting agricultural 
products, textiles, and fisheries while Japan and South Korea have the advantages in exporting 
manufactured and high-tech items. Thus, trade integration will create favorable conditions for 
Vietnam to strongly enhance trade with these countries. A comparison of TC index between 
Vietnam and Japan, South Korea, China and ASEAN in 2013 with those in 2007 and 2008 
calculated by MUTRAP III (2013) shows the TC index increased over the years. This is 
consistent with the actual increase in importing and exporting from Vietnam to ASEAN + 3 
partners. 
Table 4. Trade Complementary index between Vietnam and ASEAN + 3 in 2013 
          Unit: % 
 Partners 
Brunei 
Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore
Thaila
nd ASEAN Japan Korea China
Vietna
m: 
Exporte
r 51.43 38.5 48.72 58.19 56.23 53.07 52.91 50.12 59.15 51.14 42.35
Vietna
m: 
Importe
r  14.75 8.84 42.87 66.31 54.46 65.67 60.54 55.33 56.72 57.83 45.37
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UN Comtrade 
3.3. Intra-industry trade index (IIT) 
The intra-industry trade  index (IIT), also known as Grubel-Lloyd index, was used by 
Grubel and Lloyd (1975) to calculate the structure of intra-industry trade in total trade value and 
defined by the formula: 
۷۷܂ܑ ൌ ૚ െ	
|܆ܑ െ	ۻܑ|
ሺ܆ܑ ൅	ۻܑሻ 
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Where: IIT୧ is  intra-industry trade index for group of products i 
   Xi is the total export values of group of products i 
   Mi is the total import value of group of products i 
Similarly, the total IIT index for total trade for each economy and region is calculated by the 
formula 
ۯ۷۷܂ܒ ൌ ૚ െ	
∑ |܆ܑ െ	ۻܑ|ܑܖୀ૚
∑ ሺ܆ܑ ൅	ۻܑሻܑܖୀ૚  
Where  AIITj is intra-industry trade index of country j 
The value of IIT index is from 0 to 1. The closer to 1 IIT is, the higher intra-industry trade 
level is, while the closer to 0 IIT shows the higher level of inter-industry trade.  
Intra-industry trade takes an important role, accounting for a quarter of world trade 
(Koçyiğit & Şen 2007). The results in Table 5 also showed that intra-industry trade achieves the 
high proportion in total trade between Vietnam and the ASEAN + 3 with AIIT index over 0.53 
throughout the period. AIIT index showed intra-industry trade between Vietnam and ASEAN + 3 
increased sharply from 2006 to now, the period when Vietnam has signed a great deal of regional 
FTAs. By sector, IIT index in raw and semi-processed commodities were generally higher  than 
that in processed (or refined) items, reflecting the economies of scale in the production of these 
commodities hasn’t been fully exploited yet (Dao Ngoc Tien, 2012). In detail, the IIT index of 
crude materials, inedible, except fuels (S2) was 0.953 in 2000 and 0.788 in 2013. The IIT index 
of beverages and tobacco (S1) was 0.978 in 2006 and fell to 0.528 in 2013. More than 96% of 
trade in mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (S3) was intra-industry trade, reflecting 
export and import activities in this commodity were almost equal. The reason is that Vietnam has 
the potential to export raw materials and crude oil but doesn’t have advantages in refined items. 
Therefore, Vietnam should invest in developing high technologies and constructing refining 
factories for raw materials to serve production and export activities. Intra-industry trade of 
beverage and tobacco products (S1) tended to decrease because Vietnam gradually masters in 
production and export and thus decrease to import these items. This is also a group of 
commodity with high import duties and many of them are on the list of sensitive products in the 
regional FTAs that Vietnam has signed, leading to declined in imports over the years. 
Table 5: Intra-industry trade index between Vietnam and ASEAN+3 
 
Year  
AIIT 
index 
IIT index  according to industry classification code  SITC  
S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
2000 0.538 0.250 0.198 0.953 0.839 0.545 0.101 0.292 0.467 0.727 0.949 
2001 0.538 0.240 0.548 0.924 0.874 0.225 0.162 0.319 0.462 0.766 0.675 
2002 0.531 0.364 0.613 0.895 0.921 0.118 0.169 0.269 0.402 0.831 0.663 
2003 0.549 0.451 0.906 0.868 0.916 0.120 0.196 0.274 0.436 0.882 0.714 
2004 0.563 0.433 0.940 0.845 0.872 0.090 0.177 0.281 0.510 0.917 0.823 
2005 0.574 0.431 0.959 0.986 0.873 0.134 0.203 0.273 0.505 0.857 0.926 
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Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UN Comtrade 
In the period 2000-2013, the IIT index of processed items is lower than the IIT index of 
primary items. In 2000, the IIT indices of chemicals and related products (S5), manufactured 
goods classified by materials (S6), machinery, vehicles and spare parts (S7) are low because of 
high imported value. Over the years, the IIT indices of these items increased gradually since the 
import and export of processed items between Vietnam and ASEAN + 3 increased significantly, 
while the import turnover of Vietnam exceeded the export turnover throughout the period. In fact, 
Vietnam doesn’t have comparative advantage in producing machinery products and means of 
transport, thus it imports large value of these items. However, over the years, countries having 
comparative advantages in producing high-tech products, such as Japan, South Korea tends to 
expand production network, shift to ASEAN countries including Vietnam to take advantage of 
costs of production and preferential commitments in the FTA. At the same time, Vietnam also 
boost FDI inflows for domestic production. Therefore, the export of these items from Vietnam 
increased, though it is still significantly lower than the import of these items, which leads to 
increase IIT index. 
In detail, analysis of intra-industry trade index between Vietnam and ASEAN, Japan, Korea, 
China through Table 6 shows a significant difference compared to the IIT index in Vietnam and 
ASEAN + 3. With ASEAN and Japan, the IIT index of Vietnam in S3 is very low, respectively 
0.01 in 2000 and 0.08 in 2013, in contrast with the high IIT index of S3 in Vietnam - ASEAN +3 
and Vietnam - China, Vietnam - Korea trade. This shows that the export and import of fuel, 
lubricants between Vietnam, South Korea and China are fairly balanced. With the processed 
items such as machinery, transport equipment (S7), the IIT index between Vietnam and other 
ASEAN countries is high, which is the opposites of the IIT index between Vietnam and Japan, 
South Korea, China. Because the three Northeast Asian countries have the comparative 
advantage in manufacturing high – tech machinery products so Vietnam imports large products 
from these countries. However, the IIT index of S7 between Vietnam and Japan, Korean, China 
is ascending. Specifically 80% of trade between Vietnam and these countries in S7 items in 2013 
is intra-industry trade. This reflects the investment in producing machinery and equipment, high-
tech products in Vietnam has been increasing efficiently.  
 
 
 
2006 0.588 0.466 0.978 0.888 0.974 0.118 0.238 0.284 0.506 0.875 0.309 
2007 0.548 0.504 0.969 0.863 0.948 0.183 0.222 0.282 0.427 0.927 0.991 
2008 0.567 0.475 0.895 0.880 0.913 0.259 0.262 0.374 0.422 0.905 0.858 
2009 0.553 0.502 0.959 0.906 0.993 0.284 0.274 0.378 0.388 0.858 0.861 
2010 0.568 0.543 0.849 0.801 0.927 0.249 0.320 0.453 0.466 0.859 0.827 
2011 0.590 0.468 0.692 0.773 0.973 0.344 0.377 0.480 0.488 0.732 0.762 
2012 0.614 0.461 0.568 0.802 0.976 0.563 0.472 0.516 0.552 0.695 0.984 
2013 0.598 0.508 0.528 0.788 0.968 0.533 0.433 0.495 0.523 0.684 0.135 
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Table 6: The IIT index between Vietnam and ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, China 
 S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
ASEAN 2000 0.43 0.13 0.58 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.37 0.75 0.99 0.44 2013 0.90 0.51 0.66 0.08 0.35 0.35 0.82 0.99 0.94 0.25 
Japan  
2000 0.06 0.62 0.88 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.47 0.39 0.41 0.94 
2013 0.11 0.11 0.89 0.06 0.17 0.63 0.49 0.80 0.37 0.28 
Korea  
2000 0.25 N/A 0.45 0.04 N/A 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.71 0.70 
2013 0.29 0.71 0.95 0.88 0.14 0.11 0.29 0.22 0.63 0.00 
China 
 
2000 0.25 0.10 0.37 0.28 0.03 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.24 0.96 
2013 0.30 0.58 0.35 0.79 0.18 0.44 0.23 0.30 0.66 0.00 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UN Comtrade 
Table 7 shows intra-industry trade index of some major export items of Vietnam including 
agricultural products, textiles and electronics. The results shows that over 90% of trade in 
agricultural products, textiles between Vietnam and ASEAN are intra - industry trade, since 
Vietnam and ASEAN countries have similar comparative advantages of these items. The IIT 
index in agricultural products between Vietnam-Japan is lowest. With textiles, the IIT index 
between Vietnam and Japan, China is lowest. The reason for that is Japan is one of the partners 
leading textile imports from Vietnam while Vietnam imports large volume of textiles from China, 
not only materials but also textile and garments. 
Table 7: The ITT index in some commodities between Vietnam and ASEAN+3 
Country  Year Agricultural products Textiles Electronics 
ASEAN 
2000 0.86 0.84 0.77 
2013 0.94 0.95 0.94 
Japan  
2000 0.11 0.64 0.51 
2013 0.24 0.46 0.99 
Korea  
2000 0.70 0.31 0.46 
2013 0.61 0.95 0.18 
China 
2000 0.27 0.23 0.12 
2013 0.29 0.41 0.33 
ASEAN+3 
2000 0.49 0.91 0.58 
2013 0.62 0.87 0.55 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from UN Comtrade 
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4. Conclusion: 
Following the trend of regional economic integration , every country tries to promote its 
comparative advantages, utilizing opportunities of incentives from the process of economic 
integration. Vietnam and ASEAN + 3 are also not exceptions. Trade between Vietnam and 
ASEAN + 3 increased rapidly during the period 2000 - 2013. However, Vietnam witnessed trade 
deficit with ASEAN + 3 throughout the period. Because Vietnam mainly imported high-value 
added items such as machinery, equipment and exported primary products, raw materials that 
Vietnam has comparative advantage. The proportion of export in processed products to ASEAN 
+ 3 has increased, which reflects Vietnam focus on investing in production of these commodities. 
The traditional export items that Vietnam has comparative advantage like textiles, fisheries, 
agricultural products, mainly exported to the supplementary trade partners such as Japan, South 
Korea. The process of trade integration and also the implementation of commitments under the 
ASEAN + 3 FTAs boost intra-regional trade of Vietnam in both traditional commodities and 
non-traditional. 
The results of the analysis of intra-industry trade (IIT) index showed that intra-industry trade 
between Vietnam and ASEAN + 3 increased between 2000 and 2013. In general, the index of 
IIT's primary sectors of Vietnam is relatively high, reflecting the economies of scale in the 
production of these items have not been fully exploited. Vietnam still has to import a large 
volumes of fuel, raw materials. Calculation results also illustrated that the IIT index of processed 
goods between Vietnam-ASEAN + 3 tends to increase. Specially, IIT index of machineries, 
equipment of Vietnam-Japan reached 0.8 in 2013. It reflects trade integration has boosted 
investment in production, expanding the production network and the production scale of 
developed economics in the region to potential markets such as Vietnam.  
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1. Introduction 
Advances in Information Communication Technology (ICT) could be considered as the foremost 
contribution by the previous century to the current century and beyond. The revolutionary changes in 
the ICT, hardware and software, have made profound influence in all the spheres of human activity. 
While the genesis of such revolutionary changes could be traced to the technological changes in 
microelectronics, it has been sustained by the developments in software.  Thus viewed the cumulative 
effect has been emergence of ICT as the General Purpose Technology (GPT) of the new millennium 
that is instrumental in enhancing efficiency, competitiveness and growth in all sectors of the economy 
regardless of their stage of development. If the available evidence is any indication, there is hardly any 
developing country that has not recognized the potential of ICT and not undertaken institutional 
interventions to develop ICT capabilities as a short cut to prosperity.  
Being a general-purpose technology, it has been argued that effective harnessing of this technology for 
development calls for building capabilities in the production and use of both hardware and software 
(Ernst 2002). Studies have also shown that a lop sided approach in terms of promoting ICT use with 
the neglect of ICT production capabilities has the potential danger of perpetuating technological 
dependence (Mytelka and Ohiorhenuan 2000) on the one hand and forgoing opportunities for income 
and employment generation on the other. This is especially relevant in case of large economies like 
India. It is worth reminiscing that the green revolution, which has been an indisputable success story 
so far as agricultural productivity and economic growth in the developing world are concerned, would 
not have been possible had the strategy been simply one of passive adoption of western technologies.  
Hence a strategy towards ICT, as a general-purpose technology, needs to be one wherein there is a 
concomitant focus on production and use of both hardware and software. The often-advocated strategy 
for harnessing ICT for development has been an open trade and investment regime.  
India is one among the developing countries that systematically undertaken institutional interventions 
aimed at developing a vibrant ICT sector.  It is also worth noting that India’s success in ICT software 
has attracted the world attention mainly on account of her remarkable performance in the export of 
software services, which has been inspirational for other developing countries.  However, the key 
issue is how India has fared in terms of the production and use of hardware and software – an issue of 
paramount importance while considering ICT as a general-purpose technology. Much has been written 
184 
 
about the growth performance of the software sector (Arora et al 2001, Joseph 2002; 2009; Kumar and 
Joseph 2007; D’ Costa 2003). But our understanding on the performance of ICT hardware (read as 
electronics) and the bearing of trade liberalization in general and integration with ASEAN and Asia in 
particular on the observed performance is at best modest.  This article is an attempt at filing this gap in 
our understanding of ICT as a general-purpose technology. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The second section presents an analytical 
framework for approaching the issue at hand.  Third section presents an analysis of the growth 
performance of ICT sector with focus on electronics. Section four analyses the implications of trade 
liberalization in general and integration with ASEAN in particular on the observed trend in electronics 
followed by the last section wherein the concluding observations are presented 
2. Analytical Framework 
Given the generality of purpose and innovational complementarities, ICT qualifies itself as yet another 
GPT1. Comparing ICT with earlier GPTs, David (1990, 1991) found remarkable parallels in terms of 
their contribution towards augmenting economic growth and human welfare. In general, it has been 
argued that ICTs are key inputs for competitiveness, economic growth and development. Further, it 
offers opportunity for global integration, increasing economic and social well-being of the poor and 
enhances the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of the public sector, including the delivery of 
public services (World Bank, 2002). Thus viewed, there is hardly any field of human activity wherein 
ICT could not have its profound influence inter alia by revolutionizing the process of information 
exchange and thereby reducing the transaction cost (Joseph 2007). The contribution of a general-
purpose technology like ICT towards development could be understood in terms of its production -
both ICT goods and ICT hardware and software- and its use. While the former refers to ICT diffusion 
induced development through enhanced productivity, competitiveness, growth and human welfare the 
latter is on account of its contribution in output, employment, export earnings from the production of 
ICT related goods and services (Kraemer and Dedrick 2001).  
Production of ICT Goods and services  
Studies have shown that ICT production significantly contributes to output growth value addition, 
employment and productivity growth in developed countries like US and Japan  (US Department of 
Commerce 2000; Brynjolfsson and Adam Saunders 2010; Ezel 2012).  
                                                 
1For a detailed discussion on General Purpose Technology, see Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) who 
coined this term.   
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However, it has been argued that production of IT goods need not necessarily be an easy proposition 
for the developing countries because industrial structure of IT goods is highly concentrated with high 
entry barriers. Industry segments like microprocessors are almost closed because standards are set by 
the leading US based IT players like Intel. Most of the segments of IT industry are highly capital 
intensive and scale intensive and require specialized skills that only a few countries can hope to 
achieve (Kraemer and Dedrick 2001). Moreover, early entrants such as Singapore, Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Ireland and Israel have preempted many of these opportunities to a great extent.  
While there is some merit in the above argument, a closer look at the characteristics of ICT industry 
would reveal that the doors are not that firmly closed for the new comers. ICT industry is a multi-
product industry and the products may be broadly divided into two categories; ICT goods and ICT 
services2. In each of these broad categories there are a large number of products that vary in terms of 
technological intensity, dynamism, investment and skill requirements (Joseph 1997). This has made 
possible the segmentation of the industry into separate, yet closely interacting horizontal layers with 
greater opportunities for outsourcing and thus transforming a vertically integrated industry into 
horizontally disintegrated but closely interacting market segments. Moreover, as argued by Ernst 
(2002) under global production network that characterize IT goods production toady, geographical 
dispersion becomes more concentrated in case of high precision design intensive goods where as in 
case of lower end products there is high regional dispersion. Therefore, it is possible that the new 
comers in developing world could enter profitably into some of these product lines depending on their 
technological capability, human capital availability and the ability to mobilize capital.  
Going by the past evidence, production of ICT goods has been a major source of economic output, 
exports and job creation in countries like South Korea and Singapore during their early stage of 
development and in todays developing countries like Thailand, Malaysia and more recently in China. 
This has been facilitated by their participation in global production network of IT goods, which has a 
longer history. 
When it comes to IT services, economists have long since noted that the services in general are 
cheaper in developing countries as compared to the developed countries3.  Yet, these countries have 
been unable to take benefit of this advantage mainly because the export of most of the services called 
for the cross border movement of labour.  But the movement of labour, unlike capital, was subjected 
                                                 
2  See Joseph (1997) for a detailed analysis of the product structure of electronics industry and the 
implication of product structure for the growth performance.  
3This has been attributed mainly to the fact that labour is the major input in the production of services and 
the abundant supply of labour in less developed countries translate into low wages. Since the technology of 
producing services does not differ significantly across counties, lower wages results in low cost of 
production of services in less developed countries (Bhagwati 1984).  
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to series of restrictions. Though the process of globalization, which inter alia implied the free 
movement of products and factors, achieved momentum during the last two decades, there have been 
hardly any relaxations in the restrictions on labour mobility. However, the advances in ICT has made 
possible, to a great extent, the “splintering off” of many of the services from its providers which in 
turn led to what is often called global division of labour and the outsourcing of services. No wonder, 
as noted by number studies (Schware 1987, 1992; Arora, et. Al 2001; D’Costa 2003; Joseph 2002; 
Kumar and Joseph 2007, 2005) India, with its large pool of skilled manpower along with supporting 
policy environment and proactive private sector, has emerged as a preferred location in the 
international division of labor in knowledge intensive industries as well as in Business Process 
Outsourcing (BPO) and a leading player in the export of software services. India is not the only 
country being benefited from opportunities offered by BPOs. Countries like China, Philippines and 
others are also emerging as providers of BPO services to the developed countries.  
ICT Use  
While there were apprehensions about the return to productivity enhancement on account of ICT use, 
the evidence from the recent cross-country studies shows that the returns to investments in ICT in 
terms of productivity and growth are substantial4. Pohjola (2001) found the output elasticity of ICT 
capital as high as 0.31 for the full sample of 39 countries and 0.23 in the OECD sub sample. Country 
specific studies like the one for Singapore (Wong 2001) finds that the net return to ICT capital (37.9 
per cent) is about two and a half times higher than that for non-ICT capital (14.6 per cent).  These 
studies also show that that ICT induced productivity and growth still remains a phenomenon of 
developed OECD countries and that the developing countries are yet to catch up.  Yet, there are also 
numerous cases to show that developing countries could benefit from increased access to ICT as much 
as their counterparts in the developed world to address various development issues like empowering 
people, improving social service provision and poverty alleviation.  
In the literature on IT and development, however, the focus of attention has been essentially on IT use 
and only limited attempts have been made towards integrating the policy towards electronics 
production and diffusion of IT. As argued by Mytelka and Ohiorhenuan (2000) the often suggested 
strategies place the developing countries in a situation of perpetual attente – waiting for the transfers 
of technology from the North and focusing their attention on the need to attract transnational 
corporations to their shore. The studies on technology diffusion, however, have shown that along with 
demand side factors, supply side factors are also important determinants of diffusion.  Hence, greater 
domestic availability of electronics goods acts as a catalyst in the process of diffusion. To the extent 
                                                 
4 For a review of studies the readers are referred to Indjikian and Siegel (2005). 
187 
 
that the present levels of income are important determinants of IT use, there is no reason why the 
developing countries should forgo the income earning opportunities offered by the production of 
electronics goods which could also be instrumental in their industrial transformation. If the available 
empirical evidence on technological capability in the developing world is any indication, the lopsided 
approach in terms of promoting ICT use while neglecting ICT production capabilities, has the 
potential danger of perpetuating technological dependence on the one hand and foregoing 
opportunities for income and employment generation on the other (UNCTAD 2012; Joseph and 
Parayil 2008). 
ICT production and use: the prerequisites 
The key issue of relevance here pertains to the factors that help developing countries to leapfrog in the 
field of information technology by promoting its production and use?  
Trade, Investment and innovation system 
The virtues of trade liberalization through the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers have been well 
articulated in the literature (Dornbusch 1992, Kruger 1997, Srinivasan and Bhagwati 1999). Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) argues that that national productivity depends in part on a country’s stock of 
knowledge capital, which could be accumulated in two ways: through local research and development 
and through learning from international exchanges. The authors hypothesize that knowledge spillover 
effects are neither automatic nor instantaneous, but rather correlated to the number of contacts with 
the international research and business communities.  Because interactions are supposed to intensify 
with increased trade, it follows that the benefits from international knowledge spillover increase with 
trade openness of an economy. 
Coe and Helpman (1995) argued that the creation of new knowledge through innovation and the stock 
of knowledge are linked through a continuous feedback loop, where the existing knowledge nurtures 
innovation, which in turn increases the stock of knowledge. In their model cumulative R&D 
expenditures serve as a proxy for the stock of knowledge. Based on the data from OECD countries, 
they highlighted the importance of foreign R&D expenditures for domestic productivity. Thus viewed, 
TFP performance of country depends not only on its own R&D capital stock, but also on the R&D 
capital stocks of its primary trading partners. For smaller countries, foreign R&D capital stocks prove 
to be even more important in determining TFP than domestic R&D capital stocks. The effects of 
foreign R&D capital stocks are greater the larger is the share of domestic imports to GDP. 
In case of a developing country the following generalizations may be in order. The decline in domestic 
prices is likely to make the goods and services more affordable and therefore could act as a catalyst in 
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the process of diffusion/use of ICT into other sectors of the economy. The resultant higher output 
growth could lead to higher income and employment generation in the domestic economy as a whole. 
Second effect refers to the impact on domestic ICT producing sector on account of increased 
competition and greater access to needed inputs for production that in turn underscore the link 
between trade and investment. Trade induced competition, apart from inducing firms to cut cost of 
production, leads to the exit of inefficient firms and the absorption of their market share by more 
efficient ones leading to economies of scale and industry level efficiency. Thirdly, trade could lead to 
enhanced domestic productivity through the knowledge spillovers.   Finally liberalized trade regime, 
could act as a catalyst for investment.  
The link between trade and investment, however, is conditioned by the product characteristics and 
organization of production. This link is likely to be stronger in assembly-oriented industries as 
compared to process industries. In an assembly-oriented industry like ICT goods, production 
essentially involves assembling a number of components and sub-assemblies based on a design. The 
production of needed components and subassemblies may be highly skill, capital and/or scale 
intensive that no country could afford to have the capacity to produce all the needed components and 
other accessories. Hence there is the need for rationalizing their production across different locations. 
This is what led to the global production networks (Ernst and Kim 2002) and the international division 
of labour in ICT production. Thus in the global production network, production of each of the 
component or sub assembly is made across different countries according to their comparative 
advantage such that the overall cost of production is minimized. This essentially means that the 
production in any country will call for significant imports and bulk of the output will have to be 
exported to other countries rather than sold in the domestic market.  Hence if the production, and 
therefore investment, in ICT is to take place in any country the trade regime needs to be the one 
wherein the free flow of inputs into and outputs out of the economy is ensured. Thus viewed, there is 
an inexorable link between trade and investment, which is apparently much stronger in IT goods as 
compared to most other industries.  
Limits to Trade liberalization 
While the theoretical case for trade and investment liberalization is elegant, when it comes to the 
experience of developing countries that resorted to trade liberalization under globalization as a short 
cut to prosperity we have a mixed picture. Here it may be apt to quote Stiglitz    
“Globalization itself is neither good nor bad.  It has the power to do enormous good, and for 
the countries of East Asia who have embraced globalization under their own terms, at their 
own pace, it has been an enormous benefit…..But in much of the world it has not brought 
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comparable benefits. For many it seems closer to an unmitigated disaster” (Stiglitz 2002 
p.20).  
After analyzing the trade reform policies in developing countries Rodrik (1992) convincingly 
concludes that  
“trade policy plays a rather asymmetric role in development: an abysmal trade regime can 
perhaps drive a country into economic ruin; but good trade policy alone cannot make a poor 
country rich” (p 103).   
Trade policy, at best, provides an enabling environment for development. Perhaps most emphatic was 
Arthur Lewis who stated as early as in 1978. To quote  
“the engine of growth should be technological change with international trade serving as 
lubricating oil and not as fuel”. He continued “….international trade cannot substitute for 
technological change, so those who depend on it as their major hope are doomed to 
frustration” (Lewis 1978; p 74).  
In case of ICT production, the link between trade and investment notwithstanding, it has been shown 
that local capabilities are critical for attracting investment and promoting production and trade. In a 
context wherein low labour cost is taken for granted by the MNCs, the ability of the developing 
countries to participate in global production network is governed by their ability to provide certain 
specialized capabilities that the MNCs need in order to complement their own core competence (Lall 
2001, Ernst and Lundvall 2000). Countries that cannot provide such capabilities are kept out of the 
circuit of international production network despite their liberal trade regime. Also as argued by 
Cantwell (1995), Dunning (1996), Makino et al (2002) and Pearce (1999) the MNCs have been 
following the knowledge-based asset-seeking strategies along with natural resource-seeking, market-
seeking and efficiency-seeking strategies to reinforce their competitive strengths. More importantly to 
get rid of the risk of getting locked up at the low end of the value chain and to facilitate movement 
along the continuum of Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) to Original Brand Manufacturer 
(OBM) and finally to Original Design Manufacturer (ODM) (Hobday 1994) there is the need for 
building learning, innovation and competence building systems while resorting to a liberal trade and 
investment regime. In a similar vein, along with numerous studies, a survey by Saggi (2002) 
concludes that the absorptive capacity of the host country is crucial for obtaining significant benefits 
from FDI. Without adequate human capital or investment in R&D, spillovers from FDI are infeasible. 
When it comes to ICT use, lower prices resulting from trade liberalization need not necessarily 
promote ICT demand and its diffusion unless the developing countries have the capability to use it.  
Hence trade liberalization has to be accompanied by capacity building such that needed local content 
is developed and capabilities are created to make its effective use. This calls for complementing the 
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liberalized trade and FDI policies with appropriate policy measures and institutional interventions 
with respect to education, R&D and human capital such that learning capabilities are enhanced in all 
parts of the economy – the central concern of studies on innovation system.  
In the similar vein, The World Bank (2000) underlined the role of following factors; an educated and 
skilled population that can create and use knowledge, a dynamic national Information Infrastructure 
(NII) that consists of telecommunication networks, strategic information systems and the policy and 
legal frameworks affecting their deployment, an interlinked system of research centers, universities, 
firms and other organizations that can tap into the growing stock of global knowledge, assimilate and 
adapt it to local needs and create new knowledge.  All these can be grouped into what is now referred 
to in the literature as an innovation system.   
Drawing from the above discussion it may be inferred the liberalized trade could at best be construed as a 
necessary condition for promoting ICT production and use and the sufficient condition being a vibrant 
innovation system at the national, regional and the sectoral level. 
 
 
3. Performance of ICT Sector  
In this section we shall analyze the performance of ICT sector in India with due attention to ICT 
software ICT hardware and ICT use. The analysis is based on data gathered from different sources. The 
data on software production, employment and exports is accessed from Electronics and Software Export 
Promotion Council, Statistical Year book and Economic Survey, Government of India. The data on 
hardware read as electronics is obtained from Department of Electronics and the Annual Survey of 
Industries published by Central Statistical Organisation. The data on exports and imports of electronic 
products is availed from UN COMTRADE using World Integrated Trade Systems (WITS). We have 
used ISIC Revision 3 and HS 1988/92.  The data on R&D, import of capital goods and royalties is 
taken from Prowess provided by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy.  
Performance of Software Sector 
In what follows, we shall make use of the data provided by the Electronics and Software Export 
Promotion Council for the trend analysis.  Here, total software exports and production include 
software services, Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) and software products along with engineering 
research and design (mostly embedded software) –hereafter referred to as software products. Data 
presented in the table 1 clearly reinforces the findings of earlier studies which indicated that the 
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performance of software sector during the last two decades has been remarkable by any standard. 
During the decade of 1990s the total production of software sector increased by 26 fold; from a little 
over $200 million in 1990-91 to US $5.5 billion in 1999-00, recording an annual average growth rate 
of over 44 per cent.  With a total production of about $75 billion in 2010-11, the observed high rate of 
growth during 1990s was sustained since 2000 recording an annual average rate of growth of over 35 
per cent. 
More remarkable has been the performance with respect to exports. Total exports increased from 
$ 110 million 1990-91 to nearly $ 4 Billion in 1999-00 recording an annual average growth rate of 
about 50 percent. Going by the available evidence, with a total export of $ 57.6 billion in 2010-11 the 
observed rate of growth was as high as 38 per cent since 2000 (see table 1) Thus viewed, in a context 
wherein India has been severely constrained by the availability of foreign exchange, software sector 
contributed significantly towards improving the external health of the economy. 
Table 1: Trend in software production and export (including BPO) from India 
Year 
Software 
production 
($ Million)  
Annual 
growth rate 
(%) 
Exports 
 ($ Million) 
Annual growth 
rate (%) 
1990-91 209   110   
1991-92 289 38.3 166 50.9 
1992-93 382 32.2 221 33.1 
1993-94 545 42.7 325 47.1 
1994-95 803 47.3 473 45.5 
1995-96 1182 47.2 711 50.3 
1996-97 1798 52.1 1159 63 
1997-98 2929 62.9 1813 56.4 
1998-99 4009 36.9 2599 43.4 
1999-00 5538 38.1 3962 52.4 
Average growth 1991-
99   44.2   49.1 
2000-01 8021 44.8 5978 50.9 
2001-02 9931 23.8 7653 28 
2002-03 12376 24.6 9607 25.5 
2003-04 16141 30.4 12608 31.2 
2004-05 21587 33.7 17216 36.5 
2005-06 30404 40.8 23718 37.8 
2006-07 42312 39.2 33757 42.3 
2007-08 55144 30.3 43467 28.8 
2008-09 61984 12.4 49540 14 
2009-10 64956 4.8 51001 2.9 
2010-11 74890 15.3 57616 13 
Average growth 
 2000-10  35.3  38.2 
Source: Electronics and Software Export Promotion Council, Statistical Year book, different years. 
Note: Software includes the software services, software products and BPOs 
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Table 1 also indicates that with global financial crisis that affected initially the US - the leading 
market for India - and later spread to Europe, has had its adverse effect. This is evident from the 
drastic decline in the rate of growth in export from over 36 per cent in 2007-08 to 6.6 percent in 2008-
09. However as these economies are reviving from crisis, the adverse effect appears to have been short 
lived because the rate of growth in export also picked up as is evident from the higher export growth 
of nearly 24 per cent recorded in 2010-11. 
Software in India’s GDP and employment 
Being one of the fastest growing sectors in the Indian economy software industry has also contributed 
towards the turnaround in India’s GDP growth observed since 1991.  Share of software production, 
which includes software services, software products and BPO, in GDP increased from 1.85% in 2000-
01 to the highest level of 5.37% in 2008-09.  Thereafter it has shown a marginal decline to reach 4.7% 
in 2010-11(Table 2). It is also evident that in the service sector driven growth of the Indian economy 
recorded during the recent years, software sector played a significant role as its share in service sector 
GDP increased by threefold since 2000. Equally remarkable has been its contribution in total exports 
which nearly doubled from 7.7 per cent in 2000-01 to 14.8 per cent in 2009-10 (see table 2)   
Table 2: Contribution of software sector to India’s GDP and exports 
Year % of GDP % of Service GDP % of total exports % of Service exports 
2000-01 1.85 6.48 7.73 18.61 
2006-07 4.63 16.76 13.27 28.23 
2007-08 4.85 17.55 13.82 29.26 
2008-09 5.37 18.40 13.99 29.57 
2009-10 5.06 16.68 14.77 31.24 
2010-11 4.77 15.57 12.86 29.09 
Source: Data on GDP: Government of India, Economic Survey 2012-13 
Data on software production and export: Electronics and Software Export Promotion Council, 
Statistical yearbook different issues; Software includes the software services, software products and 
BPOs 
 
According to NASSCOM Strategic Review (2012), the direct employment generated by the software 
industry (software services, products, BPO and hardware) is estimated at 2.54 million in 2011 as 
compared to 160,000 in 1996.  It is also estimated that the indirect employment is about four times the 
direct employment.  The industry is creating job opportunities for highly qualified (majority with an 
engineering degree) young graduates with a relatively short experience. 
The observed performance of software sector in employment generation appears highly impressive 
when considered against the fact that employment generation by the organized manufacturing sector 
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has been on the decline during 1990s (Nagaraj 2004) and according to NSS statistics during 1999-00 
to 2004-05 growth in employment in the rural and urban areas has been only of the order of 1.97 per 
cent and 3.22 per cent respectively (Chandrsekhar et al 2006). While contributing significantly to 
GDP, export earnings and employment the industry has been undergoing major transformation within.  
Changing direction of exports  
There is also evidence to suggest that the export market is becoming more diversified. Table 3 
indicates that the share of North America, traditionally the leading destination of India’s software 
exports has declined by more than six per centage points since 2005 while that of EU countries 
increased.  
Table 3: Changes in the direction of software exports (including BPO) 
  
  
Destination 
Software  
2005-06 2010-11 
Value 
($Million) 
Share (%) Value 
($ Million) 
Share (%) 
North America  14727.81 62.10 32265.14 56.0 
Europe (EU countries) 6098.94 25.71 17954.35 31.16 
Singapore, Hongkong & 
Other south Asian Countries 
632.48 2.67 1843.72 3.2 
Japan Korea & Other Far east 
counties 
722.84 3.05 749.12 1.3 
Middle East Countries 564.72 2.38 1728.49 3 
Europe(Non EU counties) 496.95 2.1 633.89 1.1 
Australia & Other Oceanic 
counties 
293.65 1.24 979.59 1.7 
African Countries 96 0.4 691.4 1.2 
Latin America  79.06 0.33 576.16 1 
Russia & C.I.S Counties 5.65 0.02 194.47 0.34 
Total 23718.09 100 57616.33 100 
Source: Electronics and Software Export Promotion Council, Statistical Year book, different years 
 
There are also evidence to suggest in the shares of Africa and Latin America have increased, though 
remaining at a very low level, which in turn cannot be delinked from India’s regional trading 
arrangements and initiatives for greater integration with these countries under the auspices of IBSA 
and BRICS.  Asian countries are yet to occupy a significant position in in India’s software export. In 
case of Japan Korea & Other Far east counties, their share almost halved. When it comes to Singapore, 
Hongkong & Other south Asian Countries though their share increased, the observed increase was 
marginal. 
Trend in domestic sales  
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Given that the domestic use of software could be instrumental in enhancing competitiveness of all the 
sectors of the economy and the welfare of all sections of the society, the social marginal benefit of a 
dollar worth of ICT consumed domestically could be much higher than that of a dollar worth of 
software exported (Joseph 2002).  In the current context where international competitiveness is the 
key to survival for all the sectors of the economy and that the major export markets are in the grip of 
crisis and growing opposition to offshoring of jobs, it is of relevance to examine if there has been an 
increased focus on domestic market by the Indian software industry.  
However, there are again serious data limitations to address this issue. The reported data on domestic 
sales is likely to involve gross underestimation of domestic consumption because it will not include 
those software services rendered by the software personnel employed by the users. In India the 
common practice with larger organization with legacy systems have been to employ in-house software 
professionals for software development. The software development and maintenance undertaken by 
such professionals will not get reported as domestic sales where as such services, if rendered by a 
software company will be recorded in domestic sales. Just like the man who married his housemaid 
would reduce GDP, the commonly prevalent practice of appointing in-house software personnel is 
likely to reduce the value of domestic consumption of software. As per NASSCOM (2011) even today 
the common practice is to undertake most of the software development work in-house supported by a 
software firm. Even in 2010, the extent of software development outsourcing ranged between only 20 
to 70 per cent across different sectors with telecom at the highest with 70 percent.  
 
Table 4: Trend in Domestic sale of Software and share of domestic market in total production 
Year 
Domestic 
Sale ($ Mill) 
Annual 
growth rate 
(%) 
Domestic market 
share in 
production (%) 
1990-91 99   47.37 
1991-92 123 24.2 42.56 
1992-93 161 30.9 42.15 
1993-94 222 37.9 40.73 
1994-95 330 48.6 41.1 
1995-96 471 42.7 39.85 
1996-97 724 53.7 40.27 
1997-98 1150 58.8 39.26 
1998-99 1379 19.9 34.4
1999-00 1537 11.5 27.75 
Decadal growth   36.5   
2000-01 2043 32.9 25.47 
2001-02 2278 11.5 22.94 
2002-03 2769 21.6 22.37 
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2003-04 3533 27.6 21.89 
2004-05 4371 23.7 20.25 
2005-06 6686 53 21.99 
2006-07 8555 28 20.22 
2007-08 11677 36.5 21.17 
2008-09 12444 6.6 20.08 
2009-10 13955 12.1 21.48 
2010-11 17274 23.8 23.07
Average growth 
2000-10   30.6   
Source: Same as table 2; Total exports include software services, BPO and Software products 
including embedded software. 
 
Nonetheless, table 4 indicates that the domestic sales of software have also been highly vibrant and it 
is more so in the recent years. The observed rate of growth in the sale of software in the domestic 
market recorded an annual average rate of growth of over 36 per cent during 1990s, albeit from a 
lower base and over 30 per cent since 2000. Here it is worth noting that while the rate of growth in 
exports declined by 11 per cent (see table 1) as we move from the first period (1990s) to the second 
period (since 2000), the recorded rate of decline in domestic sale was only at much lower pace of 
about six per cent. More importantly, until 2005-06 the recorded annual rate of growth in the export of 
software in all the years was consistently higher than that of domestic sales.  However, since 2005-06 
there has been a reversal wherein the rate of growth in domestic sales exceeded that of exports in all 
the six years, the exception being only two years wherein export growth was marginally higher.   
Table 4 also indicates that the share of domestic sales in total production has been showing a steady 
decline until 2004-05 to reach the lowest level of 20 per cent. However, after 2004-05, despite a 
vibrant export market, the decline in the share of domestic market observed up to 2004-05 got arrested. 
If the empirical evidence for the last three years is any indication, a turnaround towards domestic 
market has already set in because; it is for the first time since 1991 that the share of domestic market 
has shown an upward trend consecutively for three years from 20.08 per cent in 2008-09 to 23.07 per 
cent in 2010-11.  
On the whole India’s performance in the IT software sector appears to be impressive and is considered 
inspirational for other developing countries (Joseph 2002 2007). Scholars have also argued that there 
is much for ASEAN countries especially the new comers to learn for India’s experience (Kumar and 
Joseph 2007).  
Performance of IT Hardware (electronics) 
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In its broad sense the IT industries comprises of both IT hardware and IT software. The latter 
comprises of software products and software services that also include the IT enabled services.  The 
former comprises not only computer hardware but also the whole lot of other electronic goods that are 
used in information gathering, processing and dissemination. India is one of the pioneering developing 
countries to make deliberate policy measures and institutional interventions as early in the mid-1960s 
towards developing an electronic production base in the country.  The strategy during the early years 
was on self-reliant growth in tune with the then general industrial/technology policy framework5. The 
strategy was to build up on a deliberately derivative basis, an integrated structure so as to meet the 
requirements on the basis of local manufacturing (Department of Electronics 1979). Hence the Indian 
plans, while assigning due role for the private sector that was in its infancy, envisaged a greater role for 
the public sector units set up by the central government and various regional level public sector units like 
Kelton (in Kerala), Uptron (in UP), Meltron (in Maharashtra) and others established by the state 
governments. Above all the importance of technological self-reliance was upheld and given the 
disenchantment with FDI, the strategy envisaged limited role for foreign investment. To bring out the 
desired changes, the government used a variety of control instruments relating inter alia to investment and 
trade like the Industries (Development and regulation) Act, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practice 
Act, (MRTPA) Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) and other measures.  
The strategy remained more or less the same in essence for a decade or so. In a general environment 
wherein the economy has been faced with diminishing returns to increased restrictions, the Government 
acted on the recommendations of the Sondhi Committee and Menon Committee (Govt of India 
Department of Electronics 1981). The result was a gradual, but steady, move towards a market oriented 
policy regime in the 1980s through a series of policy changes marking the second phase.  These policy 
changes sought a liberal climate, both internally and externally, through dilution of the industrial licensing, 
relaxations of MRTPA and FERA provisions, liberalization of imports and greater access to foreign 
capital and technology. Moreover, considerable relaxations were effected in the fiscal regime including 
reduction in direct taxes and reduction in excise duties to provide a more propitious economic climate for 
private sector in the Indian industrial economy. 
The new industrial policy of July 1991 set the beginning of the third phase marked by further 
liberalization in industrial licensing and greater outward orientation. In general the 1990s witnessed 
the removal of industrial licensing for most of the products except a few products of strategic 
significance, and further liberalization with respect to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and technology 
                                                 
5 The resolution, which set up the Electronics Commission in 1971, stated "the government attached the highest 
importance to the development of an integrated and self-reliant electronics industry in the country. ....an 
intensive promotional effort relating to both production and research & development was, therefore essential to 
ensure a rapid growth of self-reliance" (Department of Electronics 1982 p.14).   
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import along with series of fiscal and trade policy reforms to facilitate production and outward 
orientation. Further as signatory to the Information Technology Agreement of WTO, import duties on 
all the Information and Technology Agreement (ITA) goods have been phased out by 20056. The 
policy reforms were based on the basic premise that there is an inexorable link between trade and 
investment, which is apparently much stronger in electronics as compared to most other industries. 
Hence the restrictive trade policies have had their adverse effect on the performance of the industry in 
the past. To be more specific, in the global production network, which today characterizes electronics, 
production of each of the component or sub assembly is made across different countries according to 
their comparative advantage such that the overall cost of production is minimized. This essentially 
means that the production in any country will call for significant imports and the output made will 
have to be exported to other countries rather than sold in the domestic market.  Hence, if the 
production, and therefore investment, in IT to take place in any country, the trade regime needs to be 
the one wherein the free flow of inputs into and outputs out of the economy is ensured. 
Over the years the ownership profile of the industry has changed and its evolution in the computer 
hardware industry provides a broad indication of the way in which electronics industry evolved over the 
years. Broadly, once could discern following phases in its evolution. The first phase was marked by 
foreign domination followed by a period of where the public sector controlled the commanding heights. 
During the third phase the private sector firms began to dominate and in the final phase which coincided 
with the globalization phase the foreign firms again has taken control over the industry. 
Broadly, the performance of electronics industry since 1980-81 could be analyzed, based on policy 
changes, in two periods - with 1991 as the cut off. The post 1990s may be again divided into two sub-
periods with 1997 as the cut off. This is justified by the trade liberalization measures undertaken at the 
instance of ITA in 1996 and number of institutional intervention and new policy initiatives since 1997 
like the formation of a separate ministry for IT & electronics, reorganization and merger of DoE/DIT 
autonomous bodies, attempts at hardware promotion, fiscal incentives, etc. In the light of various 
policy changes, Figure 1 shows the number of factories in the industry from 1980-81 to 2012-13 
which roughly explains the size of the Industry.   
Figure 1: Number of Factories 
                                                 
6 Recognizing the potential of Electronics/IT industry, the Prime Minister set up a National Task Force on 
Information Technology and Software Development in May, 1998. The Task Force was of the view that 
hardware industry and the software industry are two sides of the same coin, the success of one, whether it is 
export of software of $50 billion by 2008 or IT penetration drive for realizing “IT for all” by 2008, depends 
on the concomitant success of the other.  
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Source: Annual Survey of Industries, Various Years 
 
From Figure.1 it could be observed that number of factories have gradually increased from just over 
800 in 1980-81 to 1600 in 1998-99 and declined thereafter. Here it is important to note that post ITA 
period witnessed drastic decline in the number of factories, which indicates closing down of the units 
that could not withstand the heightened competition under trade liberalization. However, the number 
of factories has started increasing after 2006-07. The decline in factories after ITA is contributed 
mostly by consumer electronics as it shows a highest decline. 
However, number of factories does not provide clear understanding on the performance of the industry 
over the years. Therefore, we presented simple annual growth rates in the output growth of the 
industry in Figure 2. As the figure depicts, the growth rate of output shows an increasing trend till 
1988 and declined after thereafter. The trend is consistent with all the sub-sectors of the industry.  A 
recent study (Joseph 2005) that covered up to 2002 found that during the first phase the recorded 
output growth of total electronics output was substantially higher (28.6 per cent) as compared to the 
second period (13.8 per cent). As we move to the period since 1997, series of institutional 
interventions and policy reforms not withstanding, there has not been any marked increase in the 
recorded rate of output growth but a marginal decline (11.2 per cent).  Figure 2 tend to suggest that the 
trend continues even in 2006 though there has been a recent revival in the electronics capital goods 
driven mostly by the communication equipment. 
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Figure 2. Annual Growth Rates in Production of Electronic Goods 
 
Source: Department of Electronics, Various years 
It is important to note that simple annual growth rates do not really convey the industry’s performance 
and hence, we present annual average growth rates (see Table 5). We have presented the growth rates 
during the last three decades and the average growth of the industry before and after the ITA 
agreement. The table 5 shows that electronics industry has registered an impressive growth rate of 
27.4 percent during the pre-liberalization period (1980-90). However, the growth could not be 
sustained as we could observe a decline in growth rates during first and decades of liberalization, 
16.88 percent during 1990-00 and 12.98 percent during 2000-12. The industry has grown at 23.99 
percent during pre ITA period and it drastically declined to 12.08 percent during the post ITA period. 
These growth trends are consistent across three sub- groups of the industry. The electronics 
components have grown at faster rate than the consumer electronics and electronic capital goods. This 
trend could be attributed to global production network, which today characterizes electronics, 
production of each of the component or sub assembly is made across different countries according to 
their comparative advantage such that the overall cost of production is minimized. This essentially 
means that the production in any country will call for significant imports and the output made will 
have to be exported to other countries rather than sold in the domestic market.  
Table 5: Decadal Growth in Electronics Output 
Year 1980-90 1990-00 2000-12 1980-96 1996-2012 
Intermediate goods 32.71 27.63 13.77 28.79 13.88 
Consumer Goods 25.73 20.92 11.29 18.41 10.74 
Capital goods 26.74 10.74 14.57 29.69 12.41 
Total 27.38 16.88 12.98 23.99 12.08 
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 Source: Same as Figure 1 
 
The table 6 presents employment growth of electronics industry. As we move from the decade of 1980s to 
1990s there was a drastic decline in the employment for the sector as a whole and in electronic consumer 
goods and electronic capital goods.  However, when it comes to the decade since 2000, thanks to the 
electronic capital goods, there was a revival in the employment growth for the sector as a whole.  
Table 6: Decadal growth in employment 
Year 1980-90 1990-00 2000-12 1980-96 1996-2012 
Intermediate goods 10.41 9.64 5.97 8.65 5.34 
Consumer Goods 1.82 2.53 -0.90 -2.37 -2.66 
Capital goods 6.40 -4.02 4.29 10.30 1.31 
Total 5.34 0.60 4.08 4.29 1.92 
 Source: Same as Figure 1 
 
Emerging picture is highly discouraging when we compare the post ITA period with the pre ITA period.  
While the employment for the sector as a whole was about 4.3 per cent during the pre ITA period it 
declined to less than two per cent during the post ITA period.  More importantly, the decline in 
employment was observed in the entire three product categories as well with more pronounced decline in 
the electronic capital goods wherein the employment growth declined from over 10 percent to a little over 
one per cent during the post ITA period. 
 
Having observed broad trends in output and employment, we have analyzed the extent of value addition 
taking place in the industry. The figure shows that the share of value addition in output has been showing 
a declining trend over the last three decades. It has declined from 30 percent in 1980-81 to 15 percent in 
2012-13. This trend is consistent across all the sub-groups.  
 
On the whole, the foregoing analysis tends to suggest that while India’s performance in ICT software 
and services has been remarkable the electronics sector (ICT goods) presented a different picture. 
While the electronics in general |and the product categories therein have shown an impressive 
performance during 1980s in terms of growth in output and employment.it did not did not sustain 
during the decades that followed. In what follows we shall try to explore the bearing of trade 
liberalization and ASEAN integration on the observed trend in electronics. 
 
 
 
201 
 
Figure 3: Share of Net Value Added in Output 
 
Source: Same as Figure 1 
 
4. Trade liberalization and ASEAN Integration 
During the pre-liberalization phase India aimed at developing an integrated electronics sector with 
greater role for the public sector (Joseph 1997).  With globalization, India’s strategy towards 
electronics also has undergone major change with greater reliance on private sector and FDI along 
with reducing the tariff barriers.  The trade liberalization strategy gathered momentum with India, as 
one of the founding members of ITA, agreed to do away with tariffs on electronics goods. The 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA) of WTO, initiated by the private sector, aimed at 
liberalizing trade in IT products as a means of promoting the use and production of IT products. Since 
the demand for IT products is known to be price elastic, ITA has been expected to result in their 
enhanced access by reduced prices inter alia through getting rid of their tariffs (also other duties and 
charges) and heightened competition induced by trade liberalization.  Given the link between trade 
and investment in assembly based industries like IT products, it was also expected to strengthen and 
widen the Global Production Network (GPN) in IT products with an increased participation by 
developing countries.  ITA required elimination of tariffs on goods coming under its ambit in maximal 
four stages until 2000. However, developing countries could opt for extending their staging until 
20057. Participating countries are required to abide by the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle. 
                                                 
7 The exact text of the ITA, including the product coverage, can be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/inftec_e.htm 
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Hence, the benefits of zero tariffs are extended to those WTO members who did not sign the ITA 
without having to provide similar access to their own markets in return.  Even today ITA is mainly a 
tariff reduction mechanism as the review of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) has not yet come to any 
definite conclusion. 
Along with the multilateral trade liberalization under ITA, India has also been integrating intensively 
with ASEAN.  In fact, the look east policy that coincided with its adoption of globalization, has led to 
a virtual transformation of India’s relationship with ASEAN. Thus within a period of 10 years (1992-
2002) India’s position with ASEAN improved from sectoral dialogue partner to a Summit-level 
interaction. It scaled new heights with the signing of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and India at the Bali Summit in October 2003 and FTA in 
goods signed in 1999.  Scholars have argued that great potential existed for India-ASEAN cooperation 
in information and communication technologies.  While ASEAN could make use of India’s strength in 
IT software and IT-enabled services to strengthen and complement their own emerging capability in 
IT hardware India could benefit from their hardware capability (Parayil and Joseph 2005). Parayil and 
Joseph(2005) among others, also called for greater interactive learning between these countries by 
linking their innovation systems. This was envisaged through facilitating frequent meetings between 
the IT business community in India and ASEAN and joint projects involving joint research and 
production by private sector firms to exploit the synergies between the hardware capabilities of 
ASEAN and the software capabilities of India.   
Trade Performance 
As mentioned earlier, India has followed self-reliant growth in tune with the then general 
industrial/technology policy framework in building electronics industry. The industry has remained in-
ward oriented until 1991. Further, given the strong link between trade and investment in the industry, 
India signed ITA in order to reap the benefits of global production network, which today characterizes 
electronics, production of each of the component or sub assembly is made across different countries 
according to their comparative advantage such that the overall cost of production is minimized. The 
table shows that there is an increase in both exports and imports of the industry over the years. 
However, it should be noted that imports have always been higher than exports and imports of the 
electronics industry have been constantly growing.  Exports of the electronics sector have increased 
from 0.2 billion dollars in 1990 to 0.44 billion dollars in 2000 and further increased to 6.61 billion 
dollars by the end of 2012. At the same time, imports increased at a much faster pace. Imports 
increased from 0.74 billion dollars in 1990 to 2.73 billion in 2000 and further it has increased to 24.95 
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billion by the end of 2012.  The National Electronics policy 2012 states that if the imports of the 
electronics continue to increase at this rate, in value terms it will surpass crude oil imports in next 10 
years. There is a massive import of electronics imports particularly after ITA. The trade balance of 
electronics industry indicates that since the beginning of 1990s, India has a fast growing trade deficit 
in electronics industry, as the imports are always higher than exports. The trade deficit was 0.53 
billion dollars in 1990, which has increased to 2.19 billion dollars in 2001 and further, increased to 
19.34 billion dollars in 2012.  This is contributed by rapid increase in the imports after the ITA.     
 
 
 
 
 Table 7: Trade Performance of the Electronics Industry 
Year 
Total Exports 
(Billion US$) 
Total Imports 
(Billion US$) 
Output 
(Billion US$) 
Trade Balance 
(Billion US$) 
Domestic 
Availability Ratio
1990 0.2 0.74 5.11 -0.53 0.90 
1991 0.21 0.49 3.95 -0.28 0.93 
1992 0.17 0.68 3.71 -0.50 0.88 
1993 0.2 0.62 4.15 -0.42 0.91 
1994 0.29 0.9 4.92 -0.61 0.89 
1995 0.5 1.3 5.2 -0.80 0.87 
1996 0.6 1.09 5.51 -0.48 0.92 
1997 0.48 1.62 5.83 -1.14 0.84 
1998 0.26 1.72 5.89 -1.46 0.80 
1999 0.33 2.18 6.4 -1.84 0.78 
2000 0.44 2.73 6.77 -2.29 0.75 
2001 0.65 2.79 6.75 -2.139 0.76 
2002 0.65 3.86 7.61 -3.20 0.70 
2003 0.8 5.83 9.29 -5.03 0.65 
2004 1.03 7.79 11.08 -6.75 0.62 
2005 1.05 10.15 12.31 -9.1 0.57 
2006 1.31 13.06 14.22 -11.74 0.55 
2007 1.49 15.63 20.97 -14.14 0.60 
2008 1.92 13.18 20.59 -11.26 0.65 
2009 5.74 19.05 23.18 -13.31 0.64 
2010 4.45 20.77 27.61 -16.31 0.63 
2011 6.68 25.77 29.85 -19.08 0.61 
2012 5.61 24.95 32.87 -19.34 0.63 
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Source: UNCOMTRADE and Annual Survey of Industries 
From the available evidence thus far, it is evident that there is growing demand for electronics in India. 
Increasingly, India depended on imports to meet the domestic demand. One could argue, given the 
evidence that imports substituted the domestic production which resulted in decline in rate of growth 
of output particularly after the ITA.  The table also indicates declining domestic availability ratio. The 
domestic availability ratio was about 90 percent in 1990 and it steadily declined to 63 percent by the 
end of 2012.  
In the context of our finding that India’s trade in electronics industry is increasing, it is important to 
analyse the major trading partners and particularly India’s engagement with the ASEAN and other 
major Asian countries as they are leaders in the industry. The table 8 presents direction of India’s 
electronics exports. We have taken ASEAN, China, Japan Korea and rest of the world to analyze the 
direction of trade. Of the total electronics exports, India exported to 7.7 percent to ASEAN in 1988, 
which increased to nearly 40 percent in 2001. However, India’s exports to ASEAN have started 
declining from 2001 and by the end of 2014 ASEAN position (8%) has returned to its level in 1988.  
Table 8:  India’s Direction of Trade in Electronics 
 
Relative Share of Exports in Total 
Electronics Exports Relative Share of Imports in Total Imports
Year ASEAN  China  Japan  Korea 
Rest of 
the 
World ASEAN China Japan  Korea  
Rest 
of the 
World
1988 7.72 0.00 0.23 0.29 91.77 15.19 0.04 27.81 6.63 50.32
1989 10.84 0.02 0.47 0.01 88.65 14.37 0.08 31.48 4.90 49.18
1990 16.33 0.12 0.21 0.08 83.27 17.81 0.06 28.14 2.27 51.73
1991 9.78 0.01 0.09 0.03 90.09 16.25 0.06 27.21 3.67 52.81
1992 26.26 0.03 0.32 0.07 73.32 15.35 0.61 21.80 2.07 60.17
1993 28.22 0.03 0.11 0.18 71.45 20.45 2.00 20.99 2.43 54.13
1994 33.72 0.28 0.27 0.15 65.58 22.14 2.45 17.95 3.49 53.97
1995 36.04 0.36 0.52 0.32 62.76 23.84 3.36 13.37 4.36 55.07
1996 23.40 0.19 1.07 0.13 75.21 28.64 4.13 9.12 5.68 52.44
1997 21.05 0.94 0.95 0.28 76.79 28.86 5.92 8.58 4.79 51.86
1998 16.68 1.01 3.30 0.37 78.64 30.04 8.42 9.14 5.97 46.43
1999 27.65 0.87 2.88 0.99 67.60 34.77 7.22 7.03 4.48 46.50
2000 29.90 1.15 1.32 1.16 66.47 37.29 7.79 5.07 4.28 45.56
2001 39.42 0.28 1.45 0.72 58.13 34.06 9.88 5.20 8.38 42.49
2002 15.27 0.78 1.66 0.72 81.57 24.02 16.86 3.84 7.19 48.09
2003 13.96 1.61 0.56 0.30 83.58 21.24 18.45 3.64 17.84 38.83
2004 16.35 1.77 0.42 0.41 81.05 23.20 23.45 2.85 14.11 36.38
2005 9.26 1.93 0.54 0.39 87.88 21.60 27.94 3.02 16.16 31.28
2006 13.07 2.24 0.49 0.23 83.97 21.15 32.88 2.68 10.13 33.17
2007 12.69 2.93 0.26 0.56 83.57 18.46 42.80 2.79 4.23 31.71
2008 13.13 2.22 0.36 1.10 83.19 16.52 46.45 2.68 7.03 27.31
2009 20.93 2.96 0.47 0.31 75.33 15.33 48.07 3.84 5.36 27.40
2010 10.48 2.84 0.33 0.17 86.18 16.74 51.92 2.25 6.35 22.75
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2011 8.86 3.59 0.16 0.29 87.10 16.96 47.87 2.62 5.45 27.10
2012 8.05 3.28 0.32 0.34 88.00 18.59 51.53 2.39 3.82 23.66
2013 8.81 3.46 0.66 0.46 86.62 19.64 56.76 1.63 4.92 17.04
2014 10.79 5.43 0.89 0.92 81.98 17.35 58.04 1.47 6.38 16.76
Source: UNCOMTRADE 
India hardly had any exports to China in 1988 but its share has gradually increased to 1.1 percent of 
total exports in 2001 and further increased to 5.43 percent in 2014. The relative share of Japan in total 
exports was about 0.23 percent in 1998 and increased up to 3.30 percent in 1998. But it declined from 
1999 onwards and it is about 0.89 percent in 2014. It appears that Japan is yet to appreciate the 
potential that Indian economy offers and this is broadly in tune with (Esho, 2001) that considering 
India a poor economy, Japan’s highest contribution of ODA not FDI has been to India. The relative 
share of Korea has been very less and largely remained less than 1 percent throughout the last two 
decades expect in the year 2000 and 2008. From the table it is evident that large proportion of India’s 
electronic exports is going to non-Asian countries. Of the total India’s electronic exports, 91.77 
percent went to non-Asian countries in 1990. The share has gradually declined to 58 percent in 2001 
and increased to 81 percent in 2014. The broad trends reveal that despite efforts to integrate India’s 
trade with ASEAN leaders such Malaysia and Singapore, India’s exports to these countries did not 
increase particularly after 2001. 
Contrary to exports, where relative shares of partners by and large remained same, direction of 
imports shows a dynamic picture. Imports of from countries other than ASEAN, Japan Korea has been 
declining constantly. Secondly, among the Asian countries, India used to import electronic goods from 
Japan. However, its import share has declined from over 27 percent in 1988 to nearly 5 percent in 
2000 and further decreased to 1.47 percent in 2014. The relative share of ASEAN has been increasing 
from 7.72 percent in 1988 to 37 percent in 2001 and started declining thereafter. Imports from 
ASEAN have declined to 17.35 percent in 2014. Imports from non-Asian countries have declined 
from 50.32 percent in 1988 to 42 percent in 2000 and further declined to 16.76 in 2014. The relative 
share of imports from China has shown a massive increase. Its share increased from 0.04 percent in 
1988 to 9.98 percent in 2001. From 2001 to 2014 the imports from China have increased by many 
folds and today (2014) its share is as high as 58 percent. From the evidence, we could tentatively infer 
that India’s electronic goods import basket consist of products from China. One could even infer that 
the decline in rate of electronics output in India could be attributed to excessive dependence on 
imports from China.   
Whither innovation system  
While trade and investment liberalization could at best be considered as a necessary condition for 
facilitating the production and use of ICT, the sufficient condition is the presence of a vibrant 
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innovation system. The innovation system framework by now emerged as the most popular approach 
in innovation studies (Fagerberg and Sapprasert 2011) highlights the role of learning and innovation, 
facilitated inter alia through the interactions between different actors involved. In the context of 
globalization, wherein innovation systems have become global in nature, the role of interaction 
between with actors outside the country is equally important as interaction between actors within the 
country. In a sense, this is also broadly in line with the arguments by Coe and Helpman (1995). The 
issue of relevance here is to what extent learning innovation and competence building have been built 
up in India’s ICT sector through trade liberalization and integration with ASEAN. This however, is an 
issue that requires a separate enquiry. The preliminary evidence Figure 4, with respect ICT hardware, 
tends to suggest low level of competence building. 
Figure 4: Technological Capabilities 
 
Source: PROWESS, various years 
 
 
Figure 4 provides proxies for both domestic and international interaction, which could lead to 
capability building. It is evident that share of import of capital goods (embodied technology), mostly 
undertaken by the producers has been on the decline. This tends to suggest that the increased import 
that the study reported earlier has been mostly for final demand, indicating interaction between 
producers’ abroad and traders within the country. The learning impact of such interaction is bound to 
be limited in the domestic economy. Similarly, the figure also shows that interaction with other 
knowledge generating actors has also been on the decline along with declining in house production of 
knowledge as evident from share of R&D expenditure in output.  
5. Conclusion 
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ICT is often considered as a general-purpose technology of the new millennium with its profound 
influence on all aspects of human life. For harnessing its potential for development without 
perpetuation of technological dependence, studies have underlined the need for developing the 
capabilities in its production and use. Trade and investment liberalization has often been advocated as 
the means of promoting its production and use. The present paper analyzed the performance of India’s 
ICT sector in terms of its production and use against the backdrop of India’s commitment to trade 
liberalization under ITA and growing integration with ASEAN countries 
The study reiterated the remarkable performance of software production and export which has been 
attributed, inter alia to the innovation system that was built up over the years.  The study also 
highlighted the recent trend towards greater orientation towards domestic market.  When it comes to 
IT hardware (electronics) the performance was rather unsatisfactory during the period wherein India 
embraced trade liberalization as a development strategy with the signing of ITA. Not only that, the 
output growth decelerated, employment growth became negligible, extent of value addition almost 
halved and finally the trade deficit boomed to threatened even to cross the deficit on account of oil 
imports. While Indian has been making concerned efforts under its look East policy to integrate with 
ASEAN and also Japan and South Korea, the available evidence tends to suggest that India is yet to 
graduate from ‘looking East’ to ‘acting East’. India’s export and import to ASEAN and electronics 
leaders like Japan and Korea declined to reach negligible level at present. Thanks to growing domestic 
demand, India’s imports by and large is confined to final demand goods almost entirely from China. It 
tends to suggest that the nature of trade integration that India had with the rest of the world, seems to 
have not resulted in interactive learning that is expected of in a globally integrated National 
Innovation System. In the case of hardware, to the extent that import has been mostly of final goods, 
interaction has been mostly with traders within the country with hardly any learning opportunities for 
the domestic producers. When it comes to import of capital goods with potential for interactive 
leaning, the trend has been on the decline. The limited scope for interactive learning in hardware has 
to be contrasted with the interaction in the software industry through exports, which offered much 
learning opportunities.  To throw further light on the issue at hand there is the need for more in depth 
inquiries into the nature and extent of integration of India’s electronics industry with the global 
production network and the extent of integration between global production network and the 
innovation system in India. This is however an area for further enquiry.  
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1. Introduction
• According to Embassy of Japan in India and
JETRO, # of Japanese companies: 926 in
20121072 in 2013  1209 in 2014 and # of
establishments of Japanese companies: 1804
in 20122542 in 2013  3961 in 2014.
• The most successful cases: Maruti Suzuki and
Honda.
• The most disappointed Cases: Daiichi Sankyo‐
Ranbaxy and Tata DoCoMo
3
• Examples of recent important events: Soft Bank,
UNIQLO, Unicharm, ``Japanese Village’’ by JGC
Corporation and Mizuho, Western Dedicated
Freight Corridor by Sojitz, US‐2 by Sinmaywa,
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
(CEPA), ``Special’’ Global Partnership, Japan‐Plus
and so on.
• Many think tanks and industrial associations
release the reports on the Japanese companies
working in India. Many scholars also do.
• To the best of my knowledge, however, there are
no academically serious research on the Japanese
companies working in India.
4
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Academic Contribution of This Study
• Making of ``population list’’ of Japanese
companies attached with the basic corporate
information.
• Based on it, a questionnaire survey was done
to all companies of ``population list.’’ The
current situation of the 113 responding
companies is investigated. The difference
between responding and non‐responding
companies is also studied.
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2. Overview of Japanese Companies
in India 
1. Ministry of Finance, Situation of Outward and
Inward Direct Investment, and Process of
Outward/ Inward Direct Investment.
2. Research Institute for Economics and Business
Administration, Kobe University, Multinational
Corporation Database (Toyokeizai, Kaigai
Sinsyutsu Kigyo Souran).
3. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Survey
of Overseas Business Activities.
6
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Foreign Direct Investments from Japan to India
JP yen in hundred of million
Source: Author’s elaboration based on  MOF “Situation of Outward and Inward Direct 
Investment” for 1989‐2004 and “Process of Outward/Inward Direct Investment” for 2005‐2013.
Start 
economic reform
Start  
CEPA
Economic 
sanctions against 
nuclear testing
7
Source: Author’s elaboration based on RIEB “Multinational Corporation Database”. 
Number of Japanese Companies, Employees 
and Capital in India
the number of 
firms
the number of  
employees
(00)
Capital 
(Rupee in
hundreds of million, 
right axis )
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Japanese Companies’ Average Capital 
in India
Average capital
(Rupee in 
million)
The average 
number of 
employees
9
Source: Author’s elaboration based on RIEB “Multinational Corporation Database”. 
The source:
http://www.freemap.jp/itemD
ownload.php?b=asia&s=india&
t=gif
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North
North
North
Locations of Japanese Companies
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on RIEB “Multinational Corporation Database”. 
Transport equipment
Agricultural products and foodstuff
Electric power and gas
Electrical and electric equipment
Steel and metal
textile
Life insurance
Information and communication
Commercial, logistics and travel
Mining and petroleum and coal
Construction
Finance and Insurance
Machinery and precision  machine
Chemically and medicine
Other manufacturing
Other service industry
Industrial Sectors of Japanese Companies
in India
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on RIEB “Multinational Corporation Database”. 218
Distribution of Japanese Companies’ Capital
Across States
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on RIEB “Multinational Corporation Database”. 
Distribution of Japanese Companies’ Employees
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on RIEB “Multinational Corporation Database”. 219
Number of Japanese Companies in India
Manufacturing industry
Transport equipment
Total
15
Source: Author’s elaboration based on METI “Survey of Overseas Business Activities”.
Manufacturing industry
Transport equipment
Total
Japanese Companies’ Sales in India
JP yen in million
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on METI “Survey of Overseas Business Activities”.
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Manufacturing industry
Transport equipment
Total
Number of Japanese Companies’ Employees
in India
17
Source: Author’s elaboration based on METI “Survey of Overseas Business Activities”.
3. The Results of Questionnaire 
Survey (2013‐14)
(1) Responding and Non‐Responding 
Japanese Companies
18
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Methodology
• Embassy of Japan in India and JETRO, Japanese Companies List, 
October 2012 covering 926 Japanese Companies is set as the 
bench mark for making the ``population list.’’
• By employing the independent sources, additional companies are 
added to Embassy of Japan in India and JETRO list. ``Master file’’ 
covering 969 companies is made.
• Master file has a lot of duplicates of the companies. We drop the 
duplicates and finally get unique 620 companies. The list of these 
620 companies is regarded as our ``population list.’’  
• We request all of 620 companies to make answer to our questions 
during the period December 2013 to February 2014. Finally we got 
113 responses. 5 companies do masking their own names.
• We look for the basic corporate information on all of 620 
companies by employing online query of Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs. We finally get the basic corporate information covering 524 
companies. Then, this information is merged into ``population 
list.’’
19
Characteristics of Responding 
Companies and Non‐responding 
Companies
• 5 anonymous companies are excluded from the 
group of responding companies.
• Response rate: 17%.
• Share of capital of responding companies: 10%.
• Average capital of responding companies is also 
smaller. 20
Non-
responding Responding Total
Responding/
Total
Number of companies 512 108 620 17%
Number of identified
companies 432 92 524 18%
Capital(Rupee in hundreds
of million) 5763 637 6400 10%
Average capital(Rupee in
hundreds of million) 13.34 6.92 12.21 87%
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Characteristics of Responding Companies 
and Non‐responding Companies(2)
• Responding companies' share of commerce/ 
transportation is larger and that of manufacturing 
(transport equipment) is less. 21
Non-
responding Responding Total
Others 3% 1% 3%
Other services 21% 19% 20%
Commerce, transportation 20% 28% 21%
Manufacturing(Others) 12% 8% 11%
Manufacturing(Chemical and medicine) 7% 10% 7%
Manufacturing(Machinary) 16% 19% 16%
Manufacturing(Metals) 3% 4% 3%
Manufacturing(Transport equipments) 19% 10% 18%
Manufacturing(Food) 0% 0% 0%
Manufacturing(Agricultural) 0% 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Characteristics of responding Companies 
and Non‐responding Companies(3)
• Location of 
responding 
companies 
is more in 
Delhi and 
Haryana 
and less in 
Tamil Nadu.
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Non-
responding Responding Total
Andhra Pradesh 0% 1% 0%
Daman and Diu 0% 0% 0%
Delhi 35% 50% 37%
Gujarat 0% 1% 0%
Haryana 17% 24% 18%
Himachal Pradesh 0% 0% 0%
Jharkhand 0% 0% 0%
Karnataka 4% 5% 4%
Kerala 1% 0% 0%
Maharashtra 9% 5% 8%
Orissa 0% 0% 0%
Pondicherry 0% 0% 0%
Punjab 1% 0% 0%
Rajasthan 2% 3% 2%
Tamil Nadu 20% 7% 18%
Uttar Pradesh 1% 1% 1%
West Bengal 2% 2% 2%
Unknown 8% 2% 7%
Total 100% 100% 100%
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Characteristics of responding Companies and 
Non‐responding Companies(4)
Characteristics of responding Companies and 
Non‐responding Companies(5)
Characteristics of responding Companies and 
Non‐responding Companies(6)
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Non-
responding Responding Total
Non-governmental company 58% 48% 56%
Foreign subsidiary company 26% 35% 28%
Other company 1% 2% 1%
Non-company 16% 15% 15%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Non-
responding Responding Total
Listed company 5% 3% 5%
Unlisted company 79% 82% 80%
Non-company 16% 15% 15%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Non-
responding Responding Total
Private limited company 67% 77% 69%
Public limited company 18% 9% 16%
Non-company 16% 14% 15%
Total 100% 100% 100%
• Responding 
Companies’ 
share of 
foreign 
subsidiary 
company and 
private limited 
company is 
larger.
Establishment year, Number of Companies 
and Capital
Note: 1981 is the year when Anchor Panasonic and  Maruti Suzuki were established and 
1995 is the year when TTSL (Tata Teleservices) was established.
Capital
Number of companies
24
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3. The Results of Questionnaire 
Survey (2013‐14)
(2) Current Situation of Responding 
Japanese Companies
25
26
2% 2%
40%
1%
26%
2%
1%
13%
2% 11%
The Reason of Investment in IndiaDA
There are a stable supplier of parts and raw materials
in India
Easy to respond to  the Indian market needs
Expectations for the Indian market
Demands of neighboring  countries are strong and
future expansion canbe expected
Easy to secure human resources with qualified labors
Low cost of materials including raw materials,
manufacturing process,transportations,land and
buildings
Penetrated along with the parent company or business
partners,etc.
Low labor cost
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27
28
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Employment Situation
29
Average Min Max Total
Number of employees 212 1 3000 23579
Japanese nationality 5 1 90 580
Local Japanese employees 1 0 10 60
Temporary staff 137 0 5000 12291
Turnover 9 0 100 811
30
227
31
32
228
33
34
42%
21%
11%
3%
3%
9%
3% 8%
Finance No obstacle
Minor obstacle
Moderate obstacle
Major obstacle
Very severe
obstacle
88DK
99DA
(Blank)
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35
36
230
37
38
41%
9%11%
7%
2%
18%
3% 9%
Courts No obstacle
Minor obstacle
Moderate obstacle
Major obstacle
Very severe
obstacle
88DK
99DA
(Blank)
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39
40
232
41
42
233
43
44
234
45
46
235
47
48
236
49
237
51
52
CEPA: Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement
DMIC: Delhi‐Mumbai Industrial Corridor Project
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Concluding Remarks
• Existing Statistics in section 2 shows:
(1) Since the mid‐2000s, investment of Japanese 
companies grows especially in NCR.
(2) Transport equipment, electronics, and machinery 
industries dominate the Japanese investment. 
(3) Maharashtra and Delhi absorb capital of Japanese 
companies. Recently the Japanese capital goes to 
Haryana. 
(4) Share of transport equipment industry in terms of 
sales and employee is very high. 
• Long‐term economic relation between India and Japan: 
Cotton era  Iron era  Car era (Pls. see Takahiro Sato, 
``Economic Relations between India and Japan, ‘’ Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, Vol.53, No.4, pp.457‐478, 2012) 53
• The results of questionnaire survey in section 3 shows:
(1) Responding companies have the following 
characteristics: more NCR in location, less transport 
equipment and more commerce/ transportation in 
industry, and smaller in size. 
(2) Reason for investment in India: Many companies 
market potentiality not only in India but also in the 
neighbor countries. Indeed, some companies have export 
destination diversity. India as step stone for business in 
Africa, Middle East, and EU.
(3) Local content ratio is not high. Many companies 
procure the goods from Japan and East Asia. 
Implications for exchange rate problem and the 
opportunities of cost advantage induced by increase of 
local contents.
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(4) Employment of contract labors is common. 
Implications for labor laws and industrial relations.
(5) Despite of the serious recession of the Indian economy, 
more than half of companies have good performance.
(6) The most serious obstacle for the business is the 
difficulty to obtain good human resources (turnover rate 
is also high). Implication for ``Skill Development’’ for 
promoting ``Make in India.’’ Many companies suffer from 
inadequate infrastructure and strong regulations (ex. High 
tax rate, inflexible and retrospective tax administration 
and introduction of MAT to SEZs).
(7) A few Japanese companies involve the CEPA and the 
DMIC. Further investigation of low utilization of 
preferential tax treatment under the CEPA is needed.
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Thank you.
Email: takahirodevelop@gmail.com
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Identifying Competition Neutrality of SOEs in China
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Abstract
This paper attempts to identify competition neutrality of state owned enterprises
(SOEs) in three consumer electronics industries in China. First, I draw a benet-price
indierence curve, at the mode of consumer surplus for each year, and a benet-price
supply curve by the manufacturers and ownership types, based on the demand estimates
of for the color TV (CTV), Mobile phone and Air conditioner industries in the 2000s.
These exercises indicate heterogeneous situations of the market neutrality of SOEs in
the Chinese consumer electronics industries: The air conditioner market shows a clear
positive relationship between benet and price for all the ownership types. At the same
time, no clear correlation between ownership and strategies focusing on price or benet
is observed. On the other hand, SOEs and privately-owned enterprises (POEs) in CTV
and mobile phone markets concentrate their products based on lower prices and lower
benet area, namely, they are taking cost advantage strategies. Ownership type and
strategies appears to have a correlation. Furthermore, price becomes independent to
the level of benet for local rms. These tendencies are clearly observed in the price-
benet supply curve of the two markets. A simple model of dierentiated competition
with one agent committing predatory pricing in expropriating soft nancial constraint
shows that the price set by the rivals of a soft constrained rm is independent to the
benet.
Keywords Competitive advantage, SOEs, FOEs, competition neutrality
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1 Introduction
This paper attempts to identify the competition neutrality of SOEs in Chinese markets.
Attempts to identify behaviors abusing the competition neutrality has been regarded as
controversial in the eld of international law. This paper will undertake this task by building
a small empirical model and empirically tested. The empirical test was exercised based on
the data utilizing empirical industrial organization's technique and the concept of Porter's
competitive advantage strategies (Watanbe, 2015). The competition neutrality of SOEs
became a focus of research following the improvement of corporate governance principles
in the OECD and international institution buildings is developed within the international
trade rules develops. Mixed markets, where SOEs, private rms and foreign owned invested
rms are competing each other, though under somehow dierent institutional settings, are
very prevalent in China. Some industries maintain sound competition or neutrality in the
presence of SOEs, whereas other industries do not. Therefore, whether the presence of
SOEs in the market is capable of being neutral to market competition and social welfare is
a quite a complex empirical question. This paper tries to answer the question.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on market competition
and SOEs. Section 3 presents the strategy of analysis of this paper. Secion5 provides
exercise tests on pricing behavior with soft nancial constraint. Section 6 discusses the
results and implication for understanding the characteristics of the Chinese markets, then
concludes. Methodology of estimating benet of individual benetis elaborated in Appendix
sections: Section A presents economic models as an analytical framework, and Section B
reports the estimated results.
2 SOEs and Competition
THe motivation behind this paper is understanding whether the presence of SOEs may sub-
stantially aect outcomes of market competition, including not only price but also quality.
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The mixed market literature originally studied this issues, but it needs to be modied to
apply to China's case. On the other hand , the other literature from legal studies and the
practical world began to argue a concept of \competitive neutrality." Essentially, the OECD
began to propose the SOEs' competitive neutrality framework. I surveyed the argements
from these two stream of literature.
2.1 Mixed Markets Literature
Public economics began to analyze outcomes of competition in the mixed market in the
1990s, along with development in the privatization of SOEs in the public utility industries.
Heterogeneity of purpose or constraints between public enterprises and privte enterprises
may generate unexpected outcomes.
The main characteristics that these theoretical papers share is an assumption that SOEs
are constrained to maximizing social welfare, not prot, only the private rms are allowed
to maximize prot. Under this assumption, the following papers developed the economic
models of mixed oligopoly competition. Some of the relatively recent models of dierentiated
market presented the following outcomes: Matsuura and Matsushima (2004) showed that
the private rm's cost is lower than the public rm's because the private rm engages in
excessive strategic cost-reducing activities. Privatization of the public rms would improve
welfare because it would mitigate losses arising from excessive cost-reducing investments.
Luts and Pezzioni (2009) provided a review of a mixed oligopoly with a dierentiated market
where there is possibility that not all of the market is not covered. They argued that mixed
competition is more socially plausible than private duopoly and seems to produce more
ecient regulatory instruments than merely adop the minimum quality. Ghosh, Mitra and
Saha (2015) argued that the SOEs will set prices under their marginal cost when they
are duopolies competing with foreign prot maximizing rms. A partial privatization of
domestic public rms will improve the welfare by decreasing the decits of public rms
competing against the foreign rms.
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These theoretical papers presented diversied results under heterogeneous assumptions:
some argues that partial privatization and mixed oligopoly are plausible options for main-
taining a certain quality level in the market. Others argue that full privatization is better
due to the smaller amoung of loss incurred. I must note that all these theoretical analy-
ses assume that the SOEs or public rms are constrained to pursue welfare maximization,
whereas the private rms pursue prot maximization. The reality is that the SOEs have
never been constrained to maximizing social welfare, but have been allowed to simply pursue
private prot 1.
2.2 SOEs Governance and Competitive Neutrality by OECD
Entering the 2000s, the OECD and other international trade regulation entities began to
discuss the impact of SOEs' presence on market competition neutrality. Here, the State
owned enterprises are regarded a special entity in terms of the following points: First, the
enterprise is burdened to fulll public welfare not only pursing their own private prot. This
is facilitated through the public ownership by exercising decision power that allocated to
the owners. As long as SOEs are producing public benets, subsidies to the SOEs from the
government are legitimate. This perspective can bell called the\ burdened SOEs view." The
problem expected to be solved under this view is how to alleviate the ineciency of SOEs
due to the public welfare burden. Secondly, however, the denition of public welfare is not
clear and is dicult to distinguish whether the action of the SOEs really serves to the public
welfare. Under this setting, the enterprises can ask for the government to exercise its power
to favor them against their rivals in the market even if their actions do not serve public
welfare at all. This phenomenon can be called as \not legally constrained SOEs views."
The problem most concerned with this type of phenomenon is to how to control the SOEs
unconstrained behaviors. Chaprbianco and Christiansen (2011) introduced the historical
development of SOEs governance code to competitive neutrality principles, and discusses
1Concerning the details of the institution, see Unirele (2012) and Watanabe (2014)
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the Competitive Neutrality Frameworks (CNFs). Then, they cataloged the various \anti-
competitive practices" that SOEs might take, and then argued for remedies that competitive
agencies can take. The OECD (2012) is a proposal following the argument of Chapribianco
and Christiansen (2011). Kawashima (2015) introduced the Australian' \Market Neutrality
Principle" and discussed its applicability to international trade regulation.
2.3 Anti-Competitive Practices and Remedy for Competitive Neutrality
Chapribianco and Christiansen (2011) discussed the four \anti competitive actions" and
remedies for them as follows: The anti-competitive practices are (1) predatory pricing, (2)
raising rivals costs, (3) cross subsidization and (4) strategic adopting of inecient technol-
ogy. Remedies that the anti competitive agency can take are (1) ex post enforcement of
competition rules on unilateral conduct (2) using merger control rules to level the playing
eld and (3) exemptions from antitrust liability for SOEs.
3 Research Strategy and Background
3.1 Research Strategy
This paper attempts to identify the competitive strategy of Chinese brands, or by ownership
type. I refer to an idea of Porter's generic competitive advantage strategies, that is, the
cost advantage strategy and benet advantage strategy. In implementing the exercise here,
I used the predicted values that estimate in Watanabe (2015).
Researh of this papher goes as follows: First, I observe outcome of market competition in
the three consumer electornics industies in China. Then, summarized the observation and
indentied tendency and characteristics that might be related to \competition neutrality."
Second, set up a model to explain the ndings in the st step, then, empirically test the
prediction from the model. Detailed procedure of individual step will be elaborate in each
section.
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3.2 Description of Industries
In this paper, three electronics industries in China were the target of analysis: color TV,
air conditioner and mobile phone. These industries all share competitive and mixed market
characteristics. This is why I chose the three industry for the excersice of this paper to
identify the competitive neutrality of SOEs.
Among these, the CTV industry was the earliest to have emerged, dating back to the
late 1980s. There was a technological transfer from the Japanese manufacturer, Panasonic,
to several SOEs including Changhong. The air conditioner industry began to grow in the
1990s, nearly ten years later. Initially, the technology was also transferred from Japanese
manufacturers, such as Sanyo and Mitsubishi and German companies to the SOEs. The
mobile phone industry is the newest of the three industries and emerged in the 2000s. In
the very initial stage, Nokia and Motorola dominated the industry. Since the late 1990s, the
government has encouraged foreign investment rm to transfer the technology by forming
joint ventures. However, because the government lifted the regulation in 2006, massive
entry of private brands was repeated2.
Figures 1 indicates how many products were supplied by privately owned, SOE or foreign
investment enterprises. This gre shows extremely contrasting proles among the three
industries. In the color TV industry, SOEs dominate more than 80 per cent of units were
produced by SOEs. Conversely, the mobile phone industry is dominated by foreign invested
and privately owned irms.
3.3 Institutional setting: Law and Politics with SOEs
In China, the three types of ownership, foreign investment, SOEs and privately owned
rms are faced with dierent institutional settings. Although they sometimes compete with
each other in a market, the institutional constraints they face with are often substantially
dierent. In terms of this nature, I regard the three ownership types as heterogeneous
2Detailed case studies of these industries were extended in Watanabe ed.,(2014).
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Figure 1: Shares of production by ownership types of
Color TVs, Air Conditioners and Mobile Phones
Source GfK Market Auditing Survey.
agents in a market, and the market should be called a \mixed market."
Legal institution since the 1980s clearly discriminated private enterprises and SOEs until
the middle of 2000s: Company Law, Security Law, Bankruptcy Law provided respective
clauses for SOEs and private enterprises. Foreign investment enterprises are regulated by
independent special laws and regulations. There was a substantial reform of these legal
institution around 2006. Although major institutional discrimination among ownerships
disappeared in the laws, but the enforcement remains widely a preferential toward SOEs3.
3Referring legal institutions related to SOEs, Watanabe (2014) reviewed in detail. In October 2015,
Communist Party of China revealed their plan of the SOE reform. It announced that SOEs will be classiend
into \commercial SOEs" and \Public welfare pursing SOEs." A part of SOEs in People's Republiuc of China
are constrained to pursuing public welfare for the rst time.
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4 Competitive Strategy and Ownership Types: Observation
4.1 Comparing Consumer Surpluses and Benets by Ownership types
The estimated demand parameters in Watanabe (2015) allow us to compute the consumer
surplus and the benet of individual products4. By summing up these consumer surplus and
benets, I can quantify the (relative) size of consumer surplus and benet for each brand
or ownership types. Here, I compare whether there is a systematic dierence in consumer
surplus or benet across ownership types (Figures 2, 3 and 4 summarize the results.).
Across the three industries, foreign-investment rms oer the greatest benet to the
Chinese market, alsthough ther price are also the highest. Privately owned rms oer the
lowest or not higher prices in all the three industries and oer the not smaller or higher
consumer surplus to SOEs acrossthe industries. State owned enterprises does not show
consistent advantages in price, benet and consumer surplus across the three industries.
In the air conditioner market, in which no single type of ownership had a dominant
share, foreign-investement rm supplies products with the greatest benet, but their prices
are high as well. As a result, the consumer surplus oered by foreign-investment rm is not
higher than SOEs. Privately owned rms oered the larget consumer surplus by following
the cost advantage strategy.
In the CTV market, in which a substantial share of the products are supplied by the
state-owned enterprises, foreign-investment rms oers the largest consumer surplus, and
those of privately owned and state-owned enterprises remain equal.
In the mobile phone market, in which foreign-investment rms shared the largest per-
centage of the market, but private rms vigorously entered, private rms provided the
largest consumer surplus by following the cost advantage strategy, whereas foreign invest-
ment rms supply products with the highest benet. Their benet advantage strategies
does not succeeded in oering the largest consumer surplus.
4Appendix of this paper also provide details of procedure to estimate the benet and consumer surplus.
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Figure 2: Dierence in mean among ownerships - Air Conditioner
unit: RMB Consumer Surplus Benet Price
F-P -128 1431*** 1559***
F-S 259 1264*** 1005***
P-S 387*** -166 -553***
Standard errors were not displayed
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Figure 3: Dierence in mean among ownerships - CTV
unit: RMB Consumer Surplus Benet Price
F-P 4352*** 8532*** 4180***
F-S 4190*** 8138*** 3948***
P-S -162 -393 -232
Standard errors were not displayed.
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Figure 4: Dierence in mean among ownerships - Mobile Phone
unit: RMB Consumer Surplus Benet Price
F-P -735*** 243*** 980***
F-S -237*** 348*** 587***
P-S 498*** 104 -393***
Standard errors were not displayed.
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
In summary, foreign-investment rms supply products that provide greater benet. In
other words, they follow the benet advantage strategy. At the same time, privately owned
rms oers the cheapest class of products: They look to follow the cost advantage products.
State-owned enterprises fell into the trap of the middle, and the size of the consumer surplus
that oered by SOEs to the Chinese markets is lower than that of either the privately owned
rms or foreign-investment rms5.
5Besanko argues that a strategy of positioning in the middle of cost advantage and benet advantage is
eective as long as they are suceeding in providing largest \benet of trade," that is B - C in the notation in
this paper. Their argument makes sense. Now we can observe B the benet oered by the SOEs is lowest,
but not sure how much C the cost is.
249
4.2 Drawing Price-Benet Curves
As we have the data on the price and benet of the products, and we can draw a price-benet
indierence curve and a price-benet supply curve for the three industries6. The procedures
are as follows: First, utilizing the demand function estimates obtained in Watanabe (2015),
I obtain the predicted value of the benet of individual products in equation (19). Second,
I draw a spline within the group, such as ownership or brand. I employ splines with equally
spaced knots based on the prices and benets of all units sold in each year.
4.2.1 Price-Benet Indierence Curve
First, I depict price-benet indierence curve. The curve depicts the relationship between
price and benet xed at a certain level. Here, I took the price-benet relationship at the
mode value of consumer surplus for each year. The mode is a value that has the maximum
observation on the distribution7. That is, I can see the price benet relationship at the
volume zone of the year. Under this setting, if a brand list products with larger benet
and higher price on the curve, we can see the brand is taking \benet advantage" strategy.
If the brand list products with lower benet and lower price on the indierence curve, it
implies the brand took \cost (price) advantage strategy."
Figures 5, 6 and 7 graphs actual distributions of strategies at the volume zone for each
years for the three consumer electronics market.
In air conditioner market, Figure 5, the strategies that represented by positioning at
price- benet axis is relatively concentrated into a narrow area from 2001 to 2008. Dierence
of positioning among ownership types are not clear, except in 2006 and 2007. In 2006 and
2007, the FIEs took position at the higher price but relatively similar benets compared to
6We depicted the cost-benet supply curve by connecting the predicted value of benet and consumer
surplus by brands or ownerships. This is the line chosen by the suppliers. When you connected the predicted
values of benets and consumer surplus according to the equivalence of consumer surplus or benet levels,
it becomes the cost-benet indierence cutve that Figure A.1 showed.
7I took a certain range between the mode value when I made these graphs so as to maintain a certain
number of observations. Because of this, we can see a dierence of consumer surplus in the actual gures
250
the local rivals. This implies FIE is inferior to SOEs and POEs in terms of this period. In
2008, dierence of positioning of the strategies by ownership types disappeared in 2009. In
2010, relatively speaking, FIEs and SOEs exhibit \benet advantage strategies," whereas
POEs shows \cost advantage strategies".
In CTV market, Figure 6, FIEs took a wider positioning at price-benet axis, that is,
low price-low benet to high price- high benet between 2001 to 2006 and 2007. On the
contrary, SOEs and POEs shows distribution of positioning concentrating into the low price
and low benet area at the same period. Ownership type and distribution of the strategies
appears to be correlated.
What I need to note here is that, the price benet curve get horizontal along with the
progress of years.
In mobile phone market, Figure 7, dierence of the positioning at at the price-benet
axis get more clear. FIEs took the higher price - higher benet positioning, that is \the
benet advantage strategies," whereas SOEs and POEs adopt the low price and low benet
positioning, that is the \cost advantage strategies." In this market, the curve got horizontal
in an area where SOEs and POEs are competing with each other.
In summary, the correlation between the ownership type and the strategies appeared in
the CTV and mobile phone markets, whereas the correlation is not so clear as the other
two markets. In the previous group, the curve get horizontal.
4.2.2 Price-Benet Supply Curve
Figures 8, 9 and 10 graph the price and benet supply curve for selected brands. I chose
the brands that have data for the entire period of the study and for which the number of
sales units is relatively large.
The graphs visualize the competitive positions of the ownership types or the brands. If
a brand or one type of ownership listed the products with higher benet and keeps price at
approximately the same level as a competitor's, the brand or ownership type have a \benet
251
advantage". On the other hand, a brand or a type of ownership that provides a product
with a lower price and keeps the benet more or less the same as that of a competitor has
a \cost advantage"（Besanko, et. al 2010: Chapter 9).
Figure 10 clearly indicates this positioning pattern in the mobile phone market. This
indicate that foreign brands, such as Nokia, Samsung and Motorola listed the products
with nearly all the support of the benet distribution. Foreign brands monopolizes the
higher benet ranges, for example, 12,000 RMB and above range for 2001, 25,000 RMB
and higher for 2005 and 40,000 RMB and above for 2008. Foreign brands succeeded in
taking the\benet advantage" position. On the contrary,the private and SOE price-benet
supply curves move nearly horizontally over the benet. They are positioning at a lower
cost and oer the same benet to foreign brands. This relationship basically holds in the
color TV market (Figure 9). For air conditioner market (Figure 8), the support of benets
for SOEs, POEs and FIEs does not show a substantial dierence, although FIEs supply
with systematically higher prices than their counterparts.
A comparison of the positioning among ownership types indicates that SOEs fail to
take an advantageous positions and are \stuck in the middle" as argued by Porter (Besanko
et.al, 2010, Chapter 9. Porter 1980: Chapter 2 ). This is because of the following point: In
terms of benet, SOEs are inferior to foreign investment brands: however, in terms of costs, I
presume they could be inferior to the private brands because as the price advantage is taken
by the privately owned rms, it implies SOEs do not have cost advantage. This observation
is consistent with anecdotal evidences that appeared in the accumulated previous researches,
news or reports.
Moreover, it is important to note the direction of correlation between benets and price
(the cost of the consumer). When the benet is large, the consumer values the products
to a larger degree, and there is more room for raising price. Usually, this is necessary for
suppliers, as suppliers bear the additional cost of producing products with greater benets.
Relatively speaking, foreign brands can enjoy positive correlation between price and benet.
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However, private rms and SOEs are faced with a horizontal cost benet indierence curve.
That is, price is independent of benets. For suppliers, this is a harsh market condition,
and they may lose incentives to invest in upgrading the quality or benet of products. Next
sections will focus on this point and try to address why this phenomenon appears.
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Figure 5: Price and Benet Indierence Curve by Ownership Type - Air Conditioner
Note: Red/Orange dots represent SOEs. Blue dots represent Private owned rms. Green dots represent
Foreign Owned rms.
Source Author's estimation.
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Figure 6: Price Benet Indierence Curve by Ownership Types - Color TV
Note: Red/Orage dots represent SOEs. Blue dots represent Private owned rms. Green dots represent
Foreign Owned rms.
Source Author's estimation.
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Figure 7: Price and Benet Indierence Curve of Selected Brand - Mobile Phone
Note: Red/Orange dots represent SOEs. Blue dots represent Private owned rms. Green dots represent
foreign-owned rms.
Source Author's estimation.
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4.3 Summary: Heterogeneous Market Outcomes and Horizontal Price
Benet Curve
The main ndings so far are summarized as follows. Concerning the relationship between
ownership type and the chosen competitive strategy, we present the following ndings;
(1) Foreign brands exhibit a strategy to list products all in support of benet of price-
benet indierence curve. This applies to all three markets. FIEs adopts the \benet
advantage strategy," at least, relative to SOEs or POEs. (2) In CTV and mobile markets,
Private brands and SOEs concentrate on listing lower benets products. This phenomenon
is clearly captured in the price benet supply curves for the two markets. In terms of
this relative positioning, SOEs and POEs exhibit \cost advantage strategies" In these two
markets, there seems to exist correlation between ownership type and chosen strategy. (3)
In the air conditioner market, all three ownership types lists their products all over the
price benet indierence curve. It appears that there is no systematic relationship between
ownership type and chosen strategy. Correlation between ownership type and strategy take
are observed in some industry, and not observed in other industries.
One more aspect that needs to be noted is the relationship between price and benet.
(1) In the air conditioner market, price and benet are positively correlated, except during
a period between 2005 to 20078.(2) On the other hand, the price benet curves for CTV
and mobile phones tend to become horizontal as time progresses. This is very explicit for
SOEs and POEs. The price benet supply curve for CTV markets clearly exhibits that
the price is maintained at the same level although benets increase9. Interestingly, FIEs
began to raise prices once SOEs and POEs give up listing at the higher benet area. These
8The positive correlation between benet and price reappeared in 2008, 2009 and 2010. In 2008, the
Chinese government implemented a energy eciency standard and labeling system to mitigate information
asymmetry between consumers and suppliers in terms of the energy eciency of products. Further study to
investigate how the system intervene the market outcome.
9There are several anecdote that might be related to this market outcome feature in the CTV industry.
From 2006 to 07, there took place an intense price competition among LCD, CRT and PDPs occured. At
the same time, PDP was an advanced and expensive technology then, but Changhong began listing the PDP
with a support of local government and technology transfer from Philips. The detailed story is developed in
Watanabe ed. (2015). Until 2015, the project completely failed.
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results imply that there exists a mechanism that causes price to beome independent from
the benets. In the next section, I will explore a mechanism that explain this phenomenon.
5 A Test on Competition Neutrality
The exercise above shows that there is a peculiarity in that (1) the price-benet indierence
curve tends to shrink and the price tends to become independent of the benet, and (2) the
price-benet supply curve of Color TV industry shows that the curve of the FIEs resume
goes correlated from the point that their rivals, the SOEs and POEs resume listing. This
implies that the disappearance of competition to local brands allow them to price their
products according to the cost to generate the benet.
Several studies on Chinese SOEs system have referred to several points as a source of
problem Among them, I will test a hypothesis that the \excess competition" phenomenon
is caused by favorable nancial constraints on the SOEs. In this section, I describe this
phenomenon by using a simple model, and test whether the hypothesis is supported by the
data.
5.1 Model: Pricing when one agent is facing soft nancial constraint
Here, I consider a duopoly model of pricing behavior when one agent is faced with softened
nancial constraint based on the well known Hotelling model.
5.1.1 Basic model
Consumers will buy a product either from Firm A or Firm B. Assume the consumers are
located at x(0  x  1) according to the relative preference between A and B at x. A fan of
rm A's products requires compensation when they will buy product B. The compensation
cost is described as tAx. tA; tB are the index of the consumer's royalties for the particular
brands, that is, ones's costs to give up the favorite products.
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The payo of the consumer who choose product A is as follows:
BA   pA   tB  x
The payo of the consumer who choose product B is as follows:
BB   pB   tA  (1  x)
The payo of a consumer who is indierent between product A and B is equivalent.
That is,
BA   pA   tB  x = BB   pB   tA  (1  x) (1)
where the x that satises equation (1) is,
x =
tA + (BA  BB)  (pA   pB)
tA + tB
(2)
Faced with this dierentiated demand, rm A will maximize its prot with regard to
price pA.
(pA   cA) x = (pA   cA)(tA +BA  BB   (pA   pB))
tA + tB
Firm B will maximize its prot with regard to price pB.
(pB   cB) (1  x) = (pB   cB)(1  (tA +BA  BB   (pA   pB))
tA + tB
)
259
The best response strategies for rms A and B satisfy the following conditions:
2pA = pB + cA + tA +BA  BB (3)
2pB = pA + cB + tB +BB  BA (4)
Prices A and B follow the relationships below:
pA =
2cA + cB + tB + 2tA +BA  BB
3
pB =
2cB + cA + tA + 2tB +BB  BA
3
The market share of A, x, becomes as follows:
x =
2tA + tB + (BA  BB)  (cA   cB)
tA + tB
5.1.2 Model with soft nancial constraint
Assume that rm A is facing a soft budget constraint; that is, if they incure a decit, they
can make it up by relying on borrowing from banks or trade credit. Under this environment,
Firm A can set their price level below the cost and above the amount of debt D10. Decit
is feasible as long as it is smaller than debt. This is the assumption of predatory pricing by
A:
pA   cA  D
pA  D  cA (5)
I assume that rm A is faced with soft nancial constraint: it can set its price pA lower
than cost cA as long as the decit pA   cA is not bigger than its debt D. Firm B has no
favorable condition: thus it cannot set the price pB lower than their marginal cost cB.
10This items can be regarded as subsidy.
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Because of the strategic relationship described by equations (3) and (4), rm A has
an incentive to shift the best response function by utilizing its soft constraint. If so, the
best response strategy for rm A changed from equation (3). According to the condition of
equation (5), cA is replaced with pA  D .
2pA = pB + pA  D + tA +BA  BB
pA = pB  D + tA +BA  BB
These equations indicate that rm A, when faced with soft constraint, will set its price
lower, and that the rival rm B should lower its price. If rm A set their price pA lower
than its rivals cost cB, they can force rm B to exit from the market and thus obtain the
whole demand.
In this case, the prices at equilibrium changed as follows:
pA = cB   2D + tB + 2tA +BA  BB (6)
pB = cB  D + tA + tB (7)
The price at equilibrium shows that rm B, which received pressure to cut price fell into
a situation in which it cannot raise its price according to its benet advantage. The pricing
of rm B become independent of the benet they provide, although consumers still values
them. This implies that the rivals of rms with soft budget constraints fell into a situation
in which they will not be rewarded for their investment in the benets for the consumer.
Thus, the market share of A, xA, becomes as follows:
xA =
D
tA + tB
(8)
Propositions that derived from the model analysis above are as follows: under dieren-
tiated market competition, when there exists a player with soft nancial constraints, the
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soft constraint rm tends to set its price as low as possible.
Proposition 1 Amount of debt determines level of equilibrium price and market shares.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium price of the rival of a soft constraint rm becomes independent
of the benet they supplied to the society. That is, the price benet function of rivals
to soft budget constraint rms becomes horizontal when the soft budget constraint
entity commits predatory pricing.
5.2 Estimation of Price Benet Supply Curve
To test the relationship between the price benet curve and nancial constraint, I combined
the estimated demand data with the nancial statement data of companies listed in stock
markets within China. About half of the market data for the three markets were matched.
Although there exist substantial data omission, most of SOE listed rms were covered11.
Therefore, I do assume that listed SOEs as \the soft budget constraint rm." According
to this classication, I did estimate price benet supply curve focusing on SOE's behavior
on respective market12.
Test functions are derived from equations (6 and 7) and described as follows:
ln(psoft) = 1ln(chard) + 2ln(csoft) + 3ln(Dsoft) + 4ln(thard)
+5ln(tsoft) + 6ln(Bself ) + 7ln(Bothers) (9)
ln(phard) = 1ln(chard) + 2ln(csoft) + 3ln(Dsoft)
+4ln(tsoft) + 5ln(thard) + 6ln(Bself ) + 7ln(Bothers) (10)
Figure 11 shows a consistent result with model prediction in equations (6 and 7): the
benet of own products is positively and the benets of rivals is negatively correlated with
11Matched observation for respective market is as follows. the matched data in CTV market covers 59%
in total, 97% for SOE. Air conditioner 59% for total, 99% for SOE. 16% for total and 67% for SOE.
12Here, I do not have sucient information about nancial constraint (e.g. amount of debt) and cost for
FIEs.
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price. Marginal costs are positively correlated. What interests us most is that the amount
of own debt is negatively correlated with pricing. That implies that a brand with the larger
borrowing sets lower prices. This is consistent with a prediction of the nancial soft budget
morel above, and contradict with an intuition that the more leveraged rm is faced with a
higher nancial cost and thus, tends to set higher prices.
I do also estimate following reduced form of price function of product j of rm h for the
all three consumer electronics .
pricehj = 0benefithj Ownership+ 1benefit2hj Ownership+ 2costh + 3Debth + hij (11)
As for Debt, I use sum of following items: (1) amount of short term debt, (2) amount of
account receivable, and (3) amount of account payable of the brand for respective year.
Cost variables are (1) nancial cost, (2) operating tax, (3) marketing cost, (4) management
cost from the nancial statement and (4) estimated costs from demand functions. OLS and
IV estimation were conducted.
Tables (C.1), (C.2) and (C.3) indicates results of regression. Results shows again het-
erogeneous situation: (1) CTV markets data shows negative relationship between price and
debt and positive relationship between nancial cost for IV estimation. OLS estimation of
the third column shows that insignicant parameters for debt variable. This implies the
possibility of predatory pricing behavior thanks to loose nancial constraint of SOEs in
CTV market. (2) Air conditioner market shows that insignicant results for debt variable
for both OLS and IV estimation. Financial cost and marketing cost is positively correlated
with price for OLS estimator. Evidence for predatory behavior is not clear. (3) Mobile
phone market, both debt amount and nancial cost are not correlated with price for OLS
estimates and nancial cost is negatively correlated with price for GMM. The latter is
against the hypothesis above.
As a whole, CTV market data could not reject the possibility that competitive neutrality
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are violated due to soft nancial constraint.
6 Conclusion
This paper attempted to identify competition neutrality of SOEs for three electronics indus-
tries in China . First, I draw price benet demand and supply curves in order to identify
positioning and the \competitive advantage" of brands in Chinese markets. The results
reveal that there is a tendency across three industries for foreign brands to hold a \benet
advantage" and for private brands to maintain a \cost advantage". The SOEs are trapped
in the middle, failing to hold competitive advantages.
One more important feature is the SOEs and private rms looks to have been trapped
in the \excess" price competition equilibrium where price is independent to the benet
that rms oers to the society. Price Benet curves goes horizontally, that is, price is
independent to benet of product. Theoretical analysis based on dierentiated products
competition with one soft nancial constraint shows that due to predatory pricing strategy
by the soft constraint rm, their rivals pricing got independent to benet level of products.
Prot from dierentiation disappeared for their rivals. Regression of specication following
model analysis on the CTV data shows that amount of debt of the soft constraint rm
shows negative coecient in the price function. Larger the debt amount of the soft budget
rm, the lower price are set. Reduced form regression on price benet function incorporating
nancial data shows contradicting results: SOEs in the color tv markets price their products
lower when their debt is large and nancial cost is lower. Estimating structural functions
and identifying the mechanism that is generating the market equilibrium is attempting in
line with the results of this paper.
264
Figure 8: Price and Benet Supply Curve by Ownership Type - Air Conditioner
Note: Red/Orange lines represent SOEs. Blue lines represent Private owned rms. Green lines represent
Foreign Owned rms.
Source Author's estimation.
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Figure 9: Price and Benet Supply Curve by Ownership Types - Color TV
Note: Red/Orage lines represent SOEs. Blue lines represent Private owned rms. Green lines represent
Foreign Owned rms.
Source Author's estimation.
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Figure 10: Price and Benet Supply Curve by ownership - Mobile Phone
Note: Red/Orange lines represent SOEs. Blue lines represent Private owned rms. Green lines represent
foreign-owned rms.
Source Author's estimation.
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Figure 11: Price Benet Supply Curve (Structural form) - CTV market
(1) Hard Constraint (2) Soft budget constraint
OLS OLS
ln priceconstraint ln pricesoftbudget
ln benefitown 4.527*** 6.354***
(0.000) (0.000)
ln benefitothers -3.995*** -6.127***
(0.000) (0.000)
ln mcsoftbudget 0.097 0.277***
(0.163) (0.000)
ln mcconstraint 0.308*** 0.016
(0.000) (0.609)
ln debtown -0.047***
(0.000)
ln debtrivals 0.076
(0.496)
constant -3.466 4.589***
(0.264) (0.000)
City Dummies + +
Year Dummies + +
Brand Dummies + +
N 5734 6377
R2 0.709 0.709
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
(Note) Marginal costs (mc) are computed from the equation: pjt  mcjt =  qjt @pjt@qjt
@pjt
@qjt
is estimated from
demand estimates in previous setion.
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A Demand Estimation
A.1 Estimating Benets of the Products
A theory behind my exercise is as follows: Consumers prefer more benets and lower
priced/cost products. At the same time, there is a trade-o between benet and cost
at a certain level of total utility. Figure A.1 indicates this indierent relationship. 13 Con-
sumers evaluate the products equivalently as long as conguration of benet and price of
the product remains along with indierence curve or left down the curve and will buy either
of the products with the same probability.
Faced with this consumer's preference, supplier can take either of following two strate-
gies. One is the \cost advantage strategy" whereby a manufacturer lists a product with
lower cost maintaining the same level of benet with their rivals. The other is the \ben-
et advantage strategies" whereby the manufacturers lists a product with greater benets
products whereby maintaining their price as the same level with their rivals. This is the
familiar concept of generic competitive advantage strategies in business management stud-
ies(Porter(1980), Besanko, et.al (2010)).
Once the price-benet curve were depicted, we can identify where a brand's strategies
locates. When the curve is going to be depicted, we need to get the data of benet. I use
estimated utility from the product as the benet of transaction that explained below.
When a products are traded, the product that are generating a benet B that was
valued by a consumer/buyer. The net value or social welfare14 of an economic transaction
is dened as a dierence between a benet B of product j for consumer i, and its production
13In 1985, Mercedes' products stayed on the cost benet indierence curve 1985. In 1988, Japanese cars
appeared on the point that named Japanese Cars 1988. The positioning of the Japanese cars product 1988
is far superior to Mercedes 1985 in terms of consumer welfare: Japanese cars in 1988 is much cheaper and
better in quality than Mercedes then. In 1994, Mercedes recovered their positioning which is equivalent
to Japanese cars in terms of consumer surplus. As is seen in this story of Mercedes positioning, utility of
consumer remains the same on the bold line in Figure A.1 for Japanese cars and Mercedes, but conguration
of price and benet changes along the line.
14If the transaction generates positive or negative externality, we need to grasp its impact and we can
explicitly describe them out in the model.
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Figure A.1: Concept of Price and Benet Indierence Curve
Source:Besanko, et.al (2002, Japanese edition), Figure 12.5
cost C. As long as B   C is not smaller than zero, the business is viable. The larger the
benet of transaction, B C, the larger is the contribution provided by the business to the
society.
V alue of transaction = (B   P ) + (P   C)
= B   C
Value of the transaction are divided between the consumer and producer: Consumers/buyer
receives a fraction as much as B   P . This is called consumer surplus. The seller receives
another fraction of value as much as P   C, which is prot. Once we obtained the data
of consumer surplus, B   P , we can quantitatively compare the size of welfare produced
by particular type of sellers or products. Then, question remains as to how to obtain the
benet or consumer welfare? I obtained them by estimating demand function for the mar-
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kets. Demand function induced from product choice model based on individual utility will
be detailed in Section A.2.
Based on this estimated parameters of demand function for products supplied by man-
ufacturers, I can depict price-benet curves for the consumers.
A.2 Estimation model of demand
Here, I develop a model for demand estimation. Consumer demand is modeled using a
discrete-choice formulation. This model describes a process that consumer will choose a
product according to the size of the utilities. On the supply side, I assume competition
between several brands in dierent geographical markets at dierent timings.
A.2.1 Utility and Demand
First, I describe the utility of consumer i that consists of the benet product j. Consumers
chose a brand j in a given market (=city and year, here) to maximize their utility. I view
a product as a particular brand sold in a city market m = 1; 2; :::M .(I delete m hereafter
simply for the reader's convenience). The indirect utility Uijt of consumer i from purchasing
brand j = 1; 2; :::J at time t = 1; 2; ::::T is,
uijt =  ipjt + Xjt + jt + ijt: (12)
pjt denotes price of brand j at market m in time t. Other factors aect product choice,
such as the features of product xjt. jt is a product-market specic unobservable. ijt is the
random unobservable error. To predict consumer surplus as much as appropriately, we need
capture dierence of elasticity of price to the same product by attributes of consumers. We
need some random coecient of the price. The random coecients of price in this paper
are dened as i = =Yi , whereas Yit is the observed income
15.
15I used average income of each city-year segments in this paper because we do not have data of individual
income. That means Yi = Ymt =
P
Yi=Imt and i = mt = =Ymt. Imt is population at market m and
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Mean utility of product16 j can be rewritten as,
jt =  ipjt + Xjt + jt; (13)
where jt represents unobservable and time specic characteristics. Each consumer i in
market m will choose product j to maximize her utility. Therefore, the aggregate market
share for product j in market m is the probability that product j yields the highest utility
across all products including outside goods 0. Therefore, the predicted market share of
product j = 1; ::::J , sj is a function of mean utility jt and parameter vector  = (; ; 
17
). If the unobserved error, ijt in the equation (12) follows i.i.d. extreme value, this
relationship can be rewritten as a logit choice probability(see Train (2009) ) as below.
Pjt = sjt(jt; )
=
eujtP
k e
ukt
=
e ipjt+Xjt+jt+ijt:
1 +
P
k e
 ipkt+Xkt+kt+ikt (14)
Here, 1 in denominator in equation (14) represents value of outside option, because
exp(u0) = exp(0) = 1. Remaining variables in the denominator is sum of exponential
utilities of all of the choices in every market.
Under this logit assumption, consumer surplus CSi for consumer i, previously indicated
by B   P , takes the following closed format.
E(CSi) =
1
i
E[Max(ujt)] (15)
The expectation is over all possible values of error ijt. Here, expected consumer surplus
time t in this paper.
16Because this is the mean of utility, unobserved independent error jt in equation (12) can be regarded
as zero.
17 is the nesting parameter that explained later referring to equation (21)
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for individual i or product j can be written as follows.
E(CSi) =
1
i
ln(
JX
j=1
euijt) + C:18 (16)
E(CSj) =
IX
i=1
1
i
ln(euijt) + C (17)
Absolute value of consumer surplus is meaningless because of the unknown C. But
the dierence between several states of consumer surplus as a gure generated from the
structure. This paper focused on dierence between two dierent agents, for example,
agent h or ownership type h comparing to agent k or ownership type k, dierence of sum of
consumer surplus of products supplied by rm k and rm h. This can be written as follows:
CShk = [
J jhX
j=1
1
i
ln(euijt) 
J jhX
j=1
1
i
ln(euijt)] (18)
Once you obtained CSj for product j from above estimates, we can compute the value
of benet of product j; Bjt.
Benefitj = CSj + Pricej (19)
Here, we can see the relative size of benets of the product following the same way as
we can do for consumer surplus.
A.2.2 Nested Logit Model and Identication
The logit-based utility model provides an estimating equation of utility in the following
form (see Train(2009) for an explicit explanation.). Based on the model, I estimate the
demand parameters following Berry (1994) and Nevo (2000) and other BLP literatures.
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Our estimation equation is,
ln(sjt)  ln(sot) =  ipjt + Xjt + ln(sjtjg) + jt: (20)
Here, I set the outside option as a dierence between population and total number of air
conditioner for individual market and year that represents number of potential buyer of the
products. sjtjg is the share of product j withing group g.
The parameters of this demand can be identied as the previous empirical industrial
organization literatures claimed (see Ackerberg and Crawford (2009)). Identication of
price parameters, which is critical for our benet computing, relies on the fact that the
unobserved determinants of demand are uncorrelated with input prices. To account for this
potential endogeneity of prices that may be caused by the presence of changes in unobserved
attributes, we use the GMM estimator with either type of instruments variables discussed
in Section A.4.
To account for the degree of preference correlation between products of the same group,
I imposed a further assumption on the error term, ijt of equation (12).
ijt = igt + ijt (21)
 is a \nesting parameter" , 0    1 that captures the correlation between preference
and product characteristics. ijt is independently distributed error for consumer, product
and timing.
When demand function parameters estimated based on the nested logit model, consumer
surplus will be computed as follows (see Ivaldi and Verboven[2005:677]).
E(CSi) =
1
i
ln(1 +
JX
j=1
D1 g ) + C: (22)
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Dg =
GgX
k=1
exp(jt=(1  )) (23)
A.3 Data
I use the market survey data of GfK market services for the three industries: air conditioner,
color TV and mobile phone. Sales value and number of units for individual model categories
are available for each top 10 brands and others for several features of the products for 30
cities in China. The features of the products are as follows: Air conditioners are divided by
(1) horsepower ( 1 HP, 1 to 2 HP and 2 HP and above) (2) grades of the energy eciency
labels, and (3) types of installment, (4) whether inverter controlled or not. Color TV data
are divided by (1) types of panels (CRT, LCD, PDP ) , (2) screen size (21 inches and
below, 21 to 32 inches, 32 inches and over). Mobile phones are divided by (1) types of
networks (CDMA, GSM, TDS-CDMA), (2) types of operation system (no OS installed,
Linux, Symbian, Windows Mobile and others) (3) Number of colors in the panel, and (4)
Camera is installed or not.
Regarding the air conditioner data, the data on sales and information related to energy
consumption begins with the year 2008 and is obtained from the GfK market auditing
data. Data for power consumption are not available directly from this data base. Hence,
I supplemented the power consumption information from the catalog data on e-commerce
site, SOHU.
A.4 Instruments
The estimation of the models I employed here is typically done using IV or GMM using
instruments for pjt and nested variables. Instruments zjt that are correlated to pjt but
are independent to ijt or ijt . In this case, candidates of instruments here mainly come
from following four sources: (1) cost shifters; fees of electricity etc. (2) price of the same
products of the same brand in other city. Here, we need to assume that dierence of
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prices of the same products across cities only reects demand factors, and that the price
of other city of the same products are correlated with price via only cost factors. (Berry,
Levinson and Pakes, 1995 (BLP paper) , Hausman, 1996. Nevo, 2001). (3) Price of the
same type of products by competitor brands in a same city (Berry, Levinson and Pakes,
1995) (4) characteristics of products; it is natural to assume that characteristics of products
are designed and planned in advance, before the price is xed. Exploiting this natural
assumption, we use the characteristics of products as instruments that predetermined to
the price. Either of four types of instruments were tried; (i) The rst type of \quality"
dummies are sum of index of characteristics within the own brand, such as capacity of air
conditioners or size of visual panels of color television. (ii) The second type of this category's
IV is sum of the characteristics of other products of rival rms, and (iii) the third one is
sum of the characteristics of other products of own rms (see Grigolon and Verboven (2011)
Verboven (1996)). (iv) The fourth is the average index of the characteristics of a competitor.
The Hausman instrument approach ((2)) relies on the assumption that prices in two
dierent markets be correlated via common cost shocks and not via common demand side
shocks such as nationwide demand shock. If a situation such as particular two markets'
demand shrink a certain common shock occurring when shrinkage in demand tales place
between two particular markets, the instruments are invalid19. However, in our estimation
case, this IV works eectively20.
19The Herndahl-Hirschman Index, HHI, that is computed by the data of the three markets shows high
competition mode. It clearly denied a monopolistic environment.
20GMM c-statistics of demand estimates results in Figures B.1(GMM c-statistics 1.185 and p=0.2763),
Figures B.2 (GMM c-statistics is 3.05299 (p = 0.2173) ) and B.3 (GMM c-statistics is 1.6e-07 (p = 1.0000))
show that the IV were conrmed as exogenous to our demand.
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B Estimated Demand and Market Outcome
B.1 Estimated Parameters
Estimated demand parameters are presented in Figures B.1, B.2 and B.3. The CTV and
mobile phone markets demands are estimated with nested logit model and air conditioner
market demand is estimated with a logit model. For the all three markets, it is conrmed
that the instrument variables used were exogenous to price variation. Nesting parameters
in the color TV and mobile phone market indicates that color TV market is homogenized
(= 0.995), whereas mobile phone market is more dierentiated (=0.245). For the air
conditioner markets, I could not nd eective instruments variables for the nested logit
model, but could nd appropriate IVs for the logit specication.
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Figure B.1: Demand Estimates:Air Conditioner
(1)
ln(sj)  ln(so)
price/wage -5.496
(0.431)
cooling capacity 0.0001
(0.000)
power consumption capacity -0.0004
(0.000)
HP: 1 to 2 0.544
(Reference=1HP below) (0.124)
HP: 2 and over 0.476
(0.090)
Label Introduced 0
Introduced X Label 1 4.816
(0.125)
Introduced X Label 2 -1.844
(0.056)
Introduced X Label 3 -1.052
(0.047)
Introduced X Label 4 -0.522
(0.041)
Inverter Introduced -0.983
(0.041)
Non Inverter Period 0.000
(.)
Installment: Stand Alone 0.0046
(Reference=Others ) (0.058)
Installment: Split -3.137
(0.125)
Brand dummies +
City dummies +
Year dummies +
Constant -5.243
(0.247)
N 17914
R2 0.487
GMMcstatistics 1.185
p = 0:2763
IV average cooling capacity of competing products
sum of horse power of products of the same brand
average horse power of own brand
average horse power of rival brand
price of other city of the same brand products, wage
per capita space of living
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
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Figure B.2: Demand Estimates: CTV market
(1)
ln(sj)  ln(so)
price/wage -1.110
(0.060)
ctvtypes 0.995

(0.060)
CTV Type: LCD -2.096
(Reference= CRT) (0.037)
CTV Type PDP -3.356
(0.088)
Screen size: 21 to 32 inches 0.316
(Reference= 21 inches and below) (0.034)
Screen size: 32 inches and over 0.658
(0.059)
Year dummies +
City dummies +
Brand dummies +
Constant -2.432
(0.243)
N 12432
R2 0.850
IV average price of other markets of the same products by the same brand
sum of the screen size among the same type products the same brand
wage, population of other city
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Source: Author's Estimates
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Figure B.3: Demand Estimates: Mobile phone market
(1)
ln(sj)  ln(so)
price/wage -6.422
(0.797)
OS 0.245

(0.106)
Network:GSM 1.669
(Reference=CDMA) (0.240)
Network: TDS-CDMA 0.823
(0.158)
Panel: Color 0.131
(Reference= B&White) (0.042)
No Camera -0.562
(0.077)
OS:Others -2.489
(Reference=Linux) (0.390)
OS: Symbian 0.410
(0.075)
OS Windows mobile -0.170
(0.153)
OS: No OS 1.940
(0.279)
Brand dummies +
Year dummies +
City dummies +
Constant -8.418
(0.461)
N 46741
R2 0.598
IV price in other markets of the same products by the same brand
square of price in other markets of the same products by the same brand
Standard errors in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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C Results of Reduced Form Estimation of Price Benet Sup-
ply Curve
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Figure C.1: Listed SOE's Price Benet Supply Curve (Reduced Form) CTV market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS GMM
Private 3215.01 0 0 0
(0.000) (.) (.) (.)
SOE 6846.73 0 0 0
(0.000) (.) (.) (.)
benet 1.05539 0.86043 0.85984 0.85859
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Private benefit -0.069248 0 0 0
(0.000) (.) (.) (.)
SOE  benefit　 -0.078118 0 0 0
(0.000) (.) (.) (.)
benefit2 -1.6809e-06 -1.4054e-06 -1.4044e-06 -1.4022e-06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Private benefit2 6.5774e-08 0 0 0
(0.118) (.) (.) (.)
SOE  benefit2 8.4946e-08 0 0 0
(0.011) (.) (.) (.)
debt total -2.2137e-08 -2.2586e-08 -3.9581e-08
(0.106) (0.140) (0.015)
nancial cost 2.1897e-06 7.7206e-06
(0.047) (0.004)
operating tax 6.9172e-06 0.000017897
(0.123) (0.005)
marketing cost -1.1747e-07 -3.2572e-07
(0.154) (0.009)
management cost -1.2729e-07 -9.5519e-08
(0.123) (0.249)
constant -51227.7 -39673.7 -39808.4 -39893.1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
City Dummies + + + +
Year Dummies + + + +
Brand Dummies + + + +
N 11406 6724 6724 6724
R2 0.781 0.684 0.684 0.683
P-value in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Figure C.2: Listed SOE's Price Benet Supply Curve Estimates: Air conditioner market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS GMM
Private -138.648 0 0 0
(0.594) (.) (.) (.)
SOE -1111.59 0 0 0
(0.000) (.) (.) (.)
benet 0.70127 0.95465 0.96415 0.95272
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Priate X benet 0.018613 -0.41127 -0.43382 -0.42076
(0.721) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SOE X benet 0.28458 0 0 0
(0.000) (.) (.) (.)
benefit2 8.1643e-06 -0.000011399 -0.000011949 -0.000011258
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Private X benefit2 -7.0168e-06 0.000028382 0.000029532 0.000029034
(0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SOE X benefit2 -0.000020670 0 0 0
(0.000) (.) (.) (.)
debt total 1.3473e-08 -6.6514e-09 -5.2525e-09
(0.000) (0.283) (0.820)
nancial cost 9.7814e-07 8.4396e-07
(0.000) (0.673)
operating tax -3.1684e-07 -2.6654e-07
(0.499) (0.777)
marketing cost 1.4798e-07 1.4494e-07
(0.000) (0.000)
management cost -2.0695e-08 -2.3661e-08
(0.674) (0.686)
constant -6.97129 -906.748 -1020.78 -1005.66
(0.968) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
City Dummies + + + +
Year Dummies + + + +
Brand Dummies + + + +
N 22308 13158 13158 13158
R2 0.592 0.545 0.547 0.547
p-values in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Figure C.3: Listed SOE's Price Benet Supply Curve Estimates: Mobile phone market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS GMM
Private 523.822 0 0 0
(0.001) (.) (.) (.)
SOE 535.895 0 0 0
(0.001) (.) (.) (.)
benet 1.07683 0.54672 0.55009 0.55439
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Private X benet -0.026086 0.094058 0.079277 0.071988
(0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SOE X benet -0.017103 0 0 0
(0.208) (.) (.) (.)
benefit2 -0.000012319 -7.4103e-06 -7.5000e-06 -7.5860e-06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Private Xbenefit2 -7.0780e-07 -3.2733e-06 -2.8617e-06 -2.6990e-06
(0.099) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SOE X benefit2 5.7006e-08 0 0 0
(0.883) (.) (.) (.)
debt total -5.1677e-09 1.6572e-09 2.8493e-09
(0.014) (0.478) (0.230)
nancial cost 1.4784e-07 -7.1338e-07
(0.477) (0.028)
operating tax -1.8722e-06 -4.0129e-06
(0.010) (0.000)
marketing cost 4.9285e-08 1.0762e-07
(0.072) (0.001)
management cost -1.4395e-07 -1.5814e-07
(0.001) (0.000)
constant -9464.13 -3196.66 -2812.70 -2515.81
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
City Dummies + + + +
Year Dummies + + + +
Brand Dummies + + + +
N 22308 13158 13158 13158
R2 0.592 0.545 0.547 0.547
p-values in parentheses
 p < 0:1,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Abstract: 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how efficient agglomeration economies work 
and how difficult industrial agglomerations sustain in the high-tech industries by a historical 
case study of the Flat Panel Display (FPD) industry in Japan in the 1990 and the first decade 
of the 2000s. Looking globally, the production locations of the FPD industry were 
concentrated in Eastern Asia during the first half of the 2000s. Particularly, more than 90% of 
panels were produced in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Also in Japan, the geographical 
concentration of production locations was remarkable, shown by the examples that Sharp 
produces liquid crystal panels only in Kameyama and that Panasonic manufactures plasma 
display panels (PDP) in Ibaraki and Amagasaki. This led to the creation of high-tech 
industrial agglomerations. Taking these observable facts and the significant changes in recent 
economic environment as a starting point, we study the case study the conditions of factory 
locations of FPD and the factors to change such conditions from the viewpoint of spatial and 
organizational location for seeking global advantage in focus on technological cycle and 
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facilities investment. From the example of one of the largest FPD manufacturer, Panasonic, 
we can observe the progress of large-scale production and the shortening of technological 
cycle, which suggest that the “thickness” of the industrial agglomeration economies was more 
important as a business environment to maintain competitiveness. However, the FPD industry 
in Japan has declined since the late 2000s, while these new high-tech industrial 
agglomerations have faced difficulties to sustain. 
 
Keywords: Agglomeration economies, Industrial location, Locational adjustment, Technological 
cycle, Facility investment, Flat panel display industry 
JEL Classification Numbers: L63, N60, R11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* An early version of this paper was presented at the SIEM International Symposium at 
Ritsumeikan University on March 24-25, 2010. This revised version was completed in 2015. 
 
291 
 
Introduction: Acceleration of Location Adjustment 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how efficient agglomeration economies 
work and how difficult industrial agglomerations sustain in the high-tech industries by a 
historical case study of the Flat Panel Display (FPD) industry in Japan. 
The location of the electronics industry in Japan was characterized by the 
“decentralization” after World War II. Especially, since the second half of the 1960s, the 
factories in the large-city areas were deconcentrated, and a number of the labor-oriented 
productions and processes were located in the local areas outside metropolitan areas. These 
locations created linkage within the areas constituting hierarchies and networks by sharing the 
works among the factories while the affiliated companies, cooperating companies and 
subcontractors were also closely located as suppliers to the factories (Kondo 2007). According 
to the Census of Manufacturers, the percentage of offices and employees of electric equipment 
and apparatus manufacturers located in the local areas1 was 15.7% and 21.1% in 1955, 
respectively, which increased to 50.6% and 59.4% in 2000. This decentralized pattern of 
locations was also developed from the inside of Japan to overseas countries. The ratio of 
production outside Japan was raised from a few percent in the period before the 1980s to 21.9% 
in 2000. This shows that, while the electronics industry was growing, the areas of locations were 
spread from the inside of the country to overseas. 
The adjustment of locations of the electronics industry has been accelerated for the last 
                                                  
1 Local areas are herein defined as the areas in Japan except three large-city areas, which are the Tokyo capital area 
(including Saitama-prefecture, Chiba-prefecture, Tokyo-metropolis and Kanagawa-prefecture), Chukyo area 
(including Gifu-prefecture, Aichi-prefecture and Mie-prefecture) and Hanshin area (including Kyoto-prefecture, 
Oosaka-prefecture and Hyogo-prefecture).  
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dozen years or so. Against the background of relative increase of the production cost in Japan 
due to yen appreciation and the strategic participation in the overseas market after the 1990s, 
business organizations were restructured. The local production linkage was weakened for the 
reasons of the consolidation of domestic production sites and the development of international 
procurement. As a result, a “hollowing out” phenomenon has temporarily appeared in Japan. 
After the 2000s, productions have been “coming back to the country” because of reinstatement 
of “monozukuri” (craftsmanship). Thus, the adjustment of locations has remained ongoing in 
the wider scale of spaces including Japan and overseas.  
There is rapid change of the economic environment with acceleration of location 
adjustment in the background. First of all, globalization and being borderless comprise one of 
the features of the new economic environment. Not only the final goods in the market but also 
information, finance, human resources and raw and intermediate materials have become very 
movable. The barrier of national borders has been lowered. Secondly, the technologies 
incorporated into the goods have evolved. Concerning information technologies and 
digitalization, it is said that the reality is that electronic device technologies have been deepened 
and have become more complex, and that as a result, the cost of R&D and facilities investment 
have sharply increased. In parallel, the interaction of processes of production systems has 
become complex. Strategic coordination within a corporate organization and among firms has 
become important, requiring the review of the “boundaries of the firm,” which concerns 
questions about which processes should be performed by the firm itself and which processes 
should be outsourced (Sako, 2006). Thirdly, international competition has become fierce. While 
the manufacturers in Korea and Taiwan have matured and the Chinese market has been 
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developing more fully, Eastern Asia including Japan has become one of the biggest production 
sites of the electronics industry in the world and the competition in this area has increasingly 
been severe. In this rapid change of economic environment, relocation and the location 
adjustment have been developed in the whole area of Asia including inside Japan. 
Under the economic environment as mentioned above, factory investment in Japan has 
apparently become larger. Particularly, domestic production locations have been redefined as 
those for high value-added products, and therefore large-scale investment with more than 100 
billion yen have continuously been implemented in such sectors as semi-conductors, flat panel 
displays and high-tech products. One of the reasons for the large-scale investment in production 
is to target making the production site a “black box” through the business model of vertical 
integration, which helps the prevention of the leakage of technologies outside the firm. In 
addition, the recent large investment is characterized by the fact that it has been made 
continuously in the specific production sites. For example, in the semi-conductor sector, a total 
of more than 500 billion yen has been invested in the Yokkaichi Plant of Toshiba since 2003. An 
accumulated amount of more than 600 billion yen has been invested in Hiroshima Elpida, which 
is the only production plant of DRAM memory chips in Japan. As for liquid crystal panels, the 
investment in IPS Alpha Technology, which is owned by Sharp, Hitachi, etc., and in Fujifilm’s 
production of polarizing filter panel protection films has amounted to approximately 100 billion 
yen in total. These examples indicate that the large-scale investment has come to the areas of 
materials and parts for “digital domestic appliances.” 
In this paper, we will take up as an example the development history of the flat panel 
display (FPD) industry against the background of the rapid change of the economic environment 
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as mentioned above, and will study the structural factors of recent large-scale investment. We 
will specifically look into the TV business of Panasonic. Recently, technological innovation has 
been developed for television receivers, and in parallel with the widespread high-vision 
broadcasting and digital broadcasting, they are in the transition from one using CRT (Cathode 
Ray Tube), so-called “brown tube TV,” to one using FPD (flat panel display), so-called 
“thin-type TV.” FPD TVs consist of, by the different image display devices they adopt, LCD 
(liquid crystal display) TVs, PDP (plasma display panel) TVs and rear-projection TVs. The 
market size of FPD TVs is large among the “digital domestic appliances” and has been growing 
globally. Therefore, the adjustment of production locations has been accelerated by 
concentrating the management resources and by investing strategically in the facilities (Figure 
1). In this paper, we will take up the processes of transitioning the products which were carried 
out by Panasonic’s TV business, and will study the direction of changes of the production 
locations from the viewpoint of technological cycle and facilities investment. Finally, based on 
the example of FPD manufacturers, we will consider the relation between the organizational 
adjustment of locations and the industrial agglomeration as well as the new direction of factory 
locations. Also, we will discuss about agglomeration economies in the fact that the FPD 
industry in Japan has declined since the late 2000s, while these new high-tech industrial 
agglomerations have faced difficulties to sustain. 
 
--Figure 1-- 
 
 
295 
 
The Case Study of Panasonic: Shifting from CRT TV to PDP business  
 
Panasonic’s TV business started its full-scale operation in 1953, and developed into 
one of the core businesses of Panasonic. Looking at the transition of Panasonic’s production in 
Japan, the main factories were located in Ibaraki and Moriguchi in Osaka till the first half of the 
era of rapid economic growth of Japan ("Golden Sixties". The factories were established in 
Fujisawa of Kanagawa in 1963 for assembly of CRTs for black and white TVs and in 
Utsunomiya of Tochigi in 1967 solely for assembly of color TVs. Thus, the production locations 
were diversified along with the expansion of the demand for the products. In the middle of the 
1970s, the mainstream of TVs shifted from black and white to color ones, and after the 
restructuring of the business organization of TVs for exports and black and white TVs, the 
production of color CRT TVs was carried out mainly in the Ibaraki Plant of Osaka and in the 
Utsunomiya Plant in Tochigi since the late 1970s. Outside Japan, factories were established in 
Mexico for the North American market and in Malaysia for the Asian market. Thus, 
international production network was formed in such a way that new technologically adapted 
goods were developed in Japan and the mass-produced goods were transferred abroad, which 
was the so-called “vertical-model” between Japan and overseas countries. The production of 
color CRT TVs was at its peak in the middle of the 1980s, and the number of CRT TVs 
produced by Panasonic exceeded 10 million units. 
Production in Japan decreased in the late 1980s since the market in Japan was 
saturated and competition against the goods of foreign manufacturers became fierce. Although 
domestic production was specialized for high added-value goods, such as flat CRT TVs, in the 
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1990s, it must have been restructured because it was less competitive in terms of production 
cost. Indeed, the Panasonic corporate group faced a management crisis between the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, and drastic management reform was conducted after President of Panasonic 
Yoichi Morishita took over the position from former President Kunio Nakamura2. In this 
movement, the TV business was substantially restructured, and the mainstream of goods was 
transposed from CRT TVs to PDP (plasma display panel) TVs.  
After the late 1990s, Panasonic underwent restructuring of the TV business through 
the stages of the establishment of new business, the reduction of CRT TV business and the 
substantial shift to PDP business. PDP business in Japan actually started in 1994 when the “Joint 
Development Committee of Plasma Display Panel for High-Vision Broadcasting” 3  was 
established. Panasonic kicked off its PDP business unit in 1998, when the other competitors, i.e. 
Fujitsu, NEC and Hitachi, had entered into the mass-production phase. Panasonic was the fourth 
participant in the PDP market in Japan. It required Panasonic to make a large investment to 
catch up with its advanced competitors. Panasonic established its PDP manufacturing subsidiary, 
“Matsushita Plasma Display Panel Company Ltd.,” in July 2000, and formed a coalition with 
Toray in October 2000, which resulted in the establishment of “Matsushita PDP Company Ltd.” 
(MPDP) with 1.2 billion yen in capital (75% owned by Panasonic and 25% owned by Toray). 
The separate entity engaging in the production of PDP co-funded with Toray was motivated by 
the diversification of investment risks and the direction for the business model of vertical 
                                                  
2 Especially, the restructuring of business organizations involved the abolishment of business units which were 
reorganized into 14 business domains, and the delisting of subsidiary companies which were merged into their parent 
company.  
3 The Committee was established under the leadership of NHK for the purpose of commercializing PDP television 
receivers with 40 inch displays and developing PDP television receivers with 50 inch displays. 27 companies, 
institutions and associations participated in the Committee.   
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integration. 
In the meantime, Panasonic invested continuously in the liquid crystal panel business 
throughout the 1990s as well as PDP, both of which were considered as post-CRT products. 
However, as the decision of “concentration in core competence” was made, CRT business and 
LCD business were restructured after the PDP business was chosen to make a concentrated 
investment of management resources. LCD business was decided to be sold to Toshiba in 2002, 
which resulted in the formation of a manufacturing subsidiary, “Toshiba Matsushita Display 
Technology Co., Ltd.,” with 60% owned by Toshiba and 40% owned by Panasonic. In the end 
of October 2004, Hitachi took the lead to establish a production company of LCD panels for 
TVs, “IPS Alpha Technology, Ltd.,”4 in which Toshiba and Panasonic jointly invested. Thus, 
Panasonic’s LCD business was restructured in such a way as to transfer the businesses to the 
entities jointly operated with other companies. CRT business was also restructured into the 
joint-venture company with Toshiba, “Matsushita Toshiba Picture Display Co., Ltd.,” 
established in 2003, which is a joint operation in charge of development, production and sales of 
CRTs on a global basis5. As seen above, in the case of Panasonic, it reduced the importance of 
CRT business and LCD business through the alliance with other companies, and reformed its 
structure allowing it to invest intensively in PDP business.  
In this process of shifting to PDP business, how was the adjustment of locations 
developed? According to the classification of Watts (1987), the adjustment of locations is 
                                                  
4 About 110 billion yen was invested in the Mobara Plant of Chiba-prefecture in May 2006, which started its 
operation with a production capacity of 1.6 million pieces of panels in a year (in terms of 32 inch size panel) using 
the sixth generation glass base plate (with a size of 1,500 millimeters by 1,850 millimeters). The production capacity 
was increased to 2.5 million pieces per annum (in terms of 32 inch size panel) in April 2007.       
5 In the end of March 2007, Panasonic bought all shares of MTPD owned by Toshiba (35.5%), which made the 
company a wholly owned subsidiary of Panasonic. The corporate name was changed to “MT Picture Display Co., 
Ltd.” Its capital is 10 billion yen and the employees of group companies are 9,077 (as of the end of 2006).  
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defined as the process in which two or more production companies restructure their production 
facilities and which consists of the phases of establishment of a factory, adjustment within the 
factory (in situ adjustment), closure of the factory, etc. If we put the adjustment of locations 
accompanied with the restructuring of TV businesses in these phases, the factories of CRTs and 
TV parts were at first closed. Panasonic’s CRT production was carried out in the Takatsuki Plant 
and Utsunomiya (Hiraide) Plant, both of which were located close to the factories for final 
assembly in Ibaraki and Utsunomiya. The Utsunomiya Plant was closed in August 2003 and the 
Takatsuki Plant was reduced to a part of a trial production line while its mass-production line 
was transferred overseas in September 2004. Along with these changes, many suppliers 
producing the peripheral parts of CRT closed their domestic factories and transferred their 
production to outside Japan. 
The next phase is the changes within the existing factories, in which the production 
facilities for CRT TVs were transformed to those for FPD panels. When PDP business started in 
1998, the only production facility of PDP was the production line at the trial level in the 
Takatsuki Plant. The No.1 Factory was constructed in Ibaraki in June 2001, and the full-scale 
production facilities for PDPs were launched in the Takatsuki Plant and Ibaraki Plant 
respectively. The No.2 Factory in the Ibaraki Plant, with its operations started in April 2004, 
was constructed in the empty space after the production facilities for CRTs were removed. As 
for the relocation of employees, about 700 employees were transferred from the parent company 
to the manufacturing subsidiary, “Matsushita Plasma Display Co., Ltd.” when it was established. 
700 employees was nearly equivalent to the total number of such subsidiary. The relocation of 
factory employees also progressed to each of the other factories. In the development groups, 
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about 400 employees working in the Takatsuki Plant were transferred to the Second Factory of 
the Ibaraki Plant in 2004. In addition, the development groups, which had been divided into the 
Ibaraki Plant for TV production and the Kadoma Plant for production of other AV products, 
were concentrated in the Kadoma Plant, into which about 1,500 engineers in charge of 
development of TV products were transferred. In other areas, the Utsunomiya Plant, which had 
been the biggest domestic production site for CRT TVs, was transformed to the assembly base 
of LCD TVs6, and the Ishikawa Plant, which had been the production base of LCD panels, was 
merged into the joint-venture company with Toshiba and specialized in production of small to 
medium size LCD panels. Thus, the adjustment of production resources was completed through 
the utilization of the existing factories. 
Finally, along with the transformation of the existing factories, the new factories were 
established with the characteristic of large investment. In the production of FPD panels, many 
types of alliance & cooperation and merger & acquisition were made among the companies. 
This may prove that the specific image display devices require huge investment. The factories 
established for the production of such devices are very large-scale, which requires such a large 
investment that may affect the management of the company. As for Panasonic’s factories of PDP 
productions, there were two factories in Takatsuki and Ibaraki which reorganized the existing 
production facilities. In addition, the Shanghai Plant (2002), the No.3 Factory (2005), the No.4 
Factory(2007), and the No.5 Factory of the Amagasaki Plant (2009) were newly established in 
the years indicated, respectively. As a result, the factory locations of panel productions of 
Panasonic’s PDP business were, as seen in Figure 2, five locations in Japan and one location 
                                                  
6 While Panasonic sells LCD TVs, most of the LCD panels for TVs are outsourced.  
300 
 
overseas. Looking globally, the panel productions were concentrated in Japan and Shanghai, 
which exported the panels to each of the factories near the market of final consumption. They 
were the assembling factories to complete the TV sets, which were located in Mexico for the 
North American market, Brazil for the South American market, the Czech Republic for the 
European market and Singapore for South East Asia and South Asia. 
 
--Figure 2-- 
 
Industrial Characteristics of PDP and Its Production System 
 
Along with the technological innovation from CRT to FPD, the characteristics of the 
TV (display) industry have significantly changed7. Firstly, the industry characteristics have 
changed in terms of product cycle. The product life is very short, the competition becomes more 
fierce and the unit price of the product falls in a short period of time. The price per unit area of 
FPD panel for TVs has fallen about 25% every year since 2003. The TV makers can secure 
profit if it successfully launches the products at the time when they are actively demanded. If 
the TV makers lose the timing, it cannot earn sufficient profit. As the pioneer has a bigger 
advantage (i.e. the first movers’ advantage), it is very important to respond quickly to changes in 
the market conditions. Investment efficiency is higher, assuming that the same amount of 
finance is invested, if the company starts production earlier. As the product has a short life cycle, 
it is not easy to differentiate the goods from the competitors’ ones and it tends to turn into severe 
                                                  
7 Please refer to Murtha, Lenway and Hart (2004) which provides an overview of the history of the FPD industry 
from its start to the substantially developed phase.  
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price competition. As a result, it easily becomes a “Commodification” (Ogasawara and 
Matsumoto, 2006).  
Secondly, there is the technological characteristic. As the production of CRT TVs 
consisted mainly of the assembly of parts and units, the production process was “visible.”8 The 
process of producing PDPs and LCDs is more invisible. Particularly, the panel production 
process takes place in a clean room, which requires knowledge in the “device” field to assess 
the yield ratio and the profit volume ratio9. In addition, as the ratio of panel component price 
against the manufacturing cost is high, the source of added-value depends largely on the costs of 
the glass panel and image processing circuit. This indicates that the development of electronic 
parts, such as panel materials and semi-conductors and the management of procurement have a 
considerable weight in the production system. 
Thirdly, there was a change in the competitive environment. Large-size FPD TVs, 
which were first commercialized by Sharp in 1999, have become popular on a global basis since 
2002, and their number of shipment exceeded that of CRT TVs in 2005. Until the late 1990s, the 
mainstream was small and medium LCDs, which were manufactured only by Japanese 
companies. For the last few years during which the market of FPD TVs has significantly 
expanded, large investment has been made by the producers of Korea and Taiwan, and the 
relative market share of FPD panels held by the Japanese manufacturers on a shipment basis has 
gone down rapidly (see Figure 3). Not only because the companies in these three Asian 
countries are seriously competing with each other in production while the Korean companies, 
                                                  
8 Refer to Hiramoto (1994) about the details of the manufacturing process and production system of CRT TVs.  
9  Mr. Ken Morita, who undertook the position of Head of PDP business in 2000, is specializing in the 
“semiconductor” field. His last position was Head of IC business of Semiconductor Company, Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co., Ltd. The fact that a person formerly in semiconductor business is assigned as a leader of PDP business 
proves that the TV business requires the knowledge and know-how of the “devices.”   
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such as Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics, and the Taiwanese producers are rising, but 
also because the different image display devices, such as LCD panels, PDPs and rear-projection 
systems are competing, the market of FPD TVs tends to enter into an oversupply situation 
against the real demand. Therefore, although the market has come to real growth, the prices of 
the products are declining and the profitability of business is rapidly going down except a few 
of the top-share producers. In order for the manufacturers of FPD TVs to increase their 
profitability, it is indispensable that the company has the scale of economy to reduce the 
procurement costs and the financial strength that enables continuous investment of huge 
amounts into their facilities. 
 
--Figure 3-- 
 
After shifting its TV business to PDP, Panasonic has segregated the products into two 
categories, which are PDP with more than 37 inch display and LCD with less than 32 inch 
display10. Although all quantity of LCD panels of less than 32 inches were purchased from the 
Korean or Taiwanese manufacturers, the panels made in Japan have been partly used after the 
Mobara Plant of IPS Alpha Technology started its full-scale operations. TVs with more than a 
37 inch size are all the PDP system in Panasonic. Its business model of PDP is called “vertical 
integration.” It makes the production of panels and image processing circuits which are the 
source of added-value into “black box” and actively expands the internalization of panel parts 
                                                  
10 Panasonic has started selling LCD TVs with more than 37 inch display since the first half of 2007. LCD panels are 
outsourced from the Taiwanese manufacturer. The fact that PDP TVs and LCD TVs, both of which have 37 inch 
display, are sold by Panasonic indicates that the competition among the different image display devices mentioned 
above has become fiercer.   
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and related resources.    
The technological characteristic of PDP is that it is not as dependent on manufacturing 
equipment as semi-conductors and LCD panels are. Analog technique is the core of the 
technology, such as know-how of calcination in the manufacturing process, designing of circuit 
boards, etc. Panasonic has two unique technologies. One is the production process developed by 
Toray with “small rooms” in which fluorescent devices are placed that are formed on a glass 
base plate in a reticular pattern by means of the photosensitive paste system mainly consisting 
of exposure and development. This system is more productive than the sandblasting system 
which is generally adopted in the industry. Another technology is the designing of the driving 
circuit. TV systems incorporate an image quality circuit (which is relevant to image quality) and 
a driving circuit as well as many peripheral parts, such as decoders, graphics circuits, 
demodulating circuits, modems, interfaces, etc. The parts relating to the image quality are 
crucial to differentiate the products from other brands as consumers require high quality image 
from high-end TVs. Panasonic has developed the universal platform system LSI called 
“Uniphier” which provides a common circuit design with the system LSIs used in digital 
domestic appliances. This gives Panasonic a competitive advantage in designing of system LSI, 
such as an image quality circuit and a driving circuit11. Thus, Panasonic has adopted its strategy 
to differentiate its products with the integrated power of its panel technology and its image 
processing circuit technology as well as its vertical integration business model.  
PDP’s production system consists of the following processes: Rear panel process in 
which electrodes and dielectrics are formed on glass board, front panel process, panel assembly 
                                                  
11 The system LSI “PEAKS”, which is a common engine of the products named “VIERA”, is one of the concrete 
examples of system LSI developed on the basis of Uniphier. 
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process and final assembly process. In the First Factory in Ibaraki, the first and second floors 
are allocated to the front panel process, there is a canteen on the third floor, the process of 
sealing of the front panel and rear panel is located on the fourth floor and the fifth floor is 
allocated to the set assembly process (after a driver LSI is affixed). The rear panel process is 
separately located in the Takatsuki Plant, which shares the total processes with Ibaraki12. The 
Shanghai Plant, which is the only panel production site overseas, was constructed in October 
2001 and started its operation in December 2001, in which the production line of the First 
Factory was copied13. At the beginning, it imported the panels from Japan and carried out the 
assembling operation. In April 2003, it introduced the production facilities of panels, and started 
the production and shipment of PDP in August 2003. As seen above, PDP business pushed 
location adjustment by utilizing the existing factories and has gradually developed into the 
vertical integration model. 
Integrated production initiated when the Second Plant of Ibaraki started. Cost 
reduction of PDP requires threefold effort: (1) standardization of processes, (2) energy-saving, 
reduction of materials and reduction of usage of parts and (3) improvement of productivity. As a 
precondition of these efforts, the crucial factor is the size of the glass base plate. The bigger the 
glass base plate is, the more panels can be taken from it. In the FPD production, the number of 
panels taken from the material is an important parameter because the production cost may be 
half if the panels taken are twice in number from one glass base plate. For this reason, the 
                                                  
12 Panasonic explains the reason why the production was not integrated in one location at the First Factory is that “it 
prioritizes early start-up and the utilization of existing facilities.” (Panasonic’s corporate materials)  
13 The corporate entity of Shanghai Plant is established in January 2001 as Shanghai Matsushita Plasma Display Co., 
Ltd. which is jointly invested by Panasonic, Shanghai Ko-Den Electronic Co., Ltd. (SVA), Shanghai Industry 
Investment (Group) Ltd. and Shanghai Ko-Den (Group) Ltd. It is designated as “the first project of domestic PDP 
production” by the National Development Committee of the Peoples Republic of China. Registered capital is 70 
million dollars, which are invested 51% by Panasonic, 41.9% by Shanghai Ko-Den Electronic and the rest of about 
8% by others. 
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factory building, production facilities and so forth should reasonably be required to be bigger as 
the glass base plate should be larger for the purpose of cost reduction.  
 
--Table 1-- 
 
Table 1 shows the PDP production bases of Panasonic. In the production line of the 
No.1 Factory of Ibaraki, only one panel can be taken from the glass base plate(“mother glass”) 
in terms of the 42 inch size panel. In the No.2 Factory, three panels can be taken, six panels can 
be taken in the No.3 Factory of Amagasaki, and the No.4 Factory increased to eight panels 
which started operation in June 2007. The number of panels taken from one glass base plate was 
directly linked to productivity. As for investment productivity which is defined as the ratio of 
the number of panels to be produced in the factory to the amount of investment made in such 
factory, it amounts to 5.3 per invested amount for the No.4 Factory of Amagasaki if that of the 
No.1 Factory is assumed as 1 for the same investment amount. As a result, the amount of 
facilities investment per factory has rapidly increased, and the investment amount in the No.4 
Factory of Amagasaki boosted to about 180 billion yen. Furthermore, in the planned No.5 
Factory of Amagasaki, which would be the world’s largest production base of PDP, a total of 
about 280 billion were be invested. It would be an enormous plant, with a total floor size about 
nine times that of the No.1 Factory. 
The accumulated amount of investment Panasonic made in its PDP business during the 
period between 2001, when it started its substantial investment, and the end of the first half of 
2007 exceeds 700 billion yen. With its cumulative and continuous facilities investment, 
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Panasonic gained the world’s top share in 2006 in terms of PDP TVs (as a complete set of 
product) and PDP panels, respectively14. This was the largest amount of investment in a single 
product ever made by Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., of which the entire business 
focus had been shifted significantly to PDP business. Sales in the PDP business were growing 
rapidly in proportion to facilities investment, and more than 20% of total facilities investment of 
the company was made for PDP business. However, a difficult condition to meet was that the 
manufactures were required to make the facilities investment within the limit of the amount of 
its owned cash, as cash-flow management was emphasized to maintain its financial rating in the 
market. There may be a risk of suffering excessive debt, and if it fails to pay off the huge 
investment, it may be exposed to a risk of going into a negative spiral in which debts increase, 
the market rating declines, and investment should be reduced. Strategic action becomes more 
important for making decisions on at which timing and in which production systems investment 
should be made. As a result of the technological character as mentioned above and the strategic 
action in facilities investment, factory investment has become large-scale and concentrated. 
 
Concentrated Locations and Industrial Agglomeration 
 
Looking globally, the production sites of the FPD industry are concentrated in Eastern 
Asia. Particularly, more than 90% of panels are produced in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. While the 
production of CRT(cathode-ray tubes) was diversified into the United States, Europe and Asia, 
                                                  
14 According to the “World’s Market Share of 26 Items” 2007 version issued by the Nikkei financial newspaper, as 
for PDP TVs, Panasonic has 29.5% of the total market share, LG Electronics (Korea) has 15.8% and Samsung 
Electronics (Korea) has 14.1%, and as for PDP panels, Panasonic has 31.5%, LG Electronics (Korea) has 28.2% and 
Samsung SDI (Korea) has 22.1% (both market shares for PDP TVs and PDP panels are on the basis of shipment 
value). 
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the production of FPDs shows an excessive concentration in Eastern Asia. Therefore, it appears 
to be a sort of “phenomenon of market occupation by a specific winner (Winner-Take-All)" that 
a winner of the competition in Eastern Asia would be a winner in the global market. In the 
intensified competition in Eastern Asia, the management of cost reduction, the protection of the 
intellectual properties15 and the shortening of “time” have become important. 
In this competitive environment, the FPD panel manufacturers were trying to 
concentrate their locations due to various factors, such as focused investment in the production 
site, the proximity to the suppliers of panel components and related materials, preferential 
treatment under the governmental or municipal policies (such as industrial park), the use of 
local resources, etc. Examples are, for LCD panels, Sharp’s Kameyama Factories in which 
concentrated investment continues, and Samsung Electronics’ factories in Cheonan and 
Tangjeong, and for PDPs, Panasonic’s Ibaraki and Amagasaki factories as mentioned above. To 
analyze the concentration of locations, a cross-sectional view of geographical proximity and 
industry cluster16 may be effective. In other words, these geographical features led to the 
development of industrial agglomerations. 
If we look at the location adjustment of Panasonic’s PDP business, geographical 
proximity was one of the key points of the expansion of factories from Takatsuki and Ibaraki to 
Amagasaki. A similar example, which is very suggestive, was Intel, one of the largest 
                                                  
15 Although this report does not go into detail on intellectual property management, it is pointed out that patent 
disputes on the PDPs are caused from time to time between the manufacturers of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, and that 
the importance of protection of intellectual properties increases. In Japan, the Advanced PDP Development Center 
Corporation (APDC) was established in July 2003 by the five Japanese PDP manufacturers (Panasonic, Hitachi, 
Pioneer, Fujitsu and NEC Plasma Display) for the purpose of engaging in joint development of the fundamental 
technologies of the next generation PDPs. Hitachi and Panasonic made a comprehensive alliance in PDP business in 
February 2005 by establishing the patent management company “Hitachi Plasma Patent Licensing Co., Ltd.” Thus, 
Japan has been moving to strengthen the protection of intellectual properties. 
16 According to Porter, industrial cluster is defined as “the status of associated companies, suppliers, service 
providers, related institutions etc. in the specific sector being geographically concentrated and cooperating with each 
other while competing with each other.” (Porter 1998) 
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semiconductor manufacturer, which experiments with “co-location” (Sakakibara 2005: 152-154). 
Co-location means to conduct R&D and production in the same place. The semiconductor 
industry has a distinctive product cycle called “silicon cycle”. In this cycle, as a frontrunner’s 
benefit is larger if the product cycle becomes shorter, the speed of technological transfer is of 
great importance from the fundamental research activities to the development and production 
bases and to other production sites. Co-location may accelerate establishment of the production 
process, startup of mass-production and improvement of yield ratio. Furthermore, Intel has 
successfully speeded up its startup of mass-production at a global level by the method of “copy 
exactly” wherein all processes developed and completed in the mass-production development 
facility including logistics systems are copied exactly in other mass-production facilities 
(McDonald, 1998). These examples from Intel suggest that close information exchange and 
information sharing among each activity of R&D and production were more and more necessary 
in order to accelerate mass-production by “vertical startup” with the cooperation of these 
activities. Like Intel’s method that maximizes the merit of proximity, Panasonic was also 
successful in setting up mass-production smoothly among the locations of Takatsuki, Ibaraki 
and Amagasaki17.  
Since the material cost represented 40 to 65% of the total cost of an FPD panel, the 
proximity to the panel component manufacturers and the manufacturing equipment producers 
was also important, as well as the importance of the co-location of R&D and production. 
Cooperation with components manufacturers and equipment producers was indispensable to 
                                                  
17 In the assembly process of the Ibaraki Factory, efforts are made to implement the cell production system under the 
direction of the Deputy Head of Production Innovation Headquarters who formerly worked for Toyota. The 
production system of the Ibaraki Factory is horizontally spread over Panasonic’s other factories in the world. In this 
sense, the production system of the Ibaraki Factory is designated the role of “mother factory.” 
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start up mass-production quickly, and therefore not only the engineers of Panasonic’s R&D 
activities but also the engineers of the components manufacturers and the equipment producers 
worked in the PDP production factories of Panasonic. In addition, the different timing of 
designing of various elements in the production line, such as panels being designed with a 
two-year cycle, the designing of semiconductors being done every year, and the circuits and 
mechanisms of the equipment being designed once every half-year, etc., caused the engineers in 
charge of these elements to make frequent adjustments in the production factories. So, the 
proximity of locations of the components manufacturers and the equipment producers was one 
of the requirements to increase the accumulative effect by gathering many diversified engineers 
in the factories. 
Another reason to make proximity more important was transportation cost. Along with 
the glass base plate becoming larger, the equipment, the components and the materials were all 
becoming bigger as well. So, the transportation cost becomes serious. In this respect, the 
industrial agglomeration brings advantages by accumulating the equipment producers and the 
component manufacturers in proximity to the FPD panel production site. In the past when the 
locations were diversified, the labor cost was a more important condition for deciding the 
locations, and the weight of the transportation costs was not so high as it was reduced by the 
development of social infrastructure such as networks of motorways. However, the FPD TV 
industry becomes an “apparatus industry” requiring a huge amount of facilities investment, and 
in such situation, the weight of fixed costs becomes higher than variable costs such as labor cost. 
For this reason, as well as the other reason of requiring close cooperation within the 
intra-divisions of the company and with the components and equipment manufacturers ,the 
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associated suppliers and the subcontractors, the importance of transportation cost has come up 
again. As for the PDP business of Panasonic, the industrial agglomeration of Hanshin 
large-cities areas where the factories of Takatsuki, Ibaraki and Amagasaki were located brings a 
large advantage to Panasonic, and also Sharp’s LCD business had benefit of agglomeration 
economies in Osaka, Nara and Mie. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
As a summary of this paper, the interrelation between the location adjustment and the 
industrial agglomeration was mentioned below. Recently, the issues of geographical proximity 
have been actively discussed, and industrial agglomeration is one of the most important 
keywords for regional policy18. Industrial agglomeration attracts social scientist’s attention to its 
role particularly as a cradle of economic growth and innovation. Its importance has also 
increased as the corporate competition strategy and the policy subject19. The discussions on 
agglomeration economies are broadly divided into two categories: One concerns the benefits of 
agglomeration that brings the effect of reduction of transportation costs and transactional costs 
and improves social infrastructures. For the companies choosing their locations in industrial 
                                                  
18 In the context of economic geography, industrial agglomeration and industrial cluster have almost the same 
meaning. However, the concept of cluster involves a partly non-geographical concept. For example, competitive 
relations and conditions for demands involved in the concept of cluster are not necessarily geographical matters. As 
for industrial agglomeration, there is an enormous amount of accumulated study results on this subject. As they 
involve many points of discussion, such as what the benefits of accumulation are, how the accumulation effect can be 
measured, etc., the geographical concentration of industry cannot be simply called agglomeration. Recognizing the 
abovementioned points, a more neutral concept of industrial agglomeration is used in this paper. 
19 Japan’s regional policy, “Law concerning Regional Industrial agglomeration and Activation,” was implemented in 
1997, and since 2001, the “Industrial cluster Plan” was developed by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
and the “Knowledge Cluster Project” by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. There 
are some reports, such as Ishikura 2003, which discuss the policy subjects comprehensively from the viewpoint of 
industrial cluster. 
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agglomeration, the benefits are those connected with economies of scale or economies of scope. 
The other point of discussion on industrial agglomeration is the benefits from the viewpoint of 
“knowledge-based activities” such as R&D and technological development. The spillover 
brought by the stock of knowledge as well as communication through face-to-face 
communication play an important role, and the existence of external economies relating to the 
non-market interaction is considered important20. In light of this point of discussion on 
industrial agglomeration, it is suggested in PDP business that the external economies were 
important as the conditions to enjoy the economies of scale. 
In the FPD industry, such as PDP or LCD, one industrial feature is the competition in 
facilities investment, and another feature is the concentration of knowledge and know-how. In 
traditional discussions on geographical proximity, the effect of reduction of transportation and 
transactional costs and the spillover effect of knowledge are identified. However, it is still 
important how to reinterpret the dynamism of location adjustments from the viewpoint of 
geographical proximity. In the FPD industry, where the market was changing drastically, a 
variety of collaborations and alliances have become important to quickly recover the huge 
amount of facilities investment, and therefore location adjustments are developing in a dynamic 
way as well. From the historical case studies of PDP industry, the increasing importance of 
“thickness” of the industrial agglomeration was observed as a business environment which 
enabled the acceleration of location adjustments and influenced the maintenance and 
improvement of competitiveness.   
                                                  
20 As for the external economies relating to non-market interaction, Yamamoto (2005) organizes the subject by 
comprehensive collection of relevant works. Mizuno (2005) also arranges the subject in the context of innovation and 
industrial agglomeration. Fujita and Thisse (2003) and others study the theory on the accumulation effect concerning 
intellectual activities. However, as Fujita and Thisse (2003) pointed out, there is substantial room for future study 
both in theory and facts to deal with the subject of accumulation effect concerning intellectual activities. 
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Finally, we would like to mention a new movement of factory locations which can be 
observed in the FPD cases. It was worth noting that the large-scale factories were located in the 
bay areas, such as the Amagasaki Plant of Panasonic and the Sakai Complex Plant of Sharp, 
where there were a lot of complexes of heavy industries, but unused lands have increased in 
these days. In the lands for industrial use in the bay areas, there were a lot of advantages. For 
example, supply bases of electricity and gas were located in the vicinity, logistics infrastructure, 
such as airports and seaports, was provided, and large areas can be secured. On the one hand, it 
was remarkable in the production of leading-edge and technology-oriented products such as 
FPDs taken up in this report that facilities investment had become significantly large and that 
the facilities had concentrated more and more in the main bases. Therefore, the factory locations 
were concentrated in the bay areas along with the strengthened hub functions in logistics. In the 
domestic production of FPDs, the importance of the Hanshin Industrial Zone had been growing, 
which show an aspect of the “panel bay." However, the FPD industry in Japan has declined 
since the late 2000s, while these new high-tech industrial agglomerations have faced difficulties 
to sustain. Thus, the current down turn in the industry is causing a lot of these fact-findings in 
agglomeration economies controversial. 
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Figure 1. FPD Plant Investment and Technological Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FPD Data Book by Electronic Journal, Inc. 
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Figure 2. Panasonic PDP Plant Location in 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Panasonic corporate profile 
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Figure 3. FPD Plant Investment among East Asian Countries in the half of the 2000s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s collected data 
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Table 1. Panasonic PDP Plants in Japan and China 
 
Shang-hai Plant
No.1 fab No.2 No.3 No.4 No.5
（Under construction)
Plant site size ? 47,000㎡
Plant building size 30,000㎡ 75,000㎡ 147,000㎡ 192,000㎡ 284,000㎡ 17,000㎡
start year to operate 2001 2004 2005 2007 2009 2002
number of building floors 5th floors 4th floors 4th floors 6th floors 6th floors -
Investment cost 35,000 60,000 95,000 180,000 280,000 20,000
(million YEN)
Production Units per month 30,000 100,000 250,000 500,000 1,000,000? 25,000
Productivity for investment 1 2.4 4.3 5.3 - 1～1.5
Labor Productivity 1 2.3 4.2 - - -
Mother Glass Size 1 3 6 8 10 1
（per 42 inch）
Ibaraki Plant Amagasaki Plant
122,000㎡ 147,000㎡
42"
42" 42" 42"
42"
42"
 
 
Source: IRC(2003, 2006) and author’s collected data by corporate interviews 
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Wrap up 
 
Hideki Esho 
 
The main research question of this conference was how Asian economies interact each other under 
the changing international economic environment. Especially a notable new trend since 1990s is the 
penetration of rising Chinese economy in “East and Southeast Asia, the center of economic growth 
in the world”. How large the penetration of Chinese economy in this region? What are the impacts of 
rising Chinese economy on this region? How Japan, ASEAN countries, and India respond to this 
new phenomenon? Can India be a competitor with China in terms of economic performance? On 
these issues we could get innumerable valuable insights through excellent presentations and 
discussions in two days’ conference of yesterday and today. First of all, representing Institute of 
Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University, I thank all participants of this conference.  
 
Prof. Hongzhong Liu approached to these issues though political economy approach. He focused on 
the effects of political relations on export flows between China and Asian countries, notably Japan, 
South Korea, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. In his conclusion, he warns that “the gap between the 
demand of economic integration by market forces and the political division among countries is wider 
and wider”, and suggest that “effectively improving in the political relations between countries will 
release the spillover effects of China’s economic growth and benefit the whole East Asia”.  
 
The paper of Prof. Tamura and Prof. Xu analyzed international competitiveness of China using a 
bilateral international trade matrix in manufacturers for China and major Asian and OECD countries 
in 2003-2008. They found the sources of Chinese competitiveness in lower wages and higher R&D 
expenditures, and, in addition, the openness to foreign capital and the excellent transportation links. 
Also they found that China was the most competitive country in 2007 and 2008, and China improved 
its state of technology since 2003.    
 
The paper of Prof. Nguen Anh Thu, focused on Vietnam’s trade integration with ASEAN+3, 
depending on RCA index, TC index, and IIT index. She indicates that trade integration in the context 
of ASEAN+3 contributes to promote Vietnam-ASEAN+3 trade, and trade integration has promoted 
investment and shifted production network toward potential markets such as Vietnam. In her analysis, 
it is interesting to know that China is the partner that Vietnam had the largest trade deficit in the 
ASEAN+3, and conversely Vietnam consistently had trade surplus with Japan.  
 
All these three papers, focusing international trade, clearly indicate the strengthening of Chinese 
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competitiveness and growing influence of rising Chinese economy.   
 
Dr. Fujita’s paper tries to deepen our understanding of the Chinese penetration in Asian market, 
notably focusing motorcycle industry of Vietnam from the viewpoint of industrial organization. She 
compares the Chinese model of industrial organization with that of Japanese model. She traces the 
trajectories of organizational change of each model depending on an in-depth longitudinal analysis. 
And she conclude that although initially Chinese model proved more adaptable to developing 
country conditions, in the medium term, the Japanese model gained supremacy over Chinese model 
as Japanese lead firms made certain adjustments to the nature of their products, while actively 
realigning the capability structure. Also she concludes that while Chinese model lost supremacy in 
the medium term, it nevertheless continued to function in an adapted form as suppliers gained the 
complementary competencies required by local assemblers.  
 
There are two papers on India. Prof. Sato analyzed Japanese companies working in India using 
original questionnaire survey of 113 companies. He indicates locations, industrial sectors, 
employment, numbers, sales, profit, establishment year, the reason to invest in India, forms of 
procurement, finance, and so on. Among his conclusions the most interesting and precious findings 
are that (1) many companies stressed the potential of not only Indian domestic market but also of the 
neighboring countries, (2) local content ratio is not high, (3) employment of contract labor is 
common, and (4) the most serious obstacle for business is the difficulty to obtain good human 
resources. Some of these findings are contrary to our general understanding of Indian economy.  
 
Prof. K. J. Joseph focuses on the development of ICT industry in India and Indian engagement in 
ASEAN. He first described a contrasting growth story of ICT software and hardware (electronics). 
And he mentions that “India’s export and import to ASEAN and electronics leaders like Japan and 
Korea declined to reach negligible level at present,” and “thank to growing domestic demand, India’s 
imports by and large is confined to final demand goods almost from China.”  
 
From these papers, we know that India is no competitor with China in Asian market. Indian 
penetration into East and Southeast Asia is negligible in terms of trade. Rather for India, China is the 
biggest importer and trade deficit of India to China is increasing in a big way from US$0.6 billion in 
1998 to US$39.1 billion in 2012. On the other hand Chinese FDI in Asia including Japan, India, 
ASEAN is almost nothing, quite a contrast with huge FDI from Japan. Chinese engagement in Asia 
confines to trade.  
 
Prof. Watanabe turns her eyes to Chinese domestic market. She took up three electronics industries, 
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namely TV, mobile phone, and air conditioner, and investigated competition neutrality (sound 
competition) of SOEs in these three markets. Her conclusions are, (1) there is a tendency across 
three industries for foreign brands to hold a benefit advantage and for private brands to maintain a 
cost advantage, and the SOEs are trapped in the middle, failing to hold competitive advantages. (2) 
the SOE s and private firms looks to have been trapped in the excess competition equilibrium.  
 
And finally there are two papers on Japanese market or industry. Prof Kondo analyzed Flat Panel 
Display (FPD) industry in Japan in terms of economic geography1. He showed how efficient 
agglomeration economies work and how difficult industrial agglomerations sustain in the high-tech 
industries. He took up the example of one of the largest FPD manufacturer, Panasonic, and found 
that the “thickness” of the industrial agglomeration economies was more important as a business 
environment to maintain competitiveness.  
 
Prof. Takechi’s paper focuses on quality sorting, transport costs, specific costs, geographic barriers, 
and product heterogeneity. To investigate these issues, he used agricultural products (vegetable) 
prices in Japan. He concludes that specific costs are more distance elastic than ad-valorem costs, and 
that the presence of specific costs is the key element in the typical empirical observation of a 
positive link between quality and distance.  
 
These two papers on Japanese economy do not directly relate to our research questions, still they 
provide us valuable insights and analytical contributions.    
 
These are my summary and final comments. Again I thank you all participants for your serious 
discussions to deepen our understandings.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
1 He could not attend the conference because he got ill.  
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